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THE REAGAN COURT AND TITLE VII: A
COMMON-LAW OUTLOOK ON A
STATUTORY TASK
THEODORE

Y. BLUMOFF*

AND HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR.**

Seldom has a group of Supreme Court decisionsproduced as much
comment as the employment discrimination output of the 1989 Term.
So substantially did the opinions curtail the reach of the modern comprehensive employment discrimination statute, Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, that they inspiredpassage of the recently vetoed Civil
Rights Act of 1990. The Court grudgingly acquiesced in placing a persuasion burden on employers in cases of traditionalintentionaldiscrimination, but only when the plaintiff'sprimafacie evidence of a violation
is "direct." In the more controversialcase ofchallenges tofacially neutralpracticesshown to have disproportionateadverse impact, the Court
dramatically relaxed the employer defense. After analyzing the decisions, the authors conclude that the Court has been driven by a turn-ofthe-century, common-law approach to the distributionofscarce employment resources. This impulse, they contend, has blinded the Court's
new majority to alternativevisions of Title VII that are more consonant
with apparentlegislative intent and the Court's own prior decisions.
The authors agree that the Court has good reason to demand
greater refinement in the statisticalevidence necessary to establish a
primafacie adverse impact case, butfind that the Court'snew defensive
standardsdoom neutralpracticechallenges to failureunless the plaintiff
proves the functionalequivalent of unlawful motive. Although theirproposed alternative standards,designed to respond to the fortified prima
facie case, are more stringent than the Court's, they are less exacting
than those that had prevailed in several federal circuits. The authors
also propose to reinvigorate the traditionalintentional discrimination
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case by placing the risk of nonpersuasion on the employer when the
plaintiff'sprima facie proof of disparate treatment is "inferential" as
well as when it is "direct."
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I. INTRODUCTION

Speculating about the motivations of Supreme Court justices is often like
reading tea leaves: one has to be slightly off center to try, although try we invariably do. But occasionally, a group of decisions arrives in which the Court

seems to reveal its underlying theoretical premises rather clearly. As its 1989
term was ending, the Supreme Court handed down two important employment
discrimination decisions under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act1 that pro-

vided an occasion for examining its underlying premises. In Wards Cove Packing Company, Inc. v. Atonio2 and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,3 the Court dealt
with the inseparable issues of causation and trial procedure: when was an em-

ployer's decision made "because of" an impermissible criterion;4 who must

prove what, when, and how? Among the enduring results are procedural modi-

fications that affect substance in a type of litigation the Court's majority disfavors. Together the cases reveal many of the Reagan majority's assumptions
about ordering the American workplace and portend a difficult future for dis5
crimination's victims.

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1988).
2. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
3. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) states the following:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
The "because of" language does not raise an issue of causation, at least as it is normally understood in traditional tort law; rather, the issue is one of motivation. The implications of that distinction are explored infra text accompanying notes 250-72.
5. For a powerful description of the societal impact of discrimination, see Lawrence, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
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Beyond its Title VII opinions and the roadblocks there erected, the Court's
1989 term will be remembered as one in which a much heralded new conservative majority created numerous substantive dead-ends for the victims of job-related (and other) discrimination. 6 In Will v. Michigan Department of State
Police,7 the Court declared that a state was not a statutory "person" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (1988), the major post-Civil War civil rights
legislation. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union8 upheld a 1976 interpretation of
a second Reconstruction civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. section 1981 (1988). The
Patterson decision granted litigants recourse against private racial discrimination
in contracting, but did so in a way that suggested that the 1976 interpretation
was erroneous. At the same time, the Patterson majority rendered a crabbed,
even counterintuitive interpretation of the scope of that statute.9 Finally the
Court canonized a previous plurality's narrow construction of section 1983 for
establishing municipal liability in Jett v. Dallas Independent School District.10
6. Earlier in the 1989 term the Supreme Court handed down two important decisions involving the scope of the nation's civil rights legislation. First, it held that a municipality could not
implement a voluntary affirmative action plan without showing a compelling governmental interest
predicated on a detailed finding of past discrimination. City of Richmond v. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706,
723-30 (1989). Croson prompted an incredulous response from former Atlanta Mayor Andrew
Young. Young criticized the Supreme Court's requirement that cities document discrimination as a
condition precedent to upholding minority preferences in hiring and contracts. He argued that
maintaining the kind of records necessary to prove past discrimination, and confronting business and
civic leaders with such proof as a condition for moving forward with new preference programs, was
not only very "unsouthern," but was a surefire way to kill efforts to put the past behind us and move
forward. Address by Mayor Andrew Young, Mercer University School of Law (March 9, 1989).
For an excellent and less partisan, yet personal response to Croson, see Williams, The Obliging Shell:
An Informal Essay on FormalEqual Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128 (1989).
Somewhat later in the same term the Court decided a general procedural question that has
profound implications for civil rights litigation-past, present, and future. See Martin v. Wilks, 109
S. Ct. 2180 (1989), which held that a group of white firefighters, who had not been parties to an
earlier consent decree entered into between a city and minorities who had suffered discrimination in
public employment, could collaterally attack that decree. See also Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2738 (1989) (refusing to award attorneys' fees against losing
intervenors who sought to protect bargained-for seniority rights because such intervenors were "particularly welcome").
7. 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989).
8. 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2371 (1989) ("Whether Runyon's interpretation of § 1981 as prohibiting
racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts is right or wrong as an
original matter, it is certain that it is not inconsistent with the prevailing sense of justice in this
country."). See also Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2710-22 (1989) (restricting
§ 1981 suits against public school systems).
The Court, on its own motion, asked the parties in Patterson a rather routine race discrimination case, to brief the question of whether it should overturn Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prevents a private school from denying admission to a black
child solely on the basis of race). Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369.
9. The implications of Patterson are counterintuitive. The question, broadly stated, was
whether the defendant's post-hiring, racially discriminatory conduct accorded plaintiff "the same
right... to make and enforce contracts.., as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The
Court, eschewing the normal interpretive approach that emphasizes legislative history, held that the
statute reaches issues related only to the formation of contracts, and not to their performance. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372-73. The implication of the Court's opinion is that the overt and honest
bigot may be liable for discrimination under § 1981 because he betrays his true feelings at formation,
but the closet bigot who withholds his true feelings until after formation may not. It is at best
counterintuitive to suggest that the Reconstruction Congress had such a purpose in mind when it
passed the statute.
10. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). The prior decision was City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 124-31 (1988) (plurality opinion setting out guidelines for determining liability based on munici-
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All three cases arose in the context of employment discrimination; their reach,
however, easily extends beyond the workplace.
This Article focuses on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Wards Cove Packing
Company, Inc. v. Atonio, and a Wards Cove precursor from the previous term,
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust." These decisions, in the larger context of
the 1989 term, suggest that the Reagan Court takes its cues from two policy
axioms that flourished early "this century and collectively preclude the attainment of standard labor market equality, equality of opportunity, and equality of
result.12 The first axiom is neutrality. The government should leave private
contracting parties to their personal preferences. The second axiom is cut from
the same cloth. The economy functions best with minimal government interference. These baselines dictate a limited judicial role; even in the face of contrary
legislative mandates, federal courts ought to minimize government intrusion to
the extent that statutory construction and objective rules permit. Thus, activist
13
legislation like Title VII runs headlong into powerful contrary baselines.
Price Waterhouse illustrates the problem in the context of "disparate treatment," the Title VII proof mode that implements the equal opportunity model
which the Court professes to embrace unreservedly. Piecing together four separate opinions, one can conclude that the Court held that only "substantial"
prima facie evidence of illicit intent underlying the challenged employment decision will shift to the defendant the ultimate burden 14 of showing that it would
pal "policy" and "policy makers"). The Praprotnikguidelines were adopted in the majority opinion
in Jett, 109 S. Ct. at 2723-24.
11. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
12. The work of Professor Cass Sunstein has led us to these conclusions. See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
13. The term "baselines" is borrowed from Sunstein, supra note 12, at 876. By "baselines"
Sunstein means that judicial interpretations of constitutional text invariably occur within the framework of individual justice's sense of controlling socio-legal values. In discussing the particular context of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Sunstein finds the common law as the controlling
context. See also Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129
(1986) (evaluating alternative rationale for government intervention in private markets and affairs).
We return to this topic infra Part VI.
14. Because the courts have been so imprecise in their use of the terms "burdens of proof,"
"inference," and "presumption," it might be helpful to clarify the basic terminology. As used in this
Article, the omnibus phrase "burden of proof" consists of the burden of producing evidence (the
"initial" burden, the burden of production, or the burden of going forward) as well as the burden of
persuasion (the "ultimate" burden or risk of nonpersuasion). See, e.g., G. WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 301.2, at 47 (1987). The initial burden of producing evidence requires the party
on whom it lies to convince the judge that she has offered sufficient evidence to submit the issue to a
fact-finder "who could rationally conclude that the fact exists." E. IMWINKELRIED, COURTROOM
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 2903, at 796 (1987). In contrast, the ultimate burden of persuasion requires
the party who carries it to convince the fact-finder that her version of the fact is more likely true than
her opponent's. Id. § 2914, at 805-06.
By "inference" we refer to a conclusion about the existence of a fact that the fact-finder is
permittedbut not requiredto make. Given the production of sufficient evidence of fact 0, the trier of
fact may infer fact P. In contrast, the term "presumption" requires the fact-finder to believe P in
light of sufficient proof of 0, unless the party against whom the presumption operates rebuts it.
Thus, the creation of a presumption serves two purposes in Title VII litigation: it relieves the party
in whose favor it operates of producing direct evidence of the presumed fact, and requires at a
minimum that the party against whom it operates come forward with evidence to meet or rebut the
presumed fact. Belton, Burdens of Pleadingand Proofin Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of
ProceduralJustice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1221-22 (1981); Mndez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VIIDisparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1129, 1143-44 (1980). On the
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have reached the same decision for independent, lawful reasons. Yet given the
real-world prevalence of mixed motives and the limitations placed on this
"same-decision" principle by three of the four opinions, the decision probably
has the net effect of relieving most employers from making that showing in intentional discrimination situations. Plaintiffs will retain the ultimate burden of
persuasion in most cases.

Watson and Wards Cove cast all the more doubt on the future of disparate

impact analysis,15 the far more controversial Title VII proof mode that seeks
equality of result. By its very nature disparate impact analysis has been prob16
lematic. On the one hand, the legacy of discrimination, especially by race,
begets a desire to achieve outcome-oriented, redemptive justice, characterized by
the reality and not just the opportunity for black representation. On the other
hand, there is a perceived unfairness in targeting the employer, at worst only the
last discriminator and at best not an intentional discriminator at all, as the locus
of this drive. In a sense, achieving population-proportionate employment representation for all protected groups across all job echelons erodes the due process
rights of the employer. 17 To counteract that possibility, the new majority rejects
the normative theory that gives content to impact analysis. The Court apparently has concluded either that recovery without a showing of intentional discrimination serves no useful public value or that the detriment to the economy
outweighs any incremental gain.
This Article explores the new majority's policy premises - its common-law
baselines - and demonstrates how they are revealed in seemingly technical but
practically dispositive questions of evidence. The Court's treatment of the causation conundrum, in particular its use of presumptions and its allocation of
burdens of proof, reshapes Title VII in that common-law image. Part II outlines
the primary strands of Title VII liability and the state of the law before Watson,
Wards Cove, and Price Waterhouse. Watson, Wards Cove, and Price Waterhouse
are then discussed in detail in Parts III, IV, and V, respectively.
Part VI identifies the new majority's baselines and premises, illustrating
their crucial role in the Court's constrictive revamping of Title VII. In Part VII,
we propose several measures in response to the changes wrought by the recent
decisions. We conclude, in agreement with the Court in Watson and Wards
Cove, that the plaintiff should be required to develop sound, statistically reliable
prima facie evidence of disparate impact, traceable to a specific practice. We

further conclude, however, that, given such powerful evidence of discriminatory
effect, the Court has unduly diluted the employer defense and improperly placed
the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff. In this connection we contend that the
relationship between burdens and presumptions under the federal rules generally, see FED. R. EVID.
301.
15. Disparate impact analysis is discussed and outlined in general terms infra text accompanying notes 51-94.
16. Special problems associated with gender discrimination are taken up in some detail infra
text accompanying notes 323-67.
17. To the extent possible, we intend to steer clear of the affirmative action issue and the perception that it violates the fourteenth amendment by victimizing individuals not responsible for dis-

crimination. See, eg., A. BicKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT 133 (1975).
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employer should be required to persuade that its chosen practice manifestly correlates with one or more important elements of the job in question. Further, and
also contrary to the view of the Court, we suggest that the plaintiff should be

able to rebut the employer's showing simply by offering evidence of an alternative practice that substantially accomplishes the employer's original business
objectives with less discriminatory impact, even at somewhat greater cost. On
this question, too, the employer should bear the burden of persuasion, as it pos-

sesses superior information about the relative inefficacy or expense of the plaintiff's proffered alternative.
We would also refortify the model of disparate treatment. At least four

members of the Price Waterhouse Court would unjustifiably relieve employers
from carrying the "same-decision" burden in the most common type of mixed
motive case, where the evidence of unlawful motive is inferential. We argue that
this employer persuasion burden should be triggered by evidence satisfying any
of the accepted modes of proving disparate treatment, inferential or direct. Further, we suggest a refraining of the mixed motive question. Instead of asking
hypothetically whether an employer already found to have acted on an unlawful
motive would have reached the same decision absent that motive, a court should
inquire whether the employer treated employees in the protected group like
other employees under similar circumstances.
Finally, we consider to what degree the Civil Rights Act of 199018 would
effectuate these proposals. We conclude that it does reinvigorate significantly
the disparate treatment case by enlarging the circumstances of intentional discrimination under which employers must shoulder the "same-decision" burden
announced by Price Waterhouse. We also conclude, however, that it falls well
short of the more publicized aim of restoring the disparate impact case to its preWatson and Wards Cove state.
II. THE Two STRANDS OF TITLE VII
Title VII contains a general prohibition against discrimination that affects
terms and conditions of employment "because of... race, color, religion, sex or
national origin." 19 It also proscribes conduct that "would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect" an individual's job status. 20 It is not surprising, given the two categories of
18. S.2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. S9966 (daily ed. July 15, 1990) (President
Bush vetoed the Act on Oct. 22, 1990; the Senate failed by one vote to override the veto on Oct. 24,

1990).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). The full text of the statute is set out supra note 4. For
simplicity's sake, this Article will refer to all impermissible discrimination as if it were based on race
or sex.
20. Id. For a discussion of whether Congress intended disparate impact recovery, compare
Rose, Subjective Employment Practice: Does the DiscriminatoryImpact Analysis Apply?, 25 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 63, 77-81 (1988) (arguing that § 703(a)(2) was designed to deal with unintentional,
institutional discrimination) and Recent Developments, Title VI's Application of ImpactAnalysis to
Subjective Employment Criteria,24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 264, 269 (1989) (agreeing with Rose)
with Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact
Definition of Employment Discriminationand a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDus. REL. L.J.
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forbidden conduct, that the statute has generated two basic theories of recovery:
21
disparate treatment and disparate impact.

Disparate treatment prohibits employers from treating individuals differently because of race or sex. 22 Disparate impact refers to an adverse effect on
members of a protected group resulting from an employer policy or practice.
Prevailing orthodoxy holds that two different conceptions of equality animate
the two theories of recovery. The treatment model is impelled by equal opportunity, the impact model by equal result or achievement. 23 In recent years the

Court has sharply retreated from the equal achievement approach and only begrudgingly given effect to equal opportunity.
A.

Disparate Treatment

1. Theoretical Basis
As the Court has noted, disparate treatment, discrimination rooted in animus, is "'the most easily understood type of discrimination.' "24 One must
prove that the employer intended to treat the employee differently than other
members of the work force and did so because of the employee's race or sex. 25
The employer's motive is key.
The treatment prohibition has both theoretical and practical consequences
that warrant brief description. The concept of merit supports the mandate that
businesses make employment decisions without reference to impermissible criteria.26 As Professor Fiss explains, the treatment rationale rests on the unfairness
of using a criterion such as race or gender that is neither predictive of productivity nor wholly within any individual's control.2 7 Although market incentives
429, 481 (1985) (concluding that there is no basis in the legislative history for disparate impact
recovery).

21. We do not mean to say that the language of §§ 703(a)(1) and (a)(2) supports the two theories
of recovery, despite the suggestion of Justice Rehnquist. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 137 (1976). There are a host of reasons for rejecting his suggestion. See 1 C. SULLIVAN,
M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 4.2.1.2 (2d ed. 1988).
22. It is important to emphasize that to recover for disparate treatment the plaintiff need not
show discrimination. Rather, the plaintiff must show that she was "treated" differently because of
her sex. 1 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 21, at 248-49.
23. Comment, When DoctrinesCollide" DisparateTreatment,DisparateImpact, and Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1757 (1989) (citing Fallon & Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of RacialJustice, 1984 Sup. CT. REV.1, 10-26); Fiss, A Theory of
FairEmployment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 237-40 (1971). Fiss notes that finding a basis for
impact analysis in the statutes language is troublesome. Id. at 240.
24. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (O'Connor, J., plurality)
(quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)).
25. Two commentators describe the plaintiff's case in four parts: 1. P was treated differently, 2.
than a person of another race or sex, 3. the employer intended the discrimination, and 4. the employer's intent caused P's different treatment. Sullivan, Zimmer & Richards, The Structureof Title
VII Individual Disparate Treatment Litigation: Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, Inferences of
Discrimination,and Burdens of Proof,9 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 28 (1986).
26. 1 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 21; See generally Fallon, To Each
According to His Ability, From None According to His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Laip of
Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U.L. REV. 815 (1974) (analyzing particular systems of merit distribution
and the implications of each); Fiss, supra note 23, at 240-44.
27. Fiss, supra note 23, at 240-44.
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eliminate a large measure of nonproductive decisionmaking, our history, our
commitment to equality, and our appreciation of human nature leave us without
warrant to rely upon the marketplace entirely. 28 As long as an employer uses
race or gender as an arbitrary basis for employment decisions and the court
indulges an employer's "taste" 29 for discrimination, the court denies the individual's opportunity to succeed.30 At the same time, the individual's autonomy

is, at least at a formal level, denied; similarly, her individual responsibility is
undermined. 3 1 Individual autonomy and responsibility course deeply through

the veins of American culture.3 2 When an employer intentionally refuses an
individual that opportunity, he strikes a blow to our ethos and disregards a more
33
objective, rational and moral way of ordering the workforce.
2.

Disparate Treatment Before Price Waterhouse

The individual plaintiff's 34 prima facie case of disparate treatment in hiring

or promotion reflects the foregoing conception. At least before the 1989 term,
few questioned the appropriate trial procedure in a treatment case. Plaintiff
could prove up her initial burden in one of two ways. If she has "direct" evi-

dence of intent to treat differently, she simply introduces it, and defendant responds accordingly.3 5 Plaintiff must persuade the trial court that the employer

intended the different treatment. More often than not, however, such evidence
is unavailable. In that case plaintiff must prove the critical inquiry, defendant's
intent, circumstantially and in stages. Plaintiff satisfies the less onerous prima
facie burden in this variant by producing evidence that she (i) belonged to a

protected group, (ii) applied and was qualified for a job or promotion, or contin28. G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 13-18 (2d ed. 1971); Fallon, supranote
26, at 844-45; Fiss, supra note 23, at 249-52.
29. This "taste" is one explanation for employment discrimination. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 27.1 (3d ed. 1986).
30. Fallon, supra note 26, at 835; Fiss, supra note 23, at 237.
31. Fallon, supra note 26, at 834; Fiss, supra note 23, at 241.
32. Fallon traces this to the Declaration of Independence. See Fallon, supra note 26, at 835-37.
It is worth noting, as Sanford Levinson points out, that when Lincoln began the Gettysburg Address
with reference to "[flour score and seven years," he brought the Declaration's ascription of equality
into the constitutional tradition. S. LEviNSON, CONSTrrUtIONAL FArm 139-40 (1988).
33. Here, of course, "objective" is measured in terms of the merit principle itself. If treating
people equally in the workforce is the goal, discrimination on the basis of race or sex is, by definition,
objectively irrational. Moreover, there is virtually no morally defensible reason for discrimination
on the basis of sex or race. Fallon & Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial
Justice, 1984 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 1, 13.
34. Unless otherwise stated in the text, when this Article refers to a disparate treatment case,
we are referring to one brought by an individual. Later in this Article we discuss "systemic" disparate treatment cases, in which a class of plaintiffs alleges that differential treatment was the employer's routine operating procedure. See, eg., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See infra notes
186-91 and accompanying text.
35. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). For example, if the
employer were foolish enough to say that he was discharging an employee because of her gender, the
trial court would find that statement to be direct evidence of discriminatory intent. The definition
and importance of a direct evidence requirement in Price Waterhouse is taken up infra at texts accompanying notes 297-300, 309, 313-22.
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ued to desire retention, and (ii) was nonetheless rejected. 36
Establishing a prima facie circumstantial case achieves two interim litigation goals: surviving a motion to dismiss and placing the burden of production
on defendant. Of immediate consequence to the plaintiff is the avoidance of
involuntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. 37 That fate is
averted because meeting the prima facie case" 'raises an inference of discrimination' "; the trial court "'presume[s] these [prima facie] acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on consideration of impermissible
factors.' "38 This inference is rather weak. The prima facie case, far from establishing with any conviction that intentional discrimination was likely, really only
eliminates two or three common nondiscriminatory explanations for the plaintiff's rejection. 39 Nevertheless, this inference moves the initial burden of going
forward from plaintiff to the employer, who must produce evidence of "a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the different treatment. The defendant's
evidence must "raise[ ] a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated
to rebut the presumption of
against the plaintiff." 4 Should the defendant 4fail
1
discriminatory intent, the plaintiff will prevail.
Title VII's very existence as a legislative statement of social policy demands
this presumption. When observed fact 0 is proved, fact P is presumed, at least
provisionally.42 Often overlooked is that the act of choosing a presumption requires a statement of preference for "which of the two states of affairs one finds
more desirable." 43 Particular presumptions "must be accepted or rejected because of the desirability or undesirability of the states of affairs they will produce, rather than on the basis of their own merits."'44 Presumptions, then,
necessarily reflect normative decisions. In Title VII the prescription is to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, but that goal leaves open critical overrid36. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1003 n.4 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The Court recently reaffirmed this inferential
proof mode in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2378 (1989). A fourth element

mentioned in these decisions-that the position remained open and the employer sought other similarly qualified applicants after plaintiff's rejection-has been considered inessential when inapplicable to the plaintiff's circumstances. See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2378 & n.7. The inferential proof
mode assumes that plaintiff is unable to produce "direct" evidence of discriminatory intent. Trans

WorldAirlines, 469 U.S. at 121. Until Price Waterhouse, it also assumed that the employer took the

challenged decision with a single motive, prohibited or not.
37. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-56; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Employment discrimi-

nation cases are nonjury affairs; hence, the fate is involuntary dismissal. Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988), which borrows Title VII analysis, jury trials
are available. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1812 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
38. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Fumco Constr. Co. v. Wa-

ters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)) (noting that the prima facie case eliminates the possibility that the
applicant was rejected because she was unqualified or there was no available job).
39. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
40. Id. at 254-55.
41. Id. at 255.
42. E.g., E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342 (3rd ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]; Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WAsH. L. REV. 255, 255-56 (1937); M6ndez, supra note 14, at
1142-43.
43. Katzner, Presumptions of Reason and Presumptionsof Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 89, 91 (1973).
44. Id.
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ing and interrelated issues. What kinds of discrimination should be eliminated,
how, and at what cost? That presumptions mirror social values does not mean
that only normative considerations apply to our decision to create presumptions.
It does insist, however, that public values are a necessary component of that
45
decision.
If the employer comes forward with sufficient evidence to establish a believable, nondiscriminatory purpose for the different treatment, thereby rebutting
the presumption of intent created by the prima facie case, then the plaintiff, who
bears the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion throughout, still has the opportunity to
prove that the defendant's proffered explanation is a pretext for invidious discrimination. As the Court has stated, once the employer provides evidence of
nondiscrimination, the trial court no longer needs to presume discriminatory
animus. At this point, plaintiff bears both the burden of coming forward with
pretextual evidence and the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion should the fact-finder
46
remain in equipoise.
The Court's initial attempts to clarify the respective cases-in-chief in a disparate treatment challenge were unedifying. For example, in two leading cases,
McDonnell Douglas v. Green47 and Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine,48 the Court left open the issue of whether the defendant was required
to rebut a prima facie case with evidence of its own, or whether the defendant
could obtain a favorable judgment through effective cross-examination of plain45. In practice, when courts make prejudgmental determinations that they will presume fact P
in light of O's proof in order to advance the fact-finder's deliberations, they have undertaken a threepart analysis, which considers inductive-probabalistic and procedurally determinative factors along
with value-related matters. See Ullman-Margalit, On Presumption, 80 J. PHIL. 143, 157-62 (1983),
on which this analysis rests.
The probability consideration was adverted to specifically in International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324(1977). By proving up a prima facie treatment case, plaintiff has demonstrated "at least that his rejection did not result from the two most common legitimate reasons on
which an employer might rely to reject a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications
or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought." Id. at 358 n.44; accordWatson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1003 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
The presumption also serves as a procedurally useful device in the trial court's deliberative
process. The presumption of P is provisional, its command endures only in the absence of non-P's
proof by the party against whom the presumption operates. MCCORMICK, supra note 42, at 950-51;
J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON SENSE 183 (1947); M6ndez, supra note

14, at 1142-43; Ullman-Margalit, supra, at 162. The Court has made clear that if facts are admitted
into evidence tending to prove the existence of non-P, the presumption is lost; the court is no longer
mandated to presume P. However, the trier of fact is still permitted to infer P, depending upon the
strength of all the evidence in the case. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
255 (1981). Thus the necessary effect is, at least, to require the party against whom the presumption
operates to come forward with proof of non-P; at most, the party against whom it operates may bear
the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion of P's nonexistence. See supra note 14; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
362; Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 773 n.32 (1976). McCormick notes that "[a]
presumption shifts the burden of producing evidence, and may assign the burden of persuasion as
well." MCCORMICK, supra note 42, at 968. The Court has often noted that the burden shift was
intended "'progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.'" Watson, 487 U.S. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at
255 n.8).
46. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
47. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
48. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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tiff's witness. 49 Moreover, the Court bandied about the terms "burden of

proof" and "burden of proving" as though they were unified concepts having
only one shared meaning. In fact, the burdens differ, and the concepts those
terms embrace are notoriously ambiguous. 50 Finally, all of the Court's disparate
treatment efforts before Price Waterhouse were premised on a single decision-

directing motive. Either the employer made the decision because of race, or he
did not. In the real world, such decisions are rarely the product of a single

criterion. They are generally mixed, based in part on an impermissible standard
and in part on perceived business requirements.
B. DisparateImpact
1. Theoretical Basis
In the disparate treatment case, the conceptual analogy that controls is a
footrace. 5 1 By making color-blind hiring decisions, employers assure members
of the protected group an equal place in the race, an equal opportunity. Everyone starts at the same line. But the footrace analogy suffers a fate common to
analogies: it neglects the question of whether all racers in fact start at the same
line with the same chances of success. The problem for the protected racers is
that the American race began centuries ago. The newly protected racers, therefore, begin with a disadvantage that survives to this day. Simply requiring an
equal opportunity, the theory states, will not eliminate the headstart enjoyed by
majority members. In other words, "[t]o shift from a system of group discrimination to a system of individual performance is to perpetuate the effects of past
discrimination into the present and the future."'5 2 Protected racers, handicapped by centuries of ill treatment, may never catch up with the pack.
Consequently, for years many ardent supporters of our antidiscrimination
laws both on and off the Court have argued for a recovery theory in addition to
and broader than the equal opportunity model. They have championed some
form of equal achievement or result with the goal of banning practices that
would prevent protected group representation in the workforce from resembling
49. Belton, supra note 14, at 1239-47; M6ndez, supra note 14, at 1129-31. Burdine did, however, clarify the confusion over one issue. In McDonnell Douglas,the Court held that when plaintiff
proves up the prima facie treatment case, the burden of going forward moves to the employer to
"articulate" a nondiscriminatory reason for the treatment. 411 U.S. at 802. The Court tried unsuccessfully to define the "articulation" requirement in Board of Trustees of Keene State v. Sweeney,

439 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1978), and Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978). It succeeded, however, in Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56 (requiring the defendant to produce evidence of a

non-discriminatory reason, rather than simply rely on its answer or argument of counsel).
50. M6ndez, supra note 14, at 1129 n.2. See supra note 14 for a discussion of the respective

definitions.
51. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICnRS, supra note 21, at 35; Fiss, supra note 23, at
237.
52. L. THUROW, THE ZERO SUM SOCIETY 188-89 (1980) (quoted in C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER
& P. RICHARDS, supra note 21, at 36). Professor Horwitz writes in a similar fashion and notes that

the "attempt to create a radical distinction between the supposedly legitimate goal of equality of
opportunity and the supposedly illegitimate goal of equality of condition, confronts the obvious
problem that in a substantially unequal society it is impossible to produce real equality of opportunity." Horwitz, The Jurisprudenceof Brown and the Dilemmas ofLiberalism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L.

L. REv. 599, 608 (1979).
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its members' concentration in the relevant population within or outside the
workforce. The resulting proof mode is styled "disproportionate adverse impact," or "disparate impact," or simply "impact."
If employer intent is the key to disparate treatment recovery, then motive,
at least according to the pre-Watson conventional wisdom, is irrelevant in a case
of disproportionate impact.5 3 The concern in an impact case is with the result of
an employer's selection device, not with differential or unlawfully motivated
treatment. Accordingly, the typical impact plaintiff must make a different evidentiary showing. The prima facie impact case consists of a statistical demonstration that a facially neutral employment criterion-for example, a test,
education requirement, interview technique, or reliance on nepotism-had a significantly disproportionate adverse impact or effect on those members of the
plaintiff's protected group who encountered it.5 4 It is critical that plaintiff attack a "practice," and show that it had an impact on her, independent of the
"bottom line" or "overall" representation of her group in the "at issue" jobs for
which the practice screens. Correlatively, relief from practices shown to have
disproportionate adverse impact flows only to those members of the plaintiff's
protected group who have shown that they were deprived of a term or condition
of employment, or an employment opportunity, as a result of the practice. No
assumption arises that all members of a protected group denied "at issue" jobs
suffered unlawful discrimination merely because some of them were eliminated
from the race by application of a practice that had disproportionate adverse
impact on the group. By the same token, that the protected group fared well in
its representation at the bottom line will not preclude recovery by individual
members of the group who were screened out by a practice resulting in disparate
55
impact.
If the plaintiff demonstrates prima facie the significant disproportionate impact of a device or practice, the employer must produce evidence that the chal56
The underlying
lenged practice satisfies some legitimate business need.
that, notwithis
simply
case
rationale of the employer defense to the prima facie
plaintiff bewhich
to
group
standing its disproportionate adverse impact on the
does not
need
longs, an employment practice that serves a legitimate business
57
Finally,
constitute discrimination "because of" a protected characteristic.
53. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The act proscribes not only overt

discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.").
54. See, eg., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (Title VII prohibits neutral practices that have a "significantly discriminatory pattern"); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1989)

[hereinafter Uniform Guidelines] (adverse impact inferred for enforcement purposes when an em-

ployer practice selects a group defined by race, sex, religion, or national origin at a rate less than
80% of the rate of another such group with the greatest success in surmounting that practice). See
Shoben, Differential Pass-FailRates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proofunder Title VII, 91

HARv. L. REV. 793 (1978).
55. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 81-91 on the history of this issue before Watson and
Wards Cove.
57. See L. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 49-53 (2d ed. 1988); Note, Business
Necessity: JudicialDualism and the Search for Adequate Records, 15 GA. L. Rlv. 376, 385 (1981).
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even if the employer does proffer such evidence, the challenger may still prevail
by persuading the court that the employer's business need could have been met
with an alternative practice that would have had a less burdensome impact on
the protected group.5 8
A fundamental paradox 59 underlies the disparate impact approach, which
appears to equate the ordinarily discordant notions of neutrality and discrimination. 60 How can an employer, using facially neutral employment criteria, be
deemed to discriminate on the basis of race or sex? 61 First, although inherent

bias in testing is a demonstrable fact, 6 2 its non-neutrality in any given instance
represents an empirical conclusion that demands verification. 63 Moreover, how
society, not to mention the courts, ought to react when biased tests show a
strong positive correlation coefficient with workplace traits the majoritarian culture values" is debatable. 65 The text of Title VII reflects this uncertainty. As
58. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (O'Connor, J., plurality); id. at 1005-06 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). Note, Business Necessity under
Title VII ofthe CivilRights Act of.1964: A No-A iternativeApproach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 101-02 (1974).
59. Fiss, supra note 23, at 297; Willborn, The DisparateImpact Model ofDiscrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 799, 804 (1985).
60. See eg., Fiss, supra note 23, at 297; Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Raclal
Discrimination,125 U. PA. L. Rv. 540, 556-57 (1977).
61. Gdggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), shed little' light on this question. The
Court wrote that "[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 430. Whether the Court was employer specific in its
reference to "freeze" or not is unclear. Does the "status quo" refer specifically to the situation at
this particular plant because of its history, or more generally to the inability of socially disadvantaged minorities to grasp initially or advance beyond the bottom rung? Moreover, if, as the Court
held, this particular employer's intent was in fact neutral, arguing that the test is a surrogate for an
adjudicated finding of intent is difficult.
62. The point is that some tests implicitly measure majoritarian cultural values in a way that,
by definition, operate to the detriment of minorities. See Clark, What is Your Tolerance ofAmbiguity?, 4 LEARNING & L. 12, 15 (1977); Linn, Test Bias and the Predictionof Grades in Law School, 27
J. LEGAL ED. 293, 294 (1975); White, Culturally Biased Testing and PredictiveInvalidity: Putting
Them on the Record, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 89, 108-14 (1979) (reviewing the social science
research in the area). The squalid history of racial bias in psychological testing is richly documented
in S.J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981) [hereinafter MISMEASURE OF MAN], and S.J.
GOULD, RacistArguments andIQ, in EvER SINCE DARWIN 243 (1977). Similar "scientific" efforts
at documenting the inferior intellectual capacity of women are discussed and explored in Gould,
Women's Brains, in THE PANDA's THUMB 152 (1980).
63. One of the few cases to recognize the problem of cultural bias in testing was Regents of
University of Californiav. Bakke, in which Justice Powell speculated in a footnote that racial classifications in the medical school admissions process, a process largely motivated by quantitative measures, could serve the goal of "fair appraisal of each individual's academic promise in the light of
some cultural bias in grading or testing procedures." 438 U.S. 265, 306 n.43 (1978). The point was
not raised, however, by the university. For a detailed discussion of the question, see White, supra
note 62, at 108-14.
64. For example, a test of verbal skills, by hypothesis related to a job requirement, may well
reflect white, middle-class values and language preferences. As a result, we can expect minorities to
perform less well. Such a finding creates a problem for disproportionate impact theory. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-48 (1976) (noting the problem impact theory would create for
legislative programs and avoiding it by holding that a denial of equal protection requires a finding of
intent); Fiss, supra note 23, at 257 (noting that businesses may use race as a "symptom of merit").

65. We do not mean to underestimate the nature of the problem, or even to state without
qualification that eliminating hierarchical preference is desirable. It may be that such preferences
(biases) are necessary constitutive elements of every society. See infra text accompanying notes 38687. But recognition of the phenomenon is a necessary precondition for dealing with those who fail to
conform to the hierarchy's dominant values.
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long as a "neutral," though inherently biased test is highly related to performance, it will not (absent a less discriminatory alternative) run afoul of the terms
of section 703(h) of Title VII, which permits the use of tests that are not
"designed, intended or used to discriminate." 66 But the word "used," as distinguished from "designed" or "intended," may connote liability predicated entirely on effects and thus appears to point to equal achievement as an ultimate
Title VII objective. On this reading section 703(h) posits protected groups historically disadvantaged relative to "unprotected" groups 67 in their attempts to
survive non-neutral practices. One could then conclude that a test or practice,
although facially neutral, violates Title VII if, in operation, it is non-neutral,
unless the employer offers a business justification.
Disparate impact analysis represents a compromise between economic
equality in the abstract and some relatively benign strategy for achieving that
aim. 6 8 For example, equal treatment may, with sufficient time, achieve equal
result. That empirical relationship, however, is at best doubtful; too many resisting forces may already exist. 69 On the other hand, disparate impact analysis
is partially incompatible with the principle of merit. The basic principle of
color-blindness 70 may obstruct the goal of equal achievement. The incompatibility creates the persistent fear that equality of result may demand what many
see as pernicious and even illegal activity. If workplace representation roughly
approximating relevant demographics is the goal, some liberty with the colorblindness principle may be required. 71 That liberty is, of course, troublesome,
because preferential treatment can be interpreted as the very conduct Title VII is
72
designed to prevent: discrimination on account of race or gender.
2.

Disparate Impact From Griggs To Watson

Given this underlying theoretical tension, it is not surprising that impact
analysis has proven resistant to coherent judicial elaboration. Indeed the confusion can be traced to the seminal decision that first articulated the impact case,
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). Judicial creation of a job-relatedness defense constitutes a
recognition that inherent bias per se does not violate § 703(h), despite its pernicious effects.

67. In fact, an "individual" member of any race, religion, gender, or national origin has standing to assert a Title VII claim provided she contrasts her situation with that of members of a different group defined by the same characteristic. See, eg., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273 (1976) (race).
68. Rutherglen, DisparateImpact under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73
VA. L. REV. 1297, 1316 (1987).
69. Fiss, supra note 23, at 238.
70. As Fiss points out, the principle is traceable to Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson, in which Harlan stated: "[In view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896); see

Fiss, supra note 23, at 235.
71. L. THUROW, supra note 52; Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 22 RuTGERs L. REv. 465, 489-92 (1968); Fiss, supra notd 23, at 240.
72. See, eg., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 658 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 196 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); A. Bicdi.L,
supra note 17, at 132-33.
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Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 73
Duke Power had a history of racial discrimination. For years it openly and
deliberately kept its black employees at the bottom of its labor pool. Before Title
VII was effective, however, it had abandoned those practices. 74 Despite abating
its intentionally discriminatory policies, the company still required a high school
diploma or successful completion of two facially neutral and objective "intelli75
gence" tests as a condition for most of its hiring and promotion decisions.
Those requirements tended to "freeze" into place intentionally discriminatory
employment practices and patterns that had the effect of keeping minority labor76
ers at the bottom of the employment ladder with little hope for advancement.
Although the practices were found not to have been adopted with invidious intent, they "operated to render ineligible a markedly disproportionate number of
Negroes." 7 7
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, declined to condemn
such practices out of hand. Instead, he wrote that "[t]he touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. 78 In its
concluding paragraphs, however, the Court suggested a substantive defensive
standard that is markedly more demanding than simple "job relatedness," but
less demanding than "necessity": "Congress has placed on the employer the
burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship
to the employment in question."' 79 In another phrasing of the business defense,
the Court observed that Congress had forbidden the use of test procedures "unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance." 80
This variety of verbal formulations-in ascending stringency, "related to
job performance," a "demonstrable" or "manifest" relationship, and strict "necessity" - announced in dictum' by the very opinion that declared the defense,
spawned ongoing confusion that lasted until Wards Cove. 82 For example, in its
73. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
74. Id. at 426-27, 428.
75. Id. at 427-28. For a highly critical view of the value of a single digit measure of "intelligence" as an accurate device for determining an individual's ability, see MISMEASURE OF MAN,
supra note 62.
76. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
77. Id. at 429.
78. Id. at 431.
79. Id. at 432.
80. Id. at 436. Under § 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers are free to use
professionally developed ability tests that are not "designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race." 42 U.S.C. § 2002e-2 (1988).
81. Gnggs, 401 U.S. at 431-42. On reflection each of these versions of the defense should have
been recognized as dictum. Duke Power, in response to the new, judge-made prima facie case,
offered no evidence whatsoever that the requirements were related to successful job performance. Id.
at 431-36. Accordingly, the Court could hold that the company had discriminated unlawfully "because of" race, notwithstanding its neutral or even benign intent, without ever having to decide what
justification countervails the showing of adverse impact.
82. For a summary of the variety of tests used by the lower courts, see Note, supra note 57, at
387-89. See also L. MoDjsKA, supra note 57, at 50-53 (providing overview of lower court's applications of seniority system tests).
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first neutral practices case after Griggs, Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody,8 3
the Court offered still another formulation: tests could be justified if "shown, by
professionally acceptable methods, to be 'predictive of or significantly correlated
with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the
job.' "84
In Albemarle the Court also devised the third potential stage of a disparate
impact case, a plaintiff's rebuttal. Despite an employer's showing of business
justification for its chosen practice, plaintiff could still prevail by establishing
that some alternative practice would serve the employer's needs with lesser discriminatory impact.85 But then, in Dothardv. Rawlinson,8 6 a sex discrimination
challenge to, among other things, Alabama's height and weight requirements for
guards at an all-male maximum security prison, the Court, again in dictum,
framed the inquiry as whether the practices were "necessary to safe and efficient
job performance," 87 or "essential to effective job performance." 8 8 Those formulations tilt heavily against the employer, since few if any practices will be "necessary" to both safety and efficiency. 89 Moreover, requiring any showing of
genuine "necessity," however defined, is inconsistent with the Albemarle notion
that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to identify a less discriminatory alternative.
By definition a practice that is literally "necessary" admits of no alternative. 90
Perhaps recognizing these difficulties, the Court on still another occasion swayed
in the opposite direction by permitting judicially noticed common experience or
common sense to substitute for any employer evidence of a link between the
challenged practice and a business need. 9 1
Finally, in Watson, the plurality moved as far toward the employer as it
could while retaining any job-relatedness requirement. It articulated a diluted
defensive standard of simple job relatedness indistinguishable in substance from
the easily established defense to a case of individual disparate treatment. 92 The
employer need only offer evidence that its practice is "normal and legitimate" or
"based on legitimate business reasons."' 93 Further, the challenged practice need
83. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 431 (quoting Uniform Guidelines, supra note 54, at § 1607.4(c)).
Id. at 425.
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
Id. at 332 n.14.
Id. at 331.
The same employment practice will rarely if ever be "necessary" to both "safety" and "effi-

ciency," which are ordinarily conflicting rather than complementary qualities. Frequently, efficiency

may be served by practices that exist at the very margin of safety.
90. Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021

(1982).
91. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (rejecting on intuitive grounds
the trial court's finding that there was no correlation between the Authority's prohibition on hiring
methadone treatment patients and job safety). Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (re-

jecting any requirement of business necessity or job relatedness for equal protection challenge to
testing that had a disproportionate impact on minority applicants to District of Columbia police

training course).
92. Watson, 487 U.S. at 986 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981), an individual treatment case).
93. Id. at 999, 998 (plurality opinion).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

only significantly serve those goals rather than be essential or even manifestly
related to them. 94 Examination of the Watson facts and opinions underscores
the significance of this new synthesis.
III.

WATSON:

SUBJECTIVE PRACTICES, CONSTRAINTS, AND

"FuNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE"

Clara Watson was a black teller at Fort Worth Bank and Trust who had
been passed over a number of times for promotion to supervisory positions.

Each time a position became available, a white was hired or promoted to fill it.
The bank had no formal evaluation standards for promotions; rather, it relied on
"the subjective judgment of supervisors who were acquainted with the candidates and with the nature of the jobs to be filled."'95 On one occasion Watson
was told, apparently unashamedly, that the position she sought was a "big responsibility with 'a lot of money... for blacks to have to count.' "96 Watson
filed a class action alleging racial discrimination in hiring, compensation, and
promotions. Although the class was subsequently decertified, she proceeded on
behalf of members of a former sub-class 97 and herself. Watson's individual
claim, the subject of the Supreme Court's opinion, was tried as a treatment case.
The trial court held that although Watson established a prima facie case, the
employer rebutted the presumption of intent and presented a legitimate, nonpretextual, nondiscriminatory reason for its promotion decisions. 98 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed this portion of the decision. 99
Two general types of issues occupied the Supreme Court's attention,
although only the first was certified. The certified question was whether challenges to the use of subjective employment criteria are triable as a treatment or
impact case. 1°° The Court unanimously agreed that plaintiffs could bring impact challenges to subjective practices. The Court's logic was compelling. If
plaintiffs were not allowed to challenge subjective practices through Griggsanalysis, employers could avoid Griggs simply by incorporating subjective techniques
into their employment decisionmaking practices. 10 1 Moreover, the Court stated
that unchecked subjective decisionmaking raises "the problem of subconscious
94. Id. at 998 (plurality opinion).

95. Id. at 982. On the nature of subjective standards and how they are used, see Blumrosen,
The Legacy of Griggs- Social Progressand Subjective Judgments, 63 CHi.-KENT L. Rn'V. 1, 17-24
(1987). The Bank employed criteria such as "personal appearance," "supervisor.co-worker rela-

tions," "quantity of work," and "accuracy of work." Although the last two categories appear amenable to quantification, they were apparently not quantified because the Bank provided no guidelines
to its supervisors. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 812 n.26 (5th Cir. 1986)

(Goldberg J.,
dissenting), vacated, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). See Note, DisparateImpact Challenges to
Subjective Employment Decisions, 102 HARv.L. REv. 308, 310 n.10 (1988).
96. Watson, 487 U.S. at 990 (quoting Appendix 7).

97. The trial court held that Watson failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in
hiring and dismissed the group claim. The issue was not reviewed by the Supreme Court. The
evidence presented on the class claim is summarized in Note, supra note 95, at 310.
98. Watson, 487 U.S. at 983-84.
99. Id. at 984 ("In order to avoid unfair prejudice to members of the class of black job applicants, however, the Court of Appeals vacated the portion of the judgment affecting them.").

100. Id. at 984-85 (summarizing the lower court conflicts).
101. Id. at 989-90, 1000.
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stereotypes and prejudices .. . [that] suggest a lingering form of the problem
10 2
Title VII was enacted to combat."'
But a plurality then argued that disparate impact analysis, at least as applied to subjective practices, must be reigned in by new "constraints" to "keep
[it] within its proper bounds."' 1 3 The plurality and the concurring justices split
over three aspects of the impact case- (1) how specifically plaintiff must identify
the challenged subjective practice, the plurality also stressing the desirability of
more reliable and powerful statistical measures of adverse impact;' ° 4 (2) the nature of the employer response to such a practice along the continuum of "job
relatedness" to "business necessity"; and (3) whether the quantum of the employer's burden on this question is production only or also persuasion. In the
end Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion (a) required the plaintiff to isolate a
particular employer practice or device and demonstrate through refined and reliable statistical evidence that this practice was the cause of a substantial adverse
impact on her group; (b) relaxed the defense, so that a practice is justifiable if it
"significantly" (rather than essentially) serves "legitimate" (rather than compel ling) business reasons; and (c) reallocated the risk of nonpersuasion on that defense to the plaintiff.10 5
These constraints were said to be necessary because the defendant feared,
and the plurality agreed, that "employers will [otherwise] find it impossible to
eliminate subjective criteria" and also find it "impossibly expensive to defend
such practices in litigation."' 1 6 As a result, the bank and the United States
argued, employers will adopt quotas to avoid liability.10 7 The plurality found
support for the quota fear in Congress's mandate in section 7030) that
"[n]othing contained in [Title VII] shall be interpreted to require an employer
... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or group because of... an
imbalance which may exist" between that group's representation in the employer's workforce and the relevant comparative labor pool.108 The plurality
interpreted that section as a congressional mandate to employers "not... to
avoid 'disparate impact' as such." 10 9 The new constraints are now discussed in
turn.
102. Id. at 990.
103. Id. at 994 (plurality opinion).
104. Id. at 995 n.3 (plurality opinion).
105. Id. at 994-97 (plurality opinion).
106. Id. at 992 (plurality opinion).
107. Id. (plurality opinion).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1988).
109. Watson, 487 U.S. at 992 (plurality opinion). The full scope of that mandate, and the change
it wrought in the law, can be appreciated only by reference to United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 205-06 (1979). There the Court, upholding a voluntary affirmative action plan, interpreted § 7030) as a mandate directed solely at the judiciary, opening the door to "voluntary affirmafive efforts to correct racial imbalances." Id.
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The Prima Facie Constraints
1. Isolating A Specific Practice

One of the new constraints requires the challenger to locate and identify the
particular subjective practice that caused a statistical disparity in the defendant's
employment rolls and then prove a causal relationship between the practice and
the disparity. To the extent that this burden increases the difficulty of establishing causation when the defendant uses a number of different practices, the requirement may present a serious problem for the impact plaintiff.
Recall that the typical impact case begins with plaintiff's statistical presentation showing that an employment practice has a disproportionate adverse effect on plaintiff's group, and that she was deprived of an employment
opportunity because of that practice. 110 When the employer conditions hiring
on a particular test score or other "objective" neutral practice, identifying and
isolating the causal relationship between the test and the disproportionate effect
is relatively easy, at least at a purely formal level."' By contrast, isolating the
effect of a subjective practice from among a number of practices presents difficult
and possibly insurmountable problems of proof. At the threshold, how does a
prospective employee even identify the subjective technique the employer may
have used? The prospective employee may know only that she was interviewed
for a job. Although she may piggyback on the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC) files if the inquiry moves forward, 112 there is reason to
suspect that the EEOC's investigation may not proceed to the point of discovery.
Plaintiff may not know early enough (to make the EEOC's preliminary litigation
process appear worth pursuing) that the employer hired by grapevine, practiced
nepotism, held informal conferences among supervisors to assess various employees' personal appearance, perceived "quickness," ability to articulate, and so
on. 113 Moreover, many subjective techniques may be ill defined. For instance,
110.

See supra text accompanying note 54.
111. The basic concept of validity asks whether an exam tests what it purports to test. Does it
do the job we think it does? W. SCOTT & M. WERTHEIMER, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGICAL
RESEARCH 142-49 (1962).
That the relationship between the test and its effect is an easy one to determine at a formal level
does not mean that the actual process of constructing a validation study is an easy one. In practice,
it can be quite costly and require elaborate and sophisticated statistical techniques. See Uniform
Guidelines, supra note 54, at §§ 1607.5 - .9, 1607.14. In fact, due to the fortuity that the Supreme
Court deferred to these exacting and complex guidelines in an early Title VII case, Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), validating tests has in practice proved more difficult than defending other "objective" practices, such as height or weight requirements and no-spouse rules,
under the more general standards of business necessity or job relatedness. But even before Wards
Cove lower courts began to dispense with literal compliance with the Guidelines. See Contreras v.
City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982).
After Wards Cove, defending a test, like any other "subjective" or "objective" practice, should be far
simpler for most employers.
112. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Associated Dry Goods Corp, 449 U.S. 590,
596-97 (1981).
113. Note the potential difficulty for the prospective employee, unaided by the EEOC, when it
comes to complying with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the extent of

required prefiling investigation varies with the circumstances (see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
which requires a "reasonable inquiry"), in some cases no amount of investigation is possible without
the help of the EEOC. Certainly the prospective employer has no prefiling obligations; in fact, one
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one of the bank's employees in Watson testified that she was given no guidance
at all for making hiring and promotion decisions. 114 These practical problems
in isolating undefined criteria and demonstrating their significantly disproportionate impact did not concern the plurality.1 15
2.

Reliably Demonstrating Statistical Adverse Impact

The Watson plurality also observed that the demonstration of disproportionate adverse impact must be made through "statistical evidence of a kind and
degree sufficient" to tie the exclusion of protected group members to the practice
in question.' 16 The disparities must be "sufficiently substantial" to raise the inference of causation. 117 In the accompanying note the plurality implied that
EEOC's own measure of disproportionate adverse impact for internal enforcement purposes - the success rate of plaintiff's protected group in passing the
test or surmounting some other employment barrier must be less than eighty

percent of the success rate of the group with the highest rate - is inadequate.
While acknowledging the lack of consensus on "any alternative mathematical
standard," the plurality referred approvingly to the far more rigorous "standard
deviation" analysis used to signify gross, long-lasting underrepresentation of a
1
protected class in cases alleging systemic disparate treatment. 8
By suggesting that the standard deviation formula would be preferable to
EEOC's eighty percent yardstick, the Court confuses, respectively, a measure of
systemic intentional discrimination with a measure of the disproportionate adverse impact of a single employment practice. "Systemic disparate treatment,"
the residue of a number of individually discriminatory decisions, is evidenced by
a gross underrepresentation of a protected group relative to the incidence one
would expect based on its members' interest, availability, and qualifications.
Unlike the impact case, it is predicated on a showing of intentional discrimination. In the systemic treatment case, all members of the protected group denied
hire or promotion to the job level during the period when the protected group
was found to be grossly underrepresented are presumptively entitled to remedies, regardless of which employer practice or conduct led to their exclusion."19
By contrast, relief in the impact case is limited to those plaintiffs excluded by the
particular practice shown to have had disproportionate adverse impact.
The Court may be right when it suggests that the EEOC's eighty percent
can imagine without difficulty that an inquiry from an individual who has been refused employment
sets off alarm bells and efforts to cover tracks. It comes as no surprise, then, that a large percentage
of sanctions are falling on pro se civil rights litigants and that commentators have expressed fear that
Rule 11 is "chilling" antidiscrimination litigation. See E. IMWINKELRIED & T. BLUMOFF, PRETRIAL DISCOvERY: STRATEGY & TAcTIcS § 13:10, at 94-95 (Supp. 1989).
114. Watson, 487 U.S. at 977 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
115. See Comment, supra note 23, at 1782.
116. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 (plurality opinion).
117. Id. at 995 (plurality opinion).
118. Id. at 995 n.3 (plurality opinion) (citing, inter alia, Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) and International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977), both cases of alleged systemic disparate treatment).
119. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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rule is a poor measure of the impact of a particular practice. Because that test
fails to reckon with the problem of sample size, it unreliably points to the discriminatory impact of some practices and overlooks the discriminatory impact
of others. 120 At least, however, the stated test is a measure of the impact of a
practice, and it should not be replaced by a formula designed to measure the
entirely different phenomenon of widespread discriminatory treatment of an entire group.
This blurring in Watson of the type of statistics required in the systemic
disparate treatment and neutral-practices/disproportionate-adverse-impact
cases was paralleled by another confusion that the Court later would magnify in
Wards Cove.121 Prefacing her explanation of the specificity and causation requirements, Justice O'Connor wrote in Watson that plaintiff's burden in an impact case "goes beyond the need to show that there are statistical disparities in
the employer's work force." 122 Later, citing to the prototypical systemic disparate treatment case, she writes that plaintiff's impact statistics may be flawed if
"based on an applicant pool containing individuals lacking minimal qualifications for the job."1 23 Does this mean that the plaintiff's statistics about the
impact of a particular practice must also address the protected group's general
representation at some level of the work force? If so, these passages imply, for
the first time since Griggs created the neutral practice case, that the plaintiff
must develop an overlay of systemic-treatment evidence in a case focused simply
on the impact of one or more neutral practices.
The Court is certainly not alone in mistakenly equating the nature and
magnitude of the two distinct modes of proof,1 24 but the consequences of the
Court's confusion are of course more significant than is confusion among commentators. One can readily acknowledge the general requirement that every
plaintiff must prove causation and at the same time recognize that a requirement
demanding systemic-treatment evidence in every case challenging only one or
more particular neutral practices would virtually eliminate the utility of the neutral practices case as a distinct evidentiary alternative. Indeed, the only remaining reason plaintiffs would continue to offer neutral practice/impact evidence
would be to bolster a case of systemic disparate treatment. Proof that the employer resorted to one or more practices with adverse impact on plaintiff's group
would help explain, and thus make more plausible, that group's apparent gross
120. See Shoben, supra note 54, at 805-09.

121. See infra text accompanying notes 181-82.
122. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 997 (plurality opinion).

124. For examples of such confusion among commentators, see Blumrosen, supra note 95, at 30
(to prove disproportionate adverse impact, "plaintiffs claim a disparity between proportion of minorities in the pool of candidates and in the group selected"); Laycock, StatisticalProofand Theories of
Discrimination,49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 102 (1986) (suggesting that individual qualifications
are "assumed away" in "the statistical cases," when in fact, under Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,

424 U.S. 747 (1976), they may be explicitly considered, albeit defensively, at the remedy stage of a
systemic disparate treatment case); Note, Availability ofDisparateImpact Theory To Attack A MulticomponentEmployment System, 31 VILL. L. RV. 377, 384 n.29 (erroneously citing systemic disparate treatment authority for proposition that standard deviation analysis has been approved by the
Supreme Court as a measure of disproportionate adverse impact).
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underrepresentation at one or more levels of the work force& However, a plaintiff would no longer be able to attack a neutral practice alone, or use impact
evidence to buttress the simple individual disparate treatment case of the McDonnell-Douglastype, without also proving that the employer routinely, systematically and intentionally discriminated against her entire group.
3.

Justifying The New Prima Facie Constraints

Although the plurality's explanations for the new identification and enhanced statistical requirements are confused, good arguments can be made for
both. The real problem in Watson and similar cases is not that the practice is
subjective; rather, the challenge is to measure the effects of an identifiable practice, whatever its nature. The terminological confusion between subjectivity, on
the one hand, and identifiability and measurability, on the other, no doubt arises
from the happenstance that many subjective evaluative components of a larger
process are not assigned arithmetic weight while others play no dispositive part
in an employer decision. The results of most "objective" selection devices, by
contrast, are either arithmetically or otherwise clearly recorded - does the applicant have an educational degree or not, did her score exceed the cut-off or not
and they typically serve an up-or-down screening function in a multistage
125
selection process.
The difference is crucial to appreciating the identification and causation requirements. Impact theory was originally devised, and, if we take the Court at
its word, remains as an alternative to proof of disparate treatment or unlawful
motive.126 But the limited attack thereby made available is on a practice
adopted by the employer that carries forward some socio-historical disadvantage
afflicting plaintiff's group. It is not an attack on the residue of all the employer's
formal and informal policies and practices concerning hiring or promotion.
That residue, or "bottom line," if it grossly understates the expected representation of the protected group, may suggest classwide disparate treatment.
Suppose, for example, that a facially neutral practice is unquantifiable in
terms of its effects on plaintiff's protected group - either because wrapped together with other practices or not assigned specific weight in the employer's
decision. Then the principal fear is not with the practice itself; it is that over
time multiple agents of the employer will use the device to treat people differently. Deference to discretionary decisions "involves an enormous risk because
...employers tend to choose individuals most like themselves. In a world dominated by white males the risk is that employers will prefer white males over
127
women and minority group members."
If that is true, though, a statistically significant underrepresentation of qual125. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
126. Evidence of subjective intent to discriminate is necessary to support a claim of disparate
treatment, but not of disparate impact. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2118-19
(1989). "Either theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts." International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 326 n.15 (1977).
127. Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title VII's DisparateImpact
Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV.869, 873.
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ified protected group members should be revealed at the bottom line and challengeable as systemic-disparate treatment. Of course, because the requisite
statistical showing of such treatment is rigorous, the effect of some immeasurable neutral practices may undoubtedly fail to show up at the bottom line with
sufficient clarity or magnitude to sustain a disparate treatment attack. Such
practices would then slip through the cracks, immune from both systemic-disparate treatment analysis and disproportionate adverse impact analysis. However,
that seems to be the system's nod to, and its working accommodation of, some
irreducible degree of employer discretion deemed essential to the viability of the
merit principle in the real world.
In addition, there are potential inequities to both defendants and discrimination victims if these challenges may be predicated on the aggregate effect of a
bundle of assorted practices. The practices' combined adverse impact on the
protected group may mask the fact that one or more of the included practices
actually results in disproportionately favorable minority selection. 128 Assume
the existence of a victorious plaintiff group larger than the number of vacancies
that the combined practices were designed to fill, and a district judge who decides to prioritize remedies among these discriminatees chronologically, by the
date they encountered any practice. Those plaintiffs first exposed to a practice
favoring minorities might then receive remedial preference over true discriminatees, since liability could be imposed without evidence of the effect of the
separate practices.
Requiring reliable quantification of the effects of identifiable neutral practices works relatively little harm to the rationale underlying impact analysis.
The bulk of those practices with measurable effects 12 9 produce their disproportionate effects precisely because members of different groups encounter those
practices at different starting lines attributable to preexisting societal disadvantage. Impact evidence, designed specifically to attack the vestiges of such disadvantage at their latest waystation, the workplace, will continue to expose such
practices effectively, notwithstanding the requirements of specific identification
and causation. By the same token, the major legitimate Title VII objection to
130
subjective discretionary evaluation, used most often for upper level positions,
is that it provides the mechanism for an evaluating group to indulge a preference
of like for like, or a taste for discrimination against the unlike. Yet when this
concern is sufficiently well founded to manifest itself in a statistically significant
128. A comparable phenomenon, stemming from the "aggregation fallacy," has been observed in
the context of systemic treatment situations. It occurs, for example, where one of several occupational categories, usually low-skilled, has the lowest promotion rate to upper-level positions but also
features the highest proportion of minorities. Where the minority-intensive category is numerous
relative to the other low-level categories from which promotions are made, aggregating them by race
may show that minority members are disproportionately underselected for the upper-level positions.
But separate analysis of the categories may show that minority members are not disproportionately
underselected, and may even be preferred. See Barrett, PersonnelSelection After Watson, Hopkins,
Atonio, and Martin (WHAM), 3 FORENSIC Rprs. 179, 185 (1990).
129. Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REv. 947, 998-99
(1982) ("objective" requirements used principally in lower level job systems).
130. Id. at 999.
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fashion, such as gross underrepresentation of the evaluees, the problem may be
addressed through the alternative proof mode of systemic disparate treatment.
There are, accordingly, justifiable reasons, despite the costs, for the Court
to require a rejected hire or promotion applicant, as a part of her prima facie
case, to isolate the particular practice that excluded her and to demonstrate that
the practice had disproportionate adverse impact on her group. The Watson
plurality also seems on solid ground in demanding a somewhat more powerful
statistical showing of that impact - not the overwhelming evidence necessary to
signify across-the-board disparate treatment, yet a measure that will account for
the greater likelihood in small samples that chance, rather than the employer's
practice, explains the adverse impact.
B.

ConstraintsAffecting The Defense: Easing The Business Justification
Showing

By contrast, the Watson plurality's second set of constraints, which greatly
relaxes the nature and quantum of the employer's defense to this fortified prima
facie case,131 is unjustified both in principle and in practice.
1. Nature of The Defense
The appropriate linguistic formulation of the business justification defense
is not a mere rhetorical dispute among scholars. It has the potential for genuine
practical impact, and mirrors the justices' sympathy with or antipathy to the
broader goals of Title VII. As one commentator has pointed out, the defense
"defines the outer limits of the Act's potential effectiveness." 13 2 At a practical
level, the scope of employee protection under Title VII is inversely proportional
to the rigor with which the test is applied: the more rigorous the defense, the

easier the recovery. In short, whether an employer's practice has caused
redressable adverse consequences for a protected group is a fumction of the appropriate scope of the test.
While it would be unfair and inconsistent with the lesser discriminatory
alternatives concept to require the employer to demonstrate the strict necessity
of its practice, the Watson plurality opted for an equally unfair opposing extreme. Its pallid formulation of the defense allows an employer to overcome a
statistically significant showing that a practice has disproportionate adverse impact simply by pointing to virtually any reason other than race, gender, religion,
or national origin. That formula undervalues the plaintiff's prima facie case of
adverse impact (especially as shored up by the opinion's other constraints) by
equating it illogically with the weak, highly inferential case of individual disparate treatment. 133
This conflation of disparate impact with intentional discrimination in the
131. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
132. Note, supra note 57, at 378.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41 (describing inferential disparate treatment

evidence).
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standard for the defense may be a natural consequence of the different ways one
can view the facially neutral selection practices of an erstwhile discriminating
employer. A charitable portrait depicts the defendant's testing conditions as a
former discriminator's effort to eliminate discrimination by removing subjectivity from the employment calculus.' 34 In Watson, however, where a fractured
Court upheld a disparate impact challenge to the use of subjective employment
criteria in hiring and promotions decisions, the plurality opted for what appears
to be a less forgiving explanation. Justice O'Connor identified Griggs as a case
involving objective employment standards that "operated to perpetuate the effects of intentional discrimination that occurred before Title VII was enacted."' 135 In light of the company's history, perpetuated discriminatory effect
could be equated with intentional, racial discrimination: "[T]he necessary premise of the disparate impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted
may in operation be functionally
without a deliberately discriminatory motive,
36
equivalent to intentional discrimination."'1
The theory of functional equivalence originated in a seminal work by Owen
Fiss. Fiss suggested that an employer's use of facially neutral ("innocent") employment criteria raises a number of concerns, including the concern that an
employer may use a test because he knows blacks will perform more poorly than
whites. At the same time, certain seemingly innocent practices, like nepotism or
referral ("grapevine") hiring, may be unfair simply because they favor the relatjves of incumbent whites, or because they frustrate the long-term goal of improving the relative economic fortunes of minorities.' 37 In addition, if
achievement or result is one of Congress's goals, the notion of intent seems incomplete as a measure for eliminating discrimination's legacy. A discriminatory
an8
effect exists whenever an employer uses an impermissible criterion in making 13
employment decision, regardless of his personal appetite for discrimination.
Thus, to avoid the potentially harmful effects associated with the use of practices
that appear innocent, some theory of discrimination in addition to intent seemed
139
necessary to explain a case like Griggs v. Duke Power Company.
But even Fiss's sympathetic theory of disparate impact rests on an equivocal rationale. For example, the use of tests by an employer who knows that
protected groups perform less well than white males is intent-based. The "neutral" test merely disguises a hostile motive. Nepotism or grapevine hiring, how134. Kandel, CurrentDevelopments in Employment Litigation: Burden ofProofafter Watson: A

Major Shift in DisparateImpact Litigation?, 14 EMPL. REL. L.J. 263, 271 (1988).
135. Watson, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
136. Id.
137. Fiss, supra note 23, at 296-97.

138. Id. at 298.
139. In a recent article, Professor Ortiz argues that the Court uses intent in two ways, depending
in part on where the ultimate burden of proof lies. Ortiz, The Myth ofIntent in EqualProtection, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1136 (1989). He suggests that in Title VII cases decided under the Griggs

regime, when the burden shifted to the employer to prove business necessity, the statute was seen as
concerned with "the substance of decisionmaking, not its motivation." Id. More generally, he argues that whether the doctrine of intent actually focuses on motivation or outcome is a function of

the strength of the individual litigant's interest. If the general thesis holds sway, the shift of the
ultimate burden to the individual reflects a diminution of her interest.
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ever, may bear no relationship to an employer's personal passion for prejudice.
The practices may reflect nothing more malignant than a cost-effective means of
hiring. In the "knowing testing" context, functional equivalence appears to ease
the task of proving intent. The rationale for discarding nepotism or grapevine
hiring, by contrast, must be effect-oriented, namely, to improve the economic
plight of a protected group collectively. Thus, at its inception the functional
equivalence theory contains and fuels the same inherent ambiguity as do the two
competing approaches to Title VII litigation.
The Watson plurality's "functional equivalence" language, if not its ethos,

betrays the same ambivalence about the underlying theory of disparate impact
litigation. Justice O'Connor indicated that "the ultimate legal issue" may be the
same in both impact and treatment cases, unmistakably suggesting that impact is
merely a surrogate for a finding of intent. Curiously, she did not identify that
ultimate issue. Although the thrust of her opinion strongly indicates that fumctional equivalence and Griggs reflect incompatible understandings of Title VII,
her language is inherently ambiguous: the ultimate issue could be either "intent" or, more generally, "discrimination."
To the extent that Justice O'Connor's language is susceptible to at least two
readings, the functional equivalence theory, although indicating a new direction
for impact analysis, ultimately begs the theoretical question of whether Title VII
permits an achievement or result goal. 140 The Watson plurality appears to mean
that in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power Company, given Duke Power's past
history, it was in effect guilty of using objective measures to achieve the same
end it had achieved in the past through intentionally prejudicial, subjective employment measures. 141 This interpretation reads as much into Griggs as its facts
will bear. 142 It also reflects a rejection of the normative theory underlying at
least one conception of disproportionate impact, namely, equality of result. Alternatively, functional equivalence may refer not to the practice, but to its effect.
If an objective criterion has the same disfavoring effect as a subjective decision to
discriminate, that criterion is "in operation ... functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination." 14 3 At any rate, this view leads directly to diluting the
140. Watson, 487 U.S. at 987. Recall Justice O'Connor's statement: "[T"he necessary premise of
the disparate impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted without a deliberately
discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination."
Id. The different readings depend upon whether one focuses on the "intentional discrimination" or
"inoperation" portions of the quote.
141. There is language in Griggs and Watson to support this interpretation. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) ("Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their
face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."); Willborn, supra note 59, at 809.
142. While the Griggs opinion identifies Duke Power's past discrimination, it is at best ambiguous on the connection between that past history of discrimination and the adverse impact theory. In
fact, the Court wrote that the source of impact theory was "plain from the language of the statute."
401 U.S. at 429. But see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (relief available only against respondents who "intentionally" engaged in unlawful employment practice); id § 2000e-2(h) (authorizing employers to
act on the results of "any professionally developed ability test.., not designed, intended, or used to
discriminate" on the prohibited grounds). If Griggs is correct, adverse impact does not depend upon
a past history of discrimination; it stands as an independent, statutorily mandated theory of recovery. See supra note 61 for a discussion of the ambiguity.
143. Watson, 487 U.S. at 987; see supra note 140.
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impact defense requirements to the low level of job relatedness associated with
the defense to inferential disparate treatment.
The rejection by Justice Blackmun and the other concurring justices of the
plurality's lax version of job-relatedness reflects their larger repudiation of an
intent-based characterization of "functional equivalence." For them impact recovery was not a shorthand method of proving intent, as Justice O'Connor
strongly implied. 144 Rather, an adverse impact, unjustified by business necessity, sufficed to establish liability without regard to motive. The concurring justices conceived of disparate impact theory as permitting recovery regardless of
past or present motive, based solely upon the adverse effect of the employer's
practice and the need to redress workplace imbalances that result from a legacy
of the broader society.
Justice Blackmun feared that the plurality, by allowing an employer to defend simply by offering some evidence of "any" legitimate business requirement-the defendant's minimal rebuttal in an individual treatment case-would
permit an impact defendant to escape liability without showing any real need for
the practice. As Blackmun explained, a comparable minimal showing is sufficient to escape liability in the treatment context only because "any" nondiscriminatory reason negates the highly inferential prima facie case of unlawful motive.
In the impact case, however, once the employee produces solid statistical evidence of a discriminatory employment effect flowing from an identified employer
practice, only an explanation based on the legitimate needs of the business
shodd suffice.
2. Quantum
The second new constraint on the defensive side of the impact equation
concerns the quantum of justification evidence an employer is required to adduce. Would the defendant employer, as the Court's previous cases had gener14 5
ally assumed, bear the risk of nonpersuasion? In a startling turnabout,
Justice O'Connor placed the risk of nonpersuasion on the challenger: "[Tihe
ultimate burden of proving that discrimination against a protected group has
been caused by a specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all
times." 146 She offered no supporting citation. Although this holding apparently
144. Justice Blackmun stated his position ten years earlier when he explained his allegiance to
Justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke.

I yield to no one in my earnest hope that the time will come when an "affirmative action"
program is unnecessary and is, in truth, only a relic of the past. I would hope that we
could reach this stage within a decade at the most. But the story of Brown v. Board of
Education, decided almost a quarter of a century ago, suggests that this hope is a slim one.
At some time, however, beyond any period of what some would claim is only transitional
inequality, the United States must and will reach a stage of maturity where action along
this line is no longer necessary. Then persons will be regarded as persons, and discrimination of the type we address today will be an ugly feature of history that is instructive but
that is behind us.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
145. See infra note 147 and text accompanying note 420.

146. Watson, 487 U.S. at 997 (plurality opinion).

1990]

TITLE VII

was new law, as the concurring justices elaborately documented, 147 the confusion and ambiguity of the Court's language in its earlier decisions arguably permitted the redefinition.
One difficulty with this allocation is that the challenger may possess little
knowledge of the employer's business. Although the discovery process, her own
on-the-job observations, or EEOC assistance might enable the plaintiff to identify shortcomings in the employer practice or to propose alternatives, 148 imposition of a persuasion burden requires the plaintiff either to disprove the needs of
the employer or to prove that the employer's business needs would also be
served by less discriminatory alternatives that plaintiff suggests. To recover, the
challenger would have to know the defendant's business at least as well as the
defendant.
Also arguing against the imposition of this burden on the plaintiff is "the
hard cold reality" of plaintiff's prima facie case. 149 Reliable, relatively high order statistical evidence has shown already that the employer engaged in conduct

with a significant discriminatory effect. The plurality, however, rejected such a
characterization and in the process gave substance to the fears of those who
150
concluded that Watson rang the death knell for an equal achievement goal.
Immediately before articulating her "functional equivalence" doctrine Justice
147. Id. at 10 7 ( 'ackwxin, J copxurrinF in part and concurring in judgr'ent). The concurence noted many ofcas° in' -icb he C rt bp i apj rent] plac, 'thei 0ectiv, iurdens of

, roving inl relatt

iess and

Lsin , neessit* on th defe. lani

[d. ( ackmu

J., ct currin, in

part and oncurring in judgment). In some of the ca.,cs, eg., D aard v. Rawlinson, 4,3. U.S. ._1,
329, 331-32 (1977) (various formulations), the language was clearly dictum; in others the language
was simply imprecise because undefined. See, ,g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976)
(Title VII litigation "involves a more probing judicial review, and less deference to the seemingly
reasonable acts of [employers] than is appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed."). Nevertheless virtually everyone who commented on the Court's work prior to Watson assumed that the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion on
business necessity rested with the employer. See, eg., C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RicHARDs,
supranote 21, at 187-94; L. MODJESKA, supra note 57 at 30, 34, 49-53; Fallon, supranote 26, at 84647; Rutherglen, supra note 68, at 1312; Note, supra note 57; Note, supra note 58. Other more
restrictive formulations by individual members of the Court presaged the Watson plurality's decision
to require plaintiff to bear the risk of nonpersuasion throughout. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 337
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (defendant need only offer evidence or make legal arguments to rebut the
prima facie impact case).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15.
149. Caldwell, Reaffirming the DisproportionateEffects Standard ofLiability in Title VILitigation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 555, 591 (1985) (arguing that because of that "hard, cold reality" the
initial burden of proof in impact cases ought to be accorded more weight than the prima facie case in
treatment litigation).
150. See Kandel, supra note 134, at 271-72 (concluding that the new "high standards" of proof
used to avoid quotas "may be daunting to plaintiffs"); Comment, supra note 23, at 1786 (concluding
that Watson was a pyrrhic victory for plaintiffs); Note, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust: Reallocating the Burdens of Proof in Employment DiscriminationLitigation, 38 AM. U.L. REv. 919, 923
(1989) (same): Note, supra note 95, at 316-17 (suggesting that the new standards may be applied to
challenges to objective tests); Recent Developments, supra note 20, at 274-75 (stating that if carried
to its extreme, Watson overrules Griggs).
The Court suggested that the constraints were required by the subjective nature of criteria
under siege and the fear of quotas, i.e., that new procedures were peculiar to this form of impact
challenge. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 n.2 (plurality opinion). But if these new constraints have no
basis in fact, that is, if they do not flow from any genuinely enhanced difficulty in validating subjective as opposed to objective practices, one has solid evidence that the court is collapsing objective
and subjective disparate impact analysis into one theory that places significantly greater hurdles in
the plaintiffs' paths.
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O'Connor wrote; "Nor do we think it is appropriate to hold a defendant liable
for unintentional discrimination on the basis of less evidence than is required to
prove intentional discrimination." 15 1 For the plurality, identifying and isolating
the specific subjective technique, and demonstrating through exacting statistical
proof its significant disproportionate impact, are simply not enough; such proof
constitutes "less evidence" than proof of intent. Such a view reveals a notion of
fairness that is inconsistent with the equal achievement goal expressed in Griggs
and espoused by Congress when it amended Title VII in 1972.152
Justice O'Connor was prepared to go even further in Watson than the introduction of new constraints. As if such constraints were not sufficient to avoid
the undocumented evil of quotas, the Court outlined the myriad ways in which
an employer might challenge plaintiff's statistics 153 and asserted that employers
15 4
are not required in any rigorous sense to "validate" their subjective practices.
In fact, the plurality concluded with language that can be taken only as an invitation to use more subjective hiring practices: "[T]he employer will often find it
easier than in the case of standardized tests to produce evidence of a 'manifest
relationship to the employment in question.' ,155 This relative ease of proof
purportedly followed from both practical and theoretical considerations. Contrary to the position of the American Psychological Association, 156 it was "self157
At
evident" that one could not validate certain discretionary hiring practices.
a theoretical level, O'Connor opined that " '[c]ourts are generally less competent
than employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so
by Congress they should not attempt it.' "158
Under the plurality's revised formulation, the impact defendant satisfies the
burden of going forward on the business necessity inquiry if it produces evidence
of a "legitimate" or "normal and legitimate" business rationale for the challenged practice. Yet as one insightful student noted, "normal" employment
practices are precisely those that Griggs cautioned the courts to be wary of,
namely, ordinary business operations that perpetuate discrimination.15 9 In this
sense, Watson gave good cause for concern about the future of Griggs and the
151. Watson, 487 U.S. at 987 (emphasis added).
152. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30; Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92.
261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1988) and 5 U.S.C.
§§ 5108(c), 5314-16 (1988)); see also infra note 416 and accompanying text.
153. Watson, 487 U.S. 996-97 (plurality opinion).

154. Id. at 998-99 (plurality opinion).
155. Id. at 999 (plurality opinion). Using the "manifest relationship" language, Justice
O'Connor potentially added further confusion to the appropriate business necessity inquiry. Given
the attention she paid to the language issue when she considered it on its own terms, however, and
the adoption of the weak version of the test in Wards Cove, one suspects that this was a case of loose
language. On Wards Cove and business necessity, see infra text accompanying notes 206-09.
156. See infra text accompanying note 171.
157. Watson, 487 U.S. at 999 (plurality opinion) ("It is self-evident that many jobs, for example
those involving managerial responsibilities, require personal qualities that have never been considered amenable to standardized testing.") On the Court's protection of upper-level employment positions in its Title VII jurisprudence, see Bartholet, supra note 129.
158. Watson, 487 U.S. at 999 (plurality opinion) (quoting Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 578 (1981)). See infra note 163.
159. Recent Developments, supra note 20, at 267.
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impact theory it spawned. Griggs'scentral understanding-that "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutralin terms of intent, cannot
be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices" 16--was in jeopardy of being lost.
The Court's expression of its incompetence to restructure business practices, which it traced to Furnco Construction Corporationv. Waters,16 1 resonates
with our traditional expectations about the judicial role. But it also carries distinct normative implications. In Furnco, the court of appeals undertook precisely the kind of business restructuring against which the Watson plurality
warned. It outlawed the employer's use of casual hiring procedures and devised
its own substitute that effectively required the employer to maximize the number

of minority applicants. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the employer's own recruiting and interviewing processes were supported by legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons. 1 62 In contrast, the Watson Court was not faced with
a situation in which the lower court had restructured an employer's practices.
Rather, the issue was whether to enjoin an existing practice, the precise authority section 706(g) gives to the district court. In short, the Watson plurality's use
of the Furnco quotation is not a response to overreaching by an appellate court
but a generally applicable normative direction to lower courts: "Don't interfere
163
with employers' subjective hiring schemes, especially for supervisory jobs.'
The statutory text, of course, makes no distinction among job echelons.
C. The Quota Fear and ConsequentialReasoning
Apart from the plurality's call for more rigor in the prima facie showing of
adverse impact, most of the new constraints rest largely on consequential reasoning. Conclusions based on the fear of detrimental consequences - here, quotas - ordinarily ought to dictate result only when the feared consequences are
likely to occur, a matter for empirical inquiry. Certainly Congress, through sec160. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (emphasis added).
161. 438 U.S. 567 (1981).
162. Id. at 576-78 (rejecting the lower court's order that the employer institute a hiring plan that
required testing and formal screening in lieu of grapevine hiring).
163. But see Comment, supra note 23, at 1774 n.99, where the author wrote that "[tiaken in

context,. . . the Court presumably meant only that it must refrain from dictating to employers how
their decisionmaking systems should be structured. It should not affect [sic] a relinquishment of the
court's ability to determine whether practices already in place violate the law." The problem with

this conclusion is the context in which the quote was taken. There was no effort here, as in Furnco,
to restructure an existing system. The context was precisely that which the commentator suggests
will not be affected.
Language similar to that used by Justice O'Connor appears in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981), where the Court gave more flesh to the defendant's
articulation burden in a treatment case. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40. The Court's use

in Burdine of similar language grew out of a context analogous to that in Furnco,an appellate court's
affirmative action requirement. The employer had been required to show that a rejected member of a
protected group had qualifications that were inferior to the white who was hired. Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 259. The Court noted that Title VII was "not intended to diminish traditional management
prerogatives," id. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 (1979)), and
that "[i]t does not require the employer to restructure his employment practices." Id. (citing
Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577-78). Again, the difference in context suggests a difference in purpose.
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tion 703() of Title VII,16 sought to prohibit court-imposed quotas absent findings of egregious and persistent discrimination. 165 The Court itself seems loath
to expand the use of preferential employment remedies. 166 But the Court's own
professed concern that employers would voluntarily resort to quotas for fear of
being unable to defend against a prima facie case of adverse impact is of a different kind.
By its terms section 7030) does not speak to employers at all; it directs

courts not to mandate affirmative action plans.1 67 Moreover, even if section
7030) were read as a mandate to employers, it does not prohibit all "voluntary"
employment quotas. 168 Congressional policy does not plainly outlaw all quotas
of other kinds' 69 and it is doubtful whether, in the absence of restraints on impact theory, employers would indiscriminately implement them, or, if they did,
170
that such quotas would be an unalloyed evil.
But more than that, the fear the Court expressed, predicated on assumed
employer inability to validate subjective practices, was without any empirical
basis in the record. In fact, the only empirical evidence provided to the Court
on the subject ran contra. The American Psychological Association, as amicus
164. This section contains an interpretive warning to the courts against "grant[ing] preferential
treatment to any individual... because of... race... [or] sex.., on account of an imbalance" in
the work force. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1988).
165. Local 28, Sheetrietal Workers Int'l Ass'n v EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 475-76 (1986) ("In the
m or:ty of Title VII enses, the court will not have to apose affirmative action.... [but it] may have
to.. when confront with... persistent or egreb.jus discrimination.").
16( Burdine, 450 S. at 258-59 (rejecting the "better qualified" or "comparative" requirement
as part of defendant's r-buttal of plaintiff's prima facie treatment case, as articulated in East v.
Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 339-40 (5th Cir. Y" 5)).
Anyone with even passing familiarity wit) the subject of affirmative action realizes that the
statement in the text is at "est a prediction and at least requires qualification. It is quite true that the
Court has pea itted some affirmative action in the face of Title VII challenges. See, e-g., California
Fed. Say. ano oan Ass'n v. Gu. ra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-85 (1987) (holding that the Pregnancy Disability Act of 1978,42 U.S.C. § 2LOe(k) (1988), permits the states to give some preference to employees" "disabled" by pregnancy); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640-42 (1987)
(holding that Title VII tolerates preferential promotions without proof of past discrimination). But
cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (striking down on constitutional
grounds a voluntary minority set-aside program adopted without a showing of compelling need
based upon a documented history of discrimination).
There is a vast body of literature on the affirmative action question. Three useful recent articles
are Daly, Some Runs, Some Hits, Some Errors--KeepingScore in the Affirmative Action Ballpark
from Weber to Johnson, 30 B.C.L. Rnv. 1 (1988); Rutherglen & Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the
Constitution and Title VII: From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REV. 467 (1988); and
Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 4ffirmative Action Cases: It's All Over But the Shouting, 86 MicH. L.
REv. 524 (1987).
167. See supra note 164.
168. Eg., Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630; United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979).
169. Cf Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding a federal statutory set-aside

program).
170. For example, even if an employer did resort to quota hiring to attain a "clean" bottom line,

its individual practices would be subject to impact attack. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
That there is a mythology about the likelihood of quotas as an employer's response to disparate
impact is not doubted. See, ag., Fallon & Weiler, supra note 33, at 22 & n.92 (sources cited). Of
course, to the considerable degrec that the very term "quota" carries negative connotations, coupled
with employers' natural desire to be let alone, they have every interest in encouraging the belief that
quotas will occur.
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curiae, argued that subjective employment criteria were amenable to the same
validation procedures as objective ones.171 The A.P.A. counselled that establishing the nexus between subjective criteria and job relatedness presented the
same problems as did validating other objective practices. Thus the real burden
on the employer in the subjective practices context may be no different from that
which exists when a more "objective" neutral practice such as height or weight
is challenged. The newly relaxed employer defense would then not rest on any
premise peculiar to challenges to subjective practices. Indeed employers had
lived with Griggs for seventeen years without any wholesale implementation of
quotas.
In sum, the extension of impact analysis in Watson to practices deemed
subjective was a pyrrhic victory for champions of the equal achievement principle. Justice O'Connor took the occasion to launch a fundamental revision of
disparate impact theory and practice, ostensibly to avoid the perceived evil of
quotas that would result from applying traditional evidentiary impact standards
to subjective practices. With a new member, Justice Kennedy, joining the Watson plurality, the Court in Wards Cove would not only extend the Watson strictures to objective practices, but would also sharply limit the utility of the
plaintiff's less discriminatory alternatives rebuttal.
IV.

WARDS COVE" THE IMPACT CASE DISMEMBERED

Two salmon canneries, including Wards Cove Packing Company, owned
seasonal canning operations in the Alaskan hinterlands. Plaintiffs, a group of
unskilled, predominantly native American, Samoan, Filipino, and other minority cannery employees, filed class action disparate impact and treatment claims
alleging racial discrimination. The class claimed that the companies' use of subjective and objective hiring and promotion practices had created a stratified
workforce, precluding class members from obtaining higher-paid, "noncannery"
positions that were primarily skilled and predominantly filled by white work173
ers. 172 Plaintiffs also complained of racial segregation in housing and dining.

Plaintiffs alleged systemic disparate treatmentbased on the segregated facilities and also, apparently, 174 based on their asserted underrepresentation in both
171. See Brief for Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner by the American Psychological Association at 2, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (No. 86-6139), quoted in
Comment, supra note 23, at 1771 n.84; Rose, supra note 20, at 69.
172. Among the allegedly discriminatory practices were "nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of
objective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels, a practice of not promoting from within" and
others including word of mouth hiring, "an English language requirement... [and a] failure to post
[skilled, predominantly white] noncannery openings." Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.
Ct. 2115, 2120 (1989).
173. The majority did not dispute the existence of discriminatory conditions, but it did observe
that all of the lower courts were in agreement that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that these
conditions resulted from intentional discrimination. Id.at 2120 n.4; see also id at 2136 (Blackmun,
J.,
dissenting) (describing the salmon industry as "a total residential and work environment organized on principles of racial stratification and segregation"); id. at 2128 n.4. (Stevens, J.,dissenting)
(likening cannery life to a "plantation economy," and suggesting that the conditions do "not necessarily fit neatly into a disparate impact or disparate treatment mold").
174. The Supreme Court wrote that all of plaintiffs' claims, including "racial stratification,"
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the skilled and unskilled noncannery jobs "at issue." They also mounted impact
attacks on the several practices that allegedly affected them adversely. The trial
court rejected all of these contentions. After the litigation had taken a number
of tortuous turns, 175 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane and presaging Watson's

holding on the use of impact theory to attack subjective practices, reversed with
respect to the subjective practices, holding that they could be scrutinized for
adverse impact and that the employer bore the risk of nonpersuasion on a defense of "business necessity." 176 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
177
rejection of all claims of disparate treatment.
The Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' rulings concerning the
impact claims; plaintiffs did not seek review of the lower courts' rejection of
their claims of systemic disparate treatment. 17 8 The issues before the Supreme
Court were limited to those claims which both the plaintiffs and the Court characterized as disproportionate impact challenges to neutral practices. 179 Nevertheless, at the outset of the opinion, the Court discussed a supposed unitary
"role" of statistics in undifferentiated "employment discrimination cases." 180
Replicating the precise confusion of the corresponding discussion in Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank and Trust Company, 18 1 Justice White, for a five-member majority, condemned plaintiffs' statistical evidence of impact for failing to satisfy
182
the standards of systemic treatment.
A. A Systemic Treatment Overlay To Attacks On Neutral Practices?
The majority properly condemned plaintiffs' statistics, but its reason for
doing so is insupportable. Stated simply, plaintiffs had persuaded the Ninth Circuit that statistical evidence patently inadequate to demonstrate systemic disparate treatment could somehow do double duty as adequate evidence of disparate
were "advanced under both the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact theories of Title VII liability." Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2120.
175. The procedural history of the case warrants brief attention. Initially, the trial court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds, a decision that was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 703 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 989 (1987),
cert. granted,487 U.S. 1232 (1988), reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1264 (1988). On remand the trial court
entered judgment for the employers on all theories, a judgment that initially was affirmed. Atonio v.
Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 989 (1987), cert.
granted, 487 U.S. 1232 (1988), reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1264 (1988). Sitting en banc for the first time,
the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that subjective practices could be scrutinized on the
adverse impact model, with the burden on the employer to rebut the prima facie case by proving
"business necessity." Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1482, 1485-86 (1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 989 (1987), cert granted,487 U.S. 1232 (1988), reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1264 (1988).
The en banc court therefore remanded to a panel, which held that plaintiffs had established a prima
facie case of "disparate-impact in hiring for both skilled and unskilled noncannery positions."

Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2120.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1482, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1987).
See supra note 175.
Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2121 & n.4.
Id. at 2119-21.
Id at 2121.
See supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2121-24. Those standards are discussed in detail infra note 186.
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impact.1 8 3 Ironically, plaintiffs' evidence did not even purport to demonstrate

statistically the adverse impact of any particular subjective or objective practice;
the evidence was really "little more than a compilation of the results of the hiring process" as a whole. 18 4 As such, plaintiffs' evidence, if adequate, could only
have established systemic, routine discriminatory treatment by comparing the
"observed" representation of protected group members in the "at issue" noncan-

nery jobs with an appropriate benchmark of "expected" protected group
representation. 185
But because systemic disparate treatment indicts the employer for inten-

tional, persistent discrimination across the board, and gives rise to presumptive
remedies for all members of the plaintiff class denied hire or promotion to the

desired jobs during the period of proven gross under-representation, its prima
facie requirements are exacting. Justice White duly rehearsed why the Wards

Cove plaintiffs' statistical showings-which the plaintiffs, the court of appeals,
and all justices of the Supreme Court erroneously styled as evidence of adverse

"impact"-fell well short of established requirements for demonstrating sys183. The Ninth Circuit applied the faulty conception that evidence of protected group underrepresentation, standing alone and measured by internal workforce comparisons, demonstrated the
disproportionate adverse impact of particular practices. In fact, the evidence in many other of the
pre-Watson circuit court cases that held "subjective" practices unamenable to impact attack more
closely resembled deficient prima facie cases of systemic treatment than attacks on the effects of

specific practices.
Several cases illustrate this point. In Pouncy v. PrudentialInsuranceCo., the plaintiffs, ostensibly under the umbrella of impact, in reality launched "a wide ranging attack on the cumulative
effect" of the company's practices. 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982). There was simply no measurement of the effect of any particular practice, objective or otherwise. Their evidence of underrepresentation in the employer's workforce relative to their representation in the surrounding labor
market amounted only to "indirect evidence" of the effects of the challenged rule. See Lamber,
supra note 127, at 883.
Similarly, in Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469
U.S. 1036 (1984), the plaintiffs challenged the defendant's compensation practices by examining
salary disparities between jobs dominated by men and others dominated by women. But salary is the
classic example of a term and condition of employment that is the product of multiple factors of
varying weight; and for this reason, salary disparities are customarily challenged in systemic treatment cases by "multiple regression" analysis, which attempts to account for the relative weights of
the several nondiscriminatory factors that the employer relies on to explain them. See Bazemore v.
Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 394 (1986). This is not to argue that a plaintiff might not attempt to demonstrate the disproportionate adverse impact on her group of a particular salary variable, only that
plaintiffs made no such showing in Spaulding.
By contrast, in Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985), the appeals court upheld an
impact attack on an ostensibly subjective practice when the employment term at issue was promotion. In addition to a systemic treatment attack on the underrepresentation of the protected group
by comparison with their representation in a lower level of the workforce from which most promotions were made, plaintiffs identified at least one practice that led to this result and attempted to
quantify its effects. Unlike Pouncy and Spaulding, which in retrospect are explicable by the plaintiffs' failure to produce statistical evidence of the impact of any particular practice, the Griffin court
had little difficulty concluding that impact analysis was available, despite the "subjective" nature of
that practice. Id. at 1522-25. See also Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (recognizing
challenges not only to "bottom line" residue of practices but to many individual practices as such),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
184. See, eg., Lowe v. Commack Union Free School Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1370 (2d Cir. 1989)
(citing Wards Cove and Watson), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1470 (1990). See also Gilty v. Village of
Oak Park, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1388 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (complaint challenged "entire
promotional process" rather than particular practices).
185. For example, the plaintiffs might have used an "internal" measure such as the cannery

workforce, or some "external" measure in the general population or relevant geographical area.
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18 6
temic disparate treatment.

Thus, the Court is correct in observing that the relatively small percentage
of minority workers in skilled positions is "not petitioners' fault."18 7 Unfortunately, that conclusion is beside the point in an impact case: motive is irrelevant. Only treatment evidence, signifying underlying discrimination that is
intentional, could have pointed to "fault"; and at the final stages of the litigation
the plaintiffs themselves no longer purported to show disparate treatment. The

Court was not content, however, to cite the obvious deficiencies in plaintiffs'
evidence, viewed as a case of systemic treatment. Inspired by Justice
O'Connor's practice in Watson, Justice White conjured the straw man of quotas.
Imagine the difficulties employers would face, he wrote, if, as had never been the
case, evidence of racial imbalance alone were sufficient to require them to defend
all the component selection devices that in the aggregate produce the imbalance:

"The only practicable option for many employers will be to adopt racial quotas
186. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2121-24. Plaintiffs had shown that they were less represented in

both skilled and unskilled noncannery positions as compared to their representation in the employers' cannery jobs. The Court rejected the comparison with skilled noncannery positions because the
pool of protected group members among either applicants for those positions or any potentially
relevant labor force was not shown to possess the qualifications for the jobs in question. Id. at 2122.
This is a standard and essential prima facie requirement in cases of systemic disparate treatment.
See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977).
The Court's reason for rejecting the evidence of a disparity between protected group representation in the cannery jobs and in the unskilled noncannery jobs is somewhat more suspect. The Court
assumed that the employer's cannery workers possessed the skills necessary for the unskilled noncannery jobs. It nevertheless insisted-absent evidence that a particular practice deterred nonwhites
from applying-on a threshold showing that the percentage of nonwhite qualified applicants was
significantly less than the percentage of nonwhite applicants selected. The Court reasoned that the
employer's particular "selection mechanism" had probably not had adverse "impact" if these applicant percentages were approximately the same. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2123.
The Court accurately observed that the percentage of protected group members in the cannery
jobs was a poor surrogate for the likely potential qualified applicant pool of protected group members, both because the full pool might encompass many persons not then employed by the defendants
in any position and because many existing cannery workers qualified for the unskilled noncannery
jobs might not have sought them. Id. But the Court's strong preference for such "applicant flow"
statistics as the measure of systemic disparate treatment contradicts its earlier assertion, addressed to
the evidence about the skilled noncannery positions, that applicant flow data is merely "equally
probative" as a labor market comparison. See id. at 2121. Further, an insistence on applicant flow
data to establish the prima facie case of systemic treatment is inconsistent with prior opinions of the
Court--opinions with which Justice White, however, had disagreed. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. 299,
307 (employer may use applicant flow data to rebut prima facie case, but the prima facie case itself
may rest on an underrepresentation of protected group members relative to their qualified, available
numbers in the surrounding labor market); cf Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977)
(evidence of the impact of a practice need not be geared to the rate of exclusion of protected group
members who actually applied, only to those in the general population).
Despite the conceptual deficiency, the Court was again justified in rejecting the evidence concerning the unskilled noncannery jobs as a sufficient showing that any particular practice for selecting employees to fill those jobs had disproportionate adverse impact on members of plaintiffs' group.
At least on appeal, neutral practice discrimination was the model plaintiffs pressed. The Court was
not discarding the impact case; it was merely deciding that impact's basic requirements had not been
met. Indeed, reaffirming its holding in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), the Court noted
that even if there were no bottom-line racial imbalance of the sort that would suggest systemic
disparate treatment, individual applicants for noncannery jobs who had been subjected to (and
failed) a particular selection practice could prevail by proving that the practice has disproportionate
adverse impact on their group. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2123 n.8.
187. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2122.
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a result that Congress expressly rejected." 18 8
After properly rejecting plaintiffs' putative "impact" evidence as nothing
more than insufficient evidence of systemic treatment, the Court unaccountably
appeared to require future impact plaintiffs to present systemic treatment evidence as part of an impact case. One hesitates to reach such a bizarre conclusion
casually, but the suggestion first appeared in Watson,18 9 and in Wards Cove the
Court referred to it four times in only two pages of text. 190 The requirement of a
systemic treatment overlay as an essential part of plaintiff's proof that a particular practice had a disparate impact on her group would all but eviscerate the
utility of the neutral practices case as a freestanding alternative to the individual
and systemic treatment modes of proof.1 9'
Fortunately, despite the four repeated references to the contrary, it is unlikely that the Court intended this requirement. Instead, the Court's repetition
in this instance may reflect its own profound misunderstanding rather than new
law. Two reasons compel this conclusion. First, elsewhere in the Wards Cove
opinion' 92 the Court specifically reaflfirmed the availability of the attack permitted by Connecticut v. Teal 193 on a particular employer practice even in the face
...

of bottom-line racial balance of the employer's workforce. That an employer
has not routinely, intentionally, and systematically discriminated does not preclude the possibility that some of its practices perpetuate pre-existing societal

disadvantage by falling more heavily on a protected group.' 9 4 Second, it strains
credulity to suppose that the Court would so casually eliminate these more limited challenges to employer practices in Wards Cove when, only one year earlier
in Watson, all justices except Justice Kennedy, who did not participate, actually
188. Id. (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993, 994 n.2 (1988) (plurality
opinion)).
189. Watson, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion) ("Plaintiff's burden in establishing a
prima facie case [of adverse impact] goes beyond the need to show that there are statistical disparities
in the employer's work force." (emphasis added)); see also id. at 997 (plurality opinon) (discussing
the need for comparative statistical evidence refined for qualifications, with a citation to Hazelwood).
190. Justice White began Part III of the opinion by suggesting that it is unnecessary for the
Court to analyze whether the employer could justify the adverse impact of any specific practices
because the "statistical disparity" relied on by the court of appeals - comparative evidence of the

disparate treatment variety - "did not suffice to make out a prima facie case" of disproportionate
adverse impact. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124. Shortly thereafter, he repeated the Watson plurality's observation, see supra note 189, that the prima facie burden in an impact case "goes beyond,"
and therefore includes, general comparative statistical disparities in the defendant's work force--that
is to say, the type of evidence used to show systemic disparate treatment. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at
2124.
Justice White then added that "even if on remand respondents can show that nonwhites are
underrepresented in the at-issue jobs in a manner that is acceptable under the standards set forth in
Part II ... this alone will not suffice to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact." Id. at 2125.
But in Part II the Court, as discussed in text above, simply restated the customary refinements
requisite to a case of systemic disparate treatment. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
Justice White concluded this section of the opinion by reiterating that evidence showing the significant disparate impact on nonwhites of a specific practice is only "part of respondents' prima facie
case." Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125. The other part, apparently, is threshold evidence of systemic
treatment.
191. See supra text following note 124.
192. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2122, 2123 n.8.
193. 457 U.S. 440, 448-56 (1982).
194. See supra note 186.
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extended the forfial reach of impact analysis, albeit in diluted form, to "subjective" practices.1 95 Indeed, Justice White wrote at the very outset of the opinion
that impact proof is an alternative to evidence of intent. 196 Preliminary indications from the lower courts also suggest that disparate impact analysis will survive the more rigorous Wards Cove approach to statistical evidence once its
97
requirements are properly understood.'
B.

Revising The Impact Case

Wholly apart from the potentially fatal, highly problematic, but also unlikely new systemic treatment statistical wrinkle, the Court, building on the
foundation Justice O'Connor laid in Watson, undertook a wholesale revision of
the commonly conceived impact case. Wards Cove departed from the pre-Watson understandings in six respects.' 98 Three changes relate to the prima facie
case. A majority now embraces the identification and causation requirements of
Watson. The Wards Cove majority also apparently subscribes to the higher magnitude statistical demonstration of causation that Justice O'Connor outlined in
Watson. 199
The other three changes relate generally to the issue of employer justification for a practice shown prima facie to have caused a significantly disproportionate adverse impact. The nature of the employer justification is substantially
relaxed and the burden is explicitly declared to be one of production only developments both previewed in Watson. The third, and new, alteration in the
evidence relating to defense is a considerable limitation on the substance of the
"lesser discriminatory alternative" which the plaintiff may propose in an effort
to overcome the employer's stated justification. Each of these changes is addressed in turn.
1. Identification and Causation
The Wards Cove majority wholeheartedly embraced the Watson requirements of identification and causation. Plaintiffs had difficulty demonstrating
"that ... the application of a specific or particular employment practice...
created the disparate impact under attack. ' '2° ° Once again the problem for the
Court lay in the relationship between the impact and some notion of defendants'
195. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989-91, 999-1000 (1988); id. at 1000,

1006-11 (Blackmun, J.,concurring); id. at 1011 (Stevens, J.,concurring).
196. Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2119.

197. Nash v. City of Jacksonville, 905 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding evidence of adverse
impact of firefighters test sufficient even under Wards Cove standards); Lowe v. Commack Union
Free School Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1369-70 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting Wards Cove's language on comparative systemic statistics but not requiring such proof in impact case).
198. See generally infra text accompanying notes 200-33.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18. The Court's statement in Wards Cove that
plaintiff must show the challenged practice to have a "significantly disparate impact" on the protected group, 109 S.Ct. at 2125, parrots the "significantly discriminatory impact" phrase found at
the exact place in the Watson opinion that Justice O'Connor suggests the need for a technical measure of disparity more rigorous than EEOC's 80% rule. Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 & n.3 (plurality
opinion).

200. Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2124.
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fault. Unless the plaintiff shows that each challenged practice has a significantly
disproportionate adverse impact, businesses could be "potentially liable for 'the
myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composi-

tion of their work forces.' "201 Following Watson's logic if not its facts, Wards
Cove made no distinction between objective and subjective practices in terms of
causation; it simply extended Watson's holding to objective practices. A rigor-

ous causal showing is required in all impact cases. 20 2
Requiring the plaintiff to isolate and identify the particular employment

practices that caused the disproportionate impact brought a cry of protest from
the dissent. Justice Stevens acknowledged that plaintiff must tender proof of a
causal nexus between defendant's conduct and the discrimination alleged, 20 3 but
found the majority's language overly burdensome and unfair to the extent that it

called for isolating the practice among several that caused an adverse impact. 2°4
The dissent's disagreement on this issue, as on the question of appropriate guidelines for the essentially irrelevant evidence of overall workforce underrepresentation, drew more strength from the inhospitable spirit of the majority's opinion
than from an articulated disagreement with its substance. In fact, insistence on

reliable evidence that an identified practice caused an adverse impact is reasonable, particularly since most intentionally discriminatory uses of unidentifiable
or immeasurable discretionary practices will be redressable through individual
20 5
or systemic evidence of disparate treatment.

2.

Reformulating the Business Defense

A more doubtful decision that carried over from Watson to Wards Cove is
the reformulation of the employer's defense to a prima facie case of adverse

impact. Rejecting the earlier formulations that ran the gamut from simple job

relatedness to strict business necessity,20 6 the new Wards Cove majority, again
taking its cues from Watson, framed the nature of defendant's burden in terms
far less demanding: "The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the
'20 7
employer's justification for his use of the challenged practice.
The Court pointedly observed that the challenged practice need not be "es201. Id. at 2125 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 992 (plurality opinion)).
202. The Court anticipated critics who would argue that the causal requirement was unduly
burdensome. Justice White sought to allay such comments by noting that liberal discovery rules and
EEOC record keeping requirements would ease the burden. Wards Cove, at 2125 (quoting Uniform
Guidelines, supra note 54, at § 1607.4(A)). The Court went on to note, however, that many recordkeeping requirements did not apply to seasonal employers, Id., at 2125 n.10, thereby confirming the
dissent's point that the majority "requires practice-by-practice statistical proof of causation, even
where, as here, such proof would be impossible." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id.at 2133
n.20 (Stevens, J.,dissenting) ("lit is undisputed that petitioners did not preserve such [necessary]
records.").
203. Id. at 2130 & n.12, 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 2132-33 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (charging the majority with betraying basic principles of fairness and the requirement that Title VII litigation be treated like any other lawsuit).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 122-30.
206. The range of previous statements of the test are discussed supra at text accompanying notes
77-90. See also L. MoDIEsKA, supra note 57, at 50-53 (surveying lower court renditions).
207. Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2126.
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sential" or "indispensable" to pass muster. 20 8 The "reasoned" review seeks only
to ensure that the challenged practice "serve[ ], in a significant way, the legitimate goals of the employer." 2° 9 The Court gave no guidance as to the content
of a "legitimate" goal. Legitimacy apparently has the same pallid meaning any reason other than discrimination - as in the setting of the "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" defense to a case of individual disparate treatment.
Moreover, if the practice need only serve this undefined goal in a "significant"
way, the employer presumably need not show that a demonstrable or manifest
need for the practice exists, let alone that the questionable practice is a matter of
strict necessity.
Thus what began in Watson as an essential mechanism to control the expansion of impact analysis into the realm of disputes about subjective employment criteria ended in Wards Cove with a new and substantially diluted formula
applicable to all disparate impact cases.
3.

Reallocating the Burden of Persuasion

The Wards Cove majority also confirmed the Watson decision to assign the
employer only a burden of production on this defense. Griggs v. Duke Power
Company2 10 placed on the employer a burden of "showing" the justification, 2 11
a requirement that most courts and commentators interpreted as placing not
only the initial burden of going forward but also the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion on the employer. 2 12 By contrast, the Wards Cove Court squarely approved
the unsupported assertion in Watson that the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion is
on the challengers. 2 13 The Court offered two justifications for this allocation,
notwithstanding "earlier decisions [that] can be read as suggesting otherwise."12 14 First, it adverted to Federal Rule of Evidence 301 which states that,
absent an act of Congress, a "presumption" shifts only the burden of production. 2 15 Second, it adopted a theory of conceptual symmetry: Requiring the
challenger to retain the burden of persuasion conforms to disparate treatment
practice. 2 16 In both Title VII configurations, Justice White argued, the statutory language required plaintiffs to show that the discrimination was "'because
of.

.

.

race.'

"1217

Neither justification withstands close scrutiny. The need for symmetry is
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2125-26.
210. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
211. See id. at 432.
212. See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2130-31 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting
from more than a dozen Supreme Court and lower court formulations of the defendant's burden); see
supra note 145.
213. "'The ultimate burden of proving that discrimination ... has been caused by a specific
employment practice remains with the plaintiff at alltimes.'" Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 997) (emphasis added in Wards Cove).
214. Id,
215. Id

216. Id
217. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988)).
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not readily apparent, unless there is no longer any distinction between impact
and treatment analysis, which seems doubtful. 2 18 One is tempted to suggest that
the reference to rule 301 is either a makeweight or a reflection of the search for a
convenient hiding place. Rule 301 addresses the effect given to presumptions
unless "otherwise provided for by Act of Congress. '2 19 The Court omitted entirely any discussion of Title VIIs allocation of burdens or its previous interpretations of legislative intent. It thus begged the question of whether rule 301
applies.
In fact, Title VII embraces a number of contexts in which the employer is
encumbered with true affirmative defenses, complete with a burden of persuasion. One example is the defense of bona fide occupational qualification by
which the employer avoids liability for policies or decisions that facially discriminate. 220 The systemic treatment case also shifts the burden of persuasion to the
defendant if plaintiffs present statistics illustrating gross underrepresentation of
a protected group. The prima facie disproportionate adverse impact case, at
least as Watson and Wards Cove shore it up, points to the adverse impact of a
single practice roughly as reliably as systemic treatment evidence points to gross,
across-the-board underrepresentation. Given the comparable statistical showings, why should the Court fail to require the defendant to bear the risk of nonpersuasion in defending either type of prima facie showing?
4. Limiting The Utility of "Less Discriminatory Alternatives"
The Court's work did not end with refraining the business defense test or
reallocating the respective trial burdens. The issue of less discriminatory alternatives still remained. Realigning the analysis in highly restrictive terms, the
Court wrote: "[I]f on remand the case reaches this point, and... [the employee]
cannot persuade the trier of fact on the question of [the employer's] business
necessity, [the employee] may still be able to prevail. '22 1 To do so the employee
must persuade the trial court that there is an alternative that is "equally as effective" as the employer's original practice which would meet the employer's needs

with less discriminatory impact on plaintiff's group. Borrowing from Justice
O'Connor's observation in Watson, the Court added that the "'cost or other
burdens of proposed alternative selection devices are relevant in determining
whether they would be equally as effective.' "222
This approach to alternatives is perhaps the single feature of Wards Cove
that most trivializes the impact mode of proof. That stage of the case is vitally
important under the Wards Cove refashioning of the employer defense, because
218. See supra text accompanying notes 192-97.
219. FED. R. EVID. 301.
220. See § 703(e), 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(e) (1988); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333
(1982). In Dothard, where neutral height/weight requirements were found unlawful on an impact

theory, Alabama successfully defended a distinct practice that expressly excluded women from holding contact positions in maximum security prisons as a bona fide occupational qualification. Id. at
332-37.

221. Wards Cove, 109 S. CL at 2126.
222. Id. at 2127 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (plurality opinion)).

42
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any employer who has continued to litigate past the plaintiff's prima facie showing at trial will be able to produce some evidence that its practice serves to some
uncertain degree any "legitimate" business goal. 223 Thus, as with individual
disparate treatment, where most cases after Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine224 were won or lost on the battleground of "pretext," most
impact cases under a Wards Cove regime will turn on the issue of less discriminatory alternatives.
The Court's handling of the less discriminatory alternatives option drains it
of practical vitality. The suggestion that increased financial or other costs associated with the proposed alternative preclude it from being considered "equally
as effective as the challenged practice" 2 25 usually should render the option unavailing to the plaintiff. After all, if the employer, with its greater knowledge of
the demands and possibilities of the business, could implement an alternative
practice that serves its needs as well and cheaply as the original practice but with
less discriminatory impact, would it not have done so initially, to avoid the expense of litigation? The only precedent for the position that minimal incremental cost to the employer will defeat a showing of employment discrimination is in
the area of religious discrimination; 226 but in that setting there is a genuine concern that stringent interpretation of the Title VII employer duty to "reasonably
accommodate" an employee's religious practices 227 could result in an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 228 In other contexts the Court has consist229
ently rejected a general cost defense to discrimination in employment.
The Wards Cove Court conceptualized the plaintiff's showing of alternatives in the impact case as akin to the rebuttal phase of the inferential form of
treatment discrimination. The required proof of a less discriminatory alternative
"would prove that... [employers] were using their tests merely as a 'pretext' for
discrimination. ' 230 Taken literally, the Court is saying that the plaintiff's demonstration of a less discriminatory alternative must be so powerful as to yield the
conclusion that the employer's earlier adoption of a different practice to accomplish the same goal was motivated by a desire to discriminate. If so, whether the
223. Less discriminatory alternatives would probably have remained a key battleground even
under the vetoed Civil Rights Act of 1990. See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONo. REC.
S9966 (daily ed. July 15, 1990) (President Bush vetoed the Act on Oct. 22, 1990; the Senate failed by
one vote to override the veto on Oct. 24, 1990); see infra text accompanying notes 481-82.
224. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
225. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127.
226. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); infra text accompanying note 406.
227. § 7010), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ej) (1988).
228. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (Connecticut statute providing
employees with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their chosen sabbath held to violate
the Establishment Clause); cf Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1986)
(distinguishing Title VII from the statute in Thornton in that the former calls for reasonable accommodation of an employee's religious beliefs and practices rather than absolute accommodation).
229. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (requiring gender-neutral pension contributions despite the greater cost of providing those benefits to women);

Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463
U.S. 1073 (1983) (mandating that similar retirement benefits be paid to male and female employees).
230. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425

(1975)).
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majority wishes to retain an impact case at all is in doubt, especially given the
diluted nature of the employer defense and the placement of the persuasion burden on the plaintiff.
But if "pretext" is accorded the meanings it receives in the context of individual disparate treatment, an impact plaintiff could persuade the fact-finder
that a less discriminatory alternative exists without necessarily establishing an
unlawful motive. In those cases, the plaintiff may show pretext in one of two
generic ways. She may demonstrate either that the employer took her race or
gender into account explicitly or, more obliquely, that the employer's proffered
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is simply implausible. 2 31 The fact that the
Court seems intent on preserving the impact case 232 suggests that its notion of
"pretext" in the context of lesser discriminatory alternatives may be little more
than a rhetorical nod in the direction of a misplaced sense of symmetry.
The Court's discussion of the less discriminatory alternative issue also generated complications for trial procedure. It ends with this curious passage:
If... [the employees], having established a prima facie case, come
forward with alternatives to... [the employers'] hiring practices that
reduce the racially-disparate impact of practices currently being used,
and... [the employers] refuse to adopt these alternatives, such a refusal would belie a claim by [the employers].., that their incumbent
2 33
practices are being employed for nondiscriminatory reasons.
The refusal would confirm, in short, that the existing practices are a "pretext"
for covert discrimination.
Implicit in the Court's new approach to the proof of alternative practices is
a timing aspect that accounts for the strangeness of the passage. When does the
Court suppose the employer will reject the proposed alternative - during discovery, during settlement negotiations, at trial? According to the Court's own
account, the plaintiffs' evidence of alternatives becomes relevant (1) after they
establish a prima facie case, including evidence of less discriminatory alternatives, and (2) after the employer comes forward with a credible and legitimate
justification for the practice. If the employer refuses to adopt the effective, legs
detrimental option, a pretext conclusion arises.234 The most logical reading of
the quote permits the employer to admit, during trial if necessary, that plaintiffs
suggested a better, less discriminatory practice. 235 As a grammatical matter,
this interpretation is supported by the use of the present tense: the pretext conclusion arises if the employer "refuse[s] to adopt" the proposed measures.23 6
231. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983); Texas

Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); see Patterson v. McLean Credit

Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2378-79 (1989).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 192-97.
233. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126-27.
234. Id. at 2125-26.
235. Presumably, this necessity would arise if the defendant and counsel predict an unfavorable
verdict during trial. One has cause to wonder how often this will happen, given the hurdles placed in
the paths of disparate impact plaintiffs.
236. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126-27.
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Most importantly, if the analysis offered here is correct, the employer's refusal is
a condition precedent to recovery.
One possible effect of the employer's admission that it rejected plaintiff's
suggested alternative would be a limitation on or avoidance of liability for
backpay.2 37 Even more clearly, an employer's mid-litigation adoption of the
proposed less discriminatory alternative would undermine plaintiff's need for an

injunction. In addition, the Court apparently gave no thought to the interface
between defendant's rejection of a proposed alternative and Federal Rule of Evidence 408, which makes offers of compromise inadmissible. 238
How this new condition will operate outside Wards Cove's particular procedural context is unclear. Presumably, sometime during discovery the plaintiff
and defendant will discuss settlement and during a conference the employer will
either accede to or reject the proposed alternative. If the employer rejects the
alternative, the condition precedent is satisfied. During her case in chief the
plaintiff will proffer evidence of the alternative and the defendant's disapproval.
If the employer agrees to the new, less burdensome condition, the matter ends.
One might then conclude that Wards Cove has created an incentive to use the
litigation process to produce less discrimination by encouraging employers to
restructure their employment practices without proof of intentional discrimination. Once the enlightened employer is confronted with equivalent practices
that yield more socially desirable consequences, he will embrace them. At the
same time, however, the Court offers no explanation why plaintiff's success
should hinge on the employer's decision to accept or reject an alternative.
Another scenario runs along these lines. Suppose the employer is accused
of using a discriminatory practice, and that during discovery plaintiff proposes a
less discriminatory alternative. The employer rejects the alternative and the case
goes to trial. If that alternative was not reasonably available as an optional industry practice before the settlement conference, the employer will argue that
although it might be liable for backpay from the time it became aware of the
alternative, it is inequitable to hold it liable for backpay that accrued before the
alternative was drawn to its attention. After all, according to this argument, the
employer has offered evidence at trial that the incumbent practice is legitimate.
The practice becomes pretextual only when the new alternative is proposed. In
this sense, pretext depends upon timing and the state of industry practice.2 39
237. Cf Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 241 (1982) (defendant's unconditional tender
of reinstatement avoids its liability for backpay accruing thereafter).
238. One can foresee a problem arising in age discrimination litigation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988), where jury trials are routine and
liability principles are largely interchangeable with those developed under Title VII. See Trans

World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). Federal Rule of Evidence 408 makes inadmissible "[e]vidence of (1) furnishing or offering... to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering... to

accept, a valuable consideration in compromising... a claim which was disputed." FED. RULE
EVID. 408. In age litigation, the defendant's refusal to accept a reasonable less discriminatory alter-

native, even one that is more expensive than the incumbent practice, could impermissibly operate to
its detriment, since the jury might view the refusal itself as evidence of discrimination.

239. As others have pointed out, it is not clear what "pretext" means in this context. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RIcHARDs, supra note 21, at 194-95. Ordinarily, one associates the term
with a state of mind, and that is clearly its connotation in treatment cases. Here, however, defendant
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The likelihood that employers will prevail with such an argument is small.
The Court generally has not absolved employers from Title VII liability for violations occurring after the statute's effective date merely because, by the time of
trial or decision, the acts of discrimination have ceased. 24° Of course this begs
the question of whether the employer has committed any violation before the
plaintiff presents it with an alternative practice. If it has, and the only available
remedy is an injunction, the impact mode becomes purely prophylactic, something suggested neither by statutory text nor by the Court.24 1
The Wards Cove dissent vented most of its frustration on the Court's willingness to place the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion on the challengers, a willingness that betrayed a "profound[ ] misapprehen[sion]" of the distinction between
treatment and impact cases.242 Justice Stevens labelled the business necessity
inquiry a "classic example of an affirmative defense," and found the Court's
"casual - almost summary - rejection" of precedent tantamount to a renunciation of a legislatively approved interpretation of the statute. 243 On his reading,
only Congress has the power to restore what Wards Cove took away: disparate
impact analysis faithful to its progenitor, Griggs.
Wards Cove exacted a heavy toll for the Watson plaintiffs' success in expanding the reach of disparate impact. The theoretical cost was the unraveling
of the fundamental assumptions of the impact mode. Under a regime of functional equivalence, a finding of impact looks very much like a proxy for intent.
The revised theory also had several concrete trial practice consequences. To
justify a significant disproportionate adverse impact the employer would henceforth only have to offer some evidence that its practice served, to an uncertain
degree, any legitimate business purpose. Plaintiffs would then bear the ultimate
burden of proving the contrary, and in doing so they would be limited to evidence of less discriminatory alternatives as cheap and effective as the employer's
own chosen practice.
V. PRICE WATERHOUSE

AND THE FUTURE

OF DISPARATE TREATMENT

Ann Hopkins, a senior manager, was on the partnership track at Price
Waterhouse, a "Big Eight" accounting firm which in 1982 had 662 partners,
has demonstrated a legitimate business reason for the practice. Thus, the "pretext" showing is at
best relative, that is, it is only a pretext for discrimination because the employer has been shown the
error of its ways and still refuses to change. Alternatively, pretext may have nothing to do with
intent. If the employer, having justified its practice in nondiscriminatory terms, nevertheless honestly believes that its incumbent practices are superior to those proposed (an easy situation to hypothesize in light of ordinary inertial forces), but the trialcourt disagrees, the court could impose
liability without necessarily impugning the employer's motives. See supra text accompanying note
231.
240. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
241. Indeed, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975), where the Court first
explained that compensation is a crucial remedial goal of Title VII, was itself a case where only
unintentionally discriminatory neutral practices were at issue.
242. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2132 n.18 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that this allocation had a very recent pedigree and was put forward in Watson without

citation).
243. Id. at 2131-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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only seven of whomwere women. The partnership process began with a proposal for candidacy after a requisite term of employment, followed by solicitations
for comments from the existing partners. Thereafter, the nominations went
through committees before a vote of the full partnership. In general, those partners who knew something about the candidates responded to the initial solicitation. In 1982 eighty-eight candidates were proposed; plaintiff was the only
woman among them. Of the eighty-eight, the partners elevated forty-seven to
partnership, rejected twenty-one, and put twenty, including plaintiff, on "hold."
The "hold" category meant that the partnership candidate could be reconsidered the following year. Plaintiff was not reconsidered.
The partners' comments about plaintiff were mixed. 244 Everyone considered her intelligent, productive, competent, and aggressive. She billed more
hours than any other partnership candidate. 245 She played a key role in bringing into the firm a twenty-five million dollar government contract, a feat that put
her above all other candidates in terms of soliciting new accounts. 24 6 She had,
however, a history of strained relations with the staff, in fact, even her supporters were critical of her interpersonal skills.24 7 With unanimity that betrays a
numbed vision of America's potential, every judge and Justice who reviewed the

facts of the case agreed that her difficulties in dealing with staff formed a legitimate basis for partnership rejection, despite the fact that she brought into the
firm contracts worth between $34 and $44 million. 248

Hopkins's lack of interpersonal skills tells only half the story. Even as that
charge was leveled against her, a number of partners criticized Hopkins for being unwomanly. They apparently insisted that her behavior conform to their
stereotypical view of women. One of her supporters, in a comment that revealed
more about the insidious nature of stereotypes than it did about his motives,
suggested that her chances for promotion would improve-if she learned to "walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 249 Because the partners would not have
244. Thirty-two partners responded to the solicitation, thirteen positively, eight negatively, three
recommended hold, and'eight had no informed opinion. Id.
245. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775
(1989).
246. According to the court of appeals, "[t]he firm's Senior Partner... characterized one of...
[the] contracts [she helped win] ... as a 'leading credential' that enabled the firm to win similar
business from other federal agencies." Id. She was credited with bringing in between $34 and $44
million during her tenure. Id; see also Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1112
(D.D.C. 1985) (finding that "[n]one of the other partnership candidates... had a comparable record
in terms of successfully securing major contracts for the partnership"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
247. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1782 (plurality opinion).
248. See supra note 246. Having practiced in large law firms, we cannot resist the urge to suggest that had Ms. Hopkins been a man, her "interpersonal skills" problem would not have existed,
notwithstanding the unanimity among all judges and justices who reviewed the case. Our experiences tell us that interpersonal difficulties with subordinates, as opposed to clients, law firm peers, or
superiors, would likely not weigh in at all as against such demonstrated capacity as a "rainmaker."
249. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in part,rev'd in
part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). The evidence of stereotypes in
this case and their insidious nature is discussed in more detail later. See infra text accompanying
notes 323-67.
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demanded such traits from a man, they treated her differently, at least in part,
because of her gender.
A.

Causation and Mixed Motives

One cannot recover under Title VII unless the employer's discriminatory
treatment occurred "because of... sex." Sometimes that showing is uncomplicated;250 more often establishing intent is subtle. Evidence scholars have long
recognized that one can never prove state of mind directly; one can only glimpse
its presence circumstantially. 25 1 In any event, the Court assumed in its pre-Price
Waterhouse jurisprudence that a single impulse moves the employer who discriminates. Seldom is reality as simple as the Court's assumption. Torts scholars have grappled with problems involved in multiple causation for decades.
The next two subsections address first, the problem in theory, and second, the
Court's resolutions of the issue.
1. The Theory of Multiple Causation
Distinctions in kind between tort problems of cause in fact and Title VII
mixed motive issues suggest that the former is an inappropriate model for the
latter. Nevertheless, courts confronting the issue in Title VII have borrowed
almost uniformly from torts to analyze the mixed motive issue. 252 Accordingly,
we begin with a brief general discussion of causation in tort law.
The basic concept of cause in fact, or "but-for" causation, is deceptive. The
premise of the "but-for" requirement is familiar: if plaintiff would have suffered
an injury despite the defendant's substandard conduct, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover; the defendant has not in fact caused the injury.253 The pluperfect "would have" is necessarily conjectural. Professors Hart and Honore stated
the issue succinctly some thirty years ago: When events are causally related,
they occupy a "place ...in a set of... general propositions... [distinguished]
by the fact that the [causal relations] are used ...to justify inferences, not
merely as to what has or will happen, but 'counterfactual' inferences as to what
would have been the case, if some actual event which in fact happened, had not
happened. ' 254 The cause-in-fact inquiry demands the creation of a hypothetical
25 5
world.
250. See, eg., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976) (discharg-

ing white, but not black, employees for identical misconduct constitutes discrimination because of

race).
251. See infra notes 316-18 and accompanying text for discussion of this issue in the Price
Waterhouse context.
252. Price Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1784 n.2 (plurality opinion).
253. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
254. H. HART & A.

& D. OWENS, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS].

KEETON

§ 41, at 264-65 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter

HONORE, CAUSATION AND THE LAW

14 (1959).

255. In the typical tort case our hypothesis is assumed. For instance, picture plaintiff, P, kneel-

ing behind a car parked in a driveway when he is hit by the driver, D, who backs the car up without
using the rearview mirror. Although D's conduct is clearly substandard, the court will conclude

that D is not liable. Even if D had looked behind her, she would not have seen P; "the defendant's
failure to look in the rearview mirror did not cause the plaintiff's injuries." Jordan v. Jordan, 220
Va. 160, 163, 257 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1979). The court reaches this conclusion not because the judges
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Both the need for and the validity of the hypothesis are more attenuated
when multiple events cause one injury. In tort law this can occur in at least
three ways, only one of which is central to understanding the mixed motive
case.2 5 6 Imagine two sources of harm combining to produce one indivisible 2in57
jury, but only one of the two sources originating in substandard conduct.
Under these facts, potential liability is and should be imposed on the negligent
defendant, even though it cannot be said that the defendant "in fact caused"
plaintiff's injury, which, by hypothesis, may have resulted from the nonnegligent
source. 258 Liability is imposed because the court seems to ask: Are we a better
society if we impose liability, given defendant's substandard conduct and the
ultimate unknowability of what might have happened based on the counterfactual hypothesis? The answer is yes; the court allocates the risk of nonpersuasion
to the defendant to absolve itself of liability, after plaintiff's prima facie showing
of substandard conduct.

2. The Special Problem of "Mixed Motives"
Mixed motive cases bear remarkable resemblance to the tort problem of
multiple causation, but the resemblance is misleading. Mixed motive cases are
not about two or more causes; motives are not causes. In mixed motive litigation, the court is asked to decide what to do when two or more motives produce
one result, such as loss of job or failure to get promoted or transferred. Lower
courts struggled for years with the proper "because of" formula to resolve these
mixed motive cases. 2 59 Price Waterhouse presented a fairly typical case and
posed a deceptively simple problem: Was Ms. Hopkins denied promotion "because of" her gender? Text, however, does not tell us how much of a factor
know that D would not have seen P had she used her mirror, or because logic dictates that conclusion. Rather, the court's holding rests on unarticulated generalizations that reflect the judges' collective experience with relations between events. H. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 254, at 9-14.
Although no one seriously disputes the court's conclusion, bear in mind that the conclusion is
neither dictated by logic nor necessarily correct. It represents nothing more (or less) than an experi-

ential judgment, rooted in statistical probability, about the connections among events.
256. In one scenario, two instances of substandard conduct may conjoin to create a single injury,
and the timing of the two events may prevent proof as to which event first occurred. See, eg.,
Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W. 2d 731 (1952); Corey v.
Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902). In a second scenario, there are also separate instances

of negligent conduct, but the evidence shows that (a) only one actor could have caused the injury,
and (b) P cannot discern which of the two actors caused the harm. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80,
199 P.2d 1 (1948). In both configurations defendants were required to bear the burden of
persuasion.
257. See, eg., Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. R.R. Co., 191 Wis. 610, 211 N.W. 913 (1927);
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R.R., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920) (holding a

railway company liable when a fire it caused joined with another of unknown origin to destroy
plaintiff's property), overruled on other groundssub nor. Borsheim v. Great N.R.R., 149 Minn. 210,
216, 183 N.W. 519, 521 (1921).
258. In Anderson judgment was against the defendant, even though the nonnegligent source of
harm was suff cient alone to cause the entire harm, so long as the negligent source of harm was a

"1substantial factor" in bringing about the injury. Anderson, 146 Minn. at 434, 179 N.W. at 46 (jury

trial instructions upheld). See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 253, § 41, at 267-68;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965).

259. The split of authority is noted in Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1784 n.2 (plurality
opinion).
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gender must be, relative to a permissible factor, before the court should impose
liability.
The typical mixed motive case resembles the multiple causation tort scenario because an impermissible "cause" combines with an apparently innocent
"cause" to produce a harm. That resemblance, though, is largely superficial,
owing more to shared language than shared etiology. At the theoretical level,
tort investigations are distinct from Title VII actions in at least two ways. First,
the but-for cause element of a tort is by definition wholly divorced from questions of motive; the lawfulness vel non of defendant's conduct is irrelevant. As
Professor Green notes, "[tihe moment some moral consideration is introduced
into the inquiry the issue is no longer one of causal relation, . . . [which] is a
neutral issue, blind to right and wrong."'26° This is so because motivation need
not recur; and it is the routine spatial and temporal recurrence among events
that permits the fact-finder in tort to generalize about the relation among the
particular events sub judice.26 1 Second, in multiple-cause tort cases the court
assumes independence among events; it assumes that two independent acts join
to produce one harm. If racial and gender stereotyping are pervasive, it is not at
all clear that one should assume sufficient independent "legitimate" employer
motivation. In fact, precisely because racist and sexist thoughts are so deeply
imbedded in our "cultural belief system," 262 the idea that one can distinguish
among such motives, especially where one of them is subscribed to unconsciously, reflects a "false dichotomy. '26 3 It may be impossible to ferret out lawful and unlawful motives by asking what decision would have been reached on
the basis of the lawful motive alone.
In the tort context, plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving cause in
fact. Plaintiff, to establish causation, must demonstrate, and persuade the jury
that his hypothesis is valid. The two distinguishing features described above
combine with at least two additional distinctions in the mixed motive, disparate
treatment action: the existence of the statutory prohibition itself, and, following
from the statute, the finding that illicit motives tainted the decision. If we carry
the tort analogy one step further, the existence of the statutory prohibition is
akin to the traditional negligence per se doctrine. 26 In the Title VII context the
260. Green, The CausalRelation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MiCH. L. REv. 543, 549 (1962).
See H. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 254, at 21 (in "interpersonal" transactions the inquiry is
into reasons for harm, not relations between physical events).
261. H. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 254, at 21, write the following:
[T]he statement that a person acted for a given reason does not require for its defence
generalizations asserting connexions between types of events. When we assert that one
person acted as he did because of another's threats our point is that this was his conscious
reason, and an honest account from him of his deliberations would settle the question of its
truth or falsity. It is no part of the meaning of such a statement that if the same circumstances recurred he would do the same again. The point is that some model other than one
which is based on the experience of recurring physical events is necessary to explain a
mixed motive case.
262. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 322 (specifically addressing the cognitive and psychological
foundations and dimensions of racial motives).
263. Id.

264. The unexcused violation of the statute, as Justice Cardozo pointed out, "is negligence."
Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 168, 126 N.E. 614, 814-15 (1920). The issue is admittedly more
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argument for liability is even stronger than in the traditional negligence per se
context. Whereas the typical negligence per se case pretermits the question of
causation, in mixed motive cases the court begins the burden of proof analysis
with an adjudicated finding that an impermissible motive played a part in producing the injury.265 In light of that litigated conclusion, there are no clear cut
policy reasons to offer the defendant a second bite of an exonerating apple, especially given the difficulty of separating lawful from unlawful motives.
In theory, at least three possible solutions derived from the tort analogy
existed before Price Waterhouse.
Solution #1: Following something like a pure "substantial factor" test, a court could simply find that the employer made his decision
266
because of race. This solution is consistent with section 703(a)(1)
and with tort law. In light of the employer's conduct respecting a protected group and the inference of intent drawn therefrom, it is a "discharge... because of such individual's race."'267 Moreover, in a case
like Hopkins's, solution #1 is the optimal resolution if, using a comparative approach, the court determines that a man presenting her mix
of credentials would have been promoted.

Solution #2: One potential problem with Solution #1 isthat it
appears to collide with section 706(g)'s mandate that an employer may
fire an employee for any reason other than discrimination based on
race. 268 Thus, if the employer could have denied partnership to Ms.
Hopkins for lack of "interpersonal skills,"'269 the argument holds, the
decision is not "on account of" gender. Solution #2 permits the defendant to demonstrate that he would not have promoted Ms. Hopkins
anyway, that is, he would have made the "same decision" even if he
had not adverted to an improper criterion.
Solution #3: A third possibility opts for liability under section
703(a)(1) without a remedy under section 706(g).270 The idea builds
on the fact that Congress separated the liability and remedial provisions of the statute; only in the remedial section does Congress state
that the employer is free to make decisions on any ground other than
those proscribed. 27 1 The theory assumes that a finding of liability
complex than our analogy suggests. We use it only to suggest that the general tort analogy is itself
more complex than the courts allow.

265. See infra text accompanying notes 276-79.
266. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988), quoted at supra note 4.
267. Id.
268. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
269. This is itself a question of proof. The employer could not discharge a woman for insubordination, for example, if he would not discharge a man under the same circumstances. See McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
270. Brodin, The Standard of Causationin the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy
Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982); C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supranote
21, at 44-51 (building on Brodin's ideas).

271. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); Brodin, supra note 270, at 298-99. Brodin recognizes that the location of § 706(g)'s mandate may simply reflect a limitation on the court's ability to find liability under
§ 703(a). Id. at 298-99. The Price Waterhouse Court rejected Solution #3. That recommended
approach, however, may have been even stronger than Brodin realized. The limitation he describes
as an alternative understanding of § 706(g) is fairly implied in the language of § 703(a) without the
additional language in the remedial provision.
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under section 703(a) has social value apart from any remedy. Even
accepting that assumption, however, this approach is at best theoretical. In the real world, prospective Title VII plaintiffs could not obtain
legal counsel for such cases, because attorneys' fees for prevailing parties are dependent on achieving more than de minimis relief.272
In Price Waterhouse, the Court chose Solution #2, but it did so without
considering the significant distinctions between multiple causation in Title VII
mixed motive suits and in garden variety tort cases, and without resolving fully
the question concerning the type of evidence that will effect a shift in the risk of

nonpersuasion.
B.

The Price Waterhouse Approach
1. Causation

Price Waterhouse generated a plurality opinion by the Wards Cove dissenters, 273 separate concurring opinions by Justices O'Connor and White, and a dissent written by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia. We
take Justice O'Connor's opinion as most representative of the Court's
opinion.

2 74

The Justices took three separate tacks on causation. Justice O'Connor, following basic tort law, wasted little energy in adopting the notion of but-for causation, and wasted still less time in subscribing to the "substantial factor"
variation that applies to problems of multiple causation. 2 75 She stressed that it
is only when the plaintiff makes a strong preliminary showing of illicit intent
that the employer must bear the burden of proving that it would have made the
same decision had it considered permissible criteria alone. 2 76 The critical issue
for Justice O'Connor was the nature of the evidence sufficient to "shift" 277 the
risk of nonpersuasion. For her, only "direct evidence" that a discriminatory
motive played a substantial role in the employment decision would justify the
shift. 2 7 8 Justice White agreed that plaintiffs' prima facie evidence of discriminatory intent must be "substantial," but he was silent as to whether it must also be
272. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 1486 (1989).
273. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens.

274. Prediction is unusually slippery without a majority opinion. The decisions of the recent
past, however, are so firmly committed to erecting barriers to recovery that Justice O'Connor's opinion seems destined to become the opinion of the Court, just as a majority in Wards Cove ultimately
subscribed to the views she expressed in Watson. See also Lowe v. Commack Union Free School
Dist., 866 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying the Watson plurality's demand for more reliable statistical evidence of adverse impact).
275. Price Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1797-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
276. Id. at 1798-99, 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

277. We adopt common, if somewhat misleading terminology in referring here to a "shift." Of
course there is no true shift of burden on a single issue. Plaintiff's persuasion burden throughout the
unadorned, "single motive" McDonnell Douglas individual treatment case is on the issue of the
employer's intentional discrimination. The persuasion burden imposed on the employer in those

cases in which plaintiff carries her burden, yet the evidence reveals that the employer decision may
also have been based in part on a benign consideration, is on a different issue: whether the employer
would have reached the same decision without relying on the motive Title VII condemns.
278. Pr'ce Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1801-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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279

"direct."
In contrast, Justices Brennan and Kennedy engaged in what at times bore
the scars of a scholastic debate over the proper definition of "because of." Justice Brennan rejected "but for" as a synonym for "because of." He interpreted
Title VII's prohibition as meaning that "gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions."' 280 That being the case, requiring the plaintiff to show that a
forbidden motive played a "substantial" role in the decision went too far; rather,
"[t]he critical inquiry ... is whether gender was a factor in the employment
decision at the time it was made. '281 If so, he would place the persuasion bur282
den on the employer as to the "same decision" issue.
Justice Kennedy, by comparison, accused Brennan of writing an opinion
that lacked internal consistency. The language of the statute, in his view, makes
it impossible to find that gender played a causal role in the decision, yet permits
the employer to prove that he would have made the same decision anyway. In
his opinion, if the employer would have made the same decision without considering gender, the decision was not made "because of" gender; "[i]n other words,
there is no violation of the statute absent 'but-for' causation. '28 3 The problem,
according to the dissent, was that after the burden-shift the wrong party - the
2 84
employer - ultimately had to prove the absence of "but-for" causation.
Justice Kennedy's reasoning is flawed. He accuses the plurality of conflating "the question whether causation must be shown with the question how it is
to be shown." 28 5 Yet Justice Brennan's formulation of plaintiff's prima facie
mixed treatment case recognizes that plaintiff must establish improper motivation. Justice Kennedy did not address motivation. Instead, he reasoned in
terms of causation and fell prey to the inherent limitations of the tort analogy:
he confused causation with motivation. To suggest that an employer's decision
was not based on gender because the defendant subsequently establishes that he
would have made the same decision without recourse to an impermissible motive
simply ignores an adjudicated finding of unlawful intent.
More importantly, when Title VII employs the phrase "because of" in the
treatment case, it is not speaking to the temporal and spatial relationship between physical events, which Justice Kennedy implicitly explains cannot both
exist and not exist in recurring relationships. Justice Kennedy's explanation is
accurate but irrelevant. McDonnell Douglas and Burdine28 6 tell us that Title
VII's language, as applied to disparate treatment analysis, refers not to causal
279. Id. at 1795 (White, J., concurring) (relying on Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)).
280. Id. at 1785 (plurality opinion).

281. Id. (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
282. Id. at 1790 (Brennan, J., plurality). Brennan also suggested at this point that there was no
meaningful distinction between his formulation and O'Connor's. Id. at 1790 n.13 (Brennan, .,
plurality).

283. Id. at 1809 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
284. Id. (Kennedy, .., dissenting).
285. Id. at 1807 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

286. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
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relations but to motivation, 287 and motives need not recur if the actor is given a
second chance. Thus, an actor could admit that an impermissible motive tainted
the decisionmaking process, but - because specific motives need not recur or
even predominate - he can still opine that he would have made the same
decision.
Justice Kennedy equated the traditional tort question of causation with the
distinct Title VII question of motivation and disregarded essential issues relating
to the separate question of trial procedure - who, for instance, must show motivation, when and why. Moreover, he failed to discuss the very policies and value
judgments underlying Title VII that traditionally have influenced the allocation
of burdens on the issue of causation.
2. The "Same Decision" Fiction
Finally, in creating the "same decision" test, each of the Justices undertook
the creation of a counterfactual, hypothetical reality that fails to meet the "butfor" test to which they purported to subscribe. Each Justice imagined that we
can separate permissible motives from a sexist mindset historically indulged. If
we cannot expunge unlawful motives, we deceive ourselves if we find as fact that
a decision was more likely than not based on a legitimate business reason.
Under this view, the same decision test is a fiction the Court should not condone
for at least two reasons beyond self-deception. First, it encourages employers to
create personnel files simply to mask previous decisions made on impermissible
bases. Perhaps more importantly, in the absence of an objective evidence requirement of the sort Justice Brennan proposed, 288 the test will conduce inevitably a kind of petty perjury. What employer will fail to take the stand and swear
that he would have made the same decision absent the impermissible motive?
Moreover, the test is not necessary to achieve the result the Court seeks. We can
permit an employer to avoid liability in mixed motive cases without creating an
unnecessary fiction and without these other undesirable consequences if we simply require the employer to prove that he would have made the same decision if
the candidate had been a member of the group most heavily represented in the
workforce, usually a white male.
3.

Burdens of Proof and "Direct" Evidence

The dissenters found the plurality's approach to causation misleading, for
even the plurality appeared to admit that the plaintiff must "effectively" show
28 9
"but-for" causation to place the same decision burden on the employer.
Although Justice Kennedy twice adverted to the "thoughtful" quality of Justice
O'Connor's arguments, he nevertheless opined that the benefits of a burden shift
290
were outweighed by the potential for confusion that such a shift would entail.
He predicted a new generation ofjurisprudence over the meaning of "substantial
287.
288.
289.
290.

See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
See infra text accompanying notes 301-02.
Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1809 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1806, 1811 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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factor" and the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" evidence. 29 1
This latter distinction was born of Justice O'Connor's concern for employers. In general, she subscribed to the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine proof
scheme: the plaintiff bears the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion throughout the
trial. 292 In light of the challenger's "not onerous" 2 93 prima facie showing, the
employer "facing only circumstantial evidence of discrimination" after the
prima facie showing, is entitled to a "presumption of good faith" in his decisionmaking. 2 94 Any departure from that scheme required significant justification
and "outlines... [that were] carefully drawn. '295 For Justice O'Connor, the
employer's "presumption of good faith" could never be overcome in a circumstantial case like McDonnell Douglas. Rather, only when the plaintiff has "direct" evidence of "substantial reliance" upon an impermissible criterion does
this "presumption" dissipate. Only in such unusual cases, then, would Justice
O'Connor consider it warranted to strap the employer with a risk of
296
nonpersuasion.
The relatively simple circumstantial showing that attends the shift in burdens of production in the more common individual treatment case of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine variety explains Justice O'Connor's insistence on
"direct" evidence before she would reallocate the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion.
The very premise of that scheme, she wrote, is the plaintiff's difficulty in unearthing "direct evidence" of discriminatory motives. The substitute, stripped
down McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, should place on the employer only
29 7
the burden of going forward with evidence of justification.
Alternatively, if plaintiff can produce "direct" evidence - testimony about
a slur, or about a policy explicitly geared to gender, or, more doubtfully, reliance
on a stereotype - she has gone as far as she can go; to require plaintiff to continue to carry the ultimate burden of nonpersuasion is simply unfair. 298 Given
such strong plaintiff's evidence, the failure to allocate the risk of nonpersuasion
to the employer in the multifactor, subjective decisionmaking context might be
"tantamount to declaring Title VII inapplicable to such decisions. '299 As Justice O'Connor chided the dissent, if presumptions and burden shifts reflect " 'judicial evaluations of probabilities and [ought] to conform with a party's superior
access to the proof,' one would be hard pressed to think of a situation where it
would be more appropriate to require the defendant to show that its decision
291. Id. at 1812 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (also predicting confusion injury instructions in litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621,
634, both of which recognize counterparts to Title VII's treatment mode).
292. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
293. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 250 (1981)).
294. Id. at 1798-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The inconsistency between this "presumption"
and its progenitor, Burdine, is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 313-15.
295. Id. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
296. Id. at 1800-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
297. Id. at 1801-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
298. Id. at 1802 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
299. Id. at 1803 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 935-37
(1st Cir. 1987); Thompkins v. Morris Brown College, 752 F.2d 558, 563 (11th Cir. 1985)).
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would have been justified by wholly legitimate conceMs. ' '3s°
Justice Brennan placed that burden on the defendant by denominating the
"same decision" issue an affirmative defense.30 1 After the plaintiff shows that a
forbidden criterion was a factor in the adverse employment decision, the employer bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of "objective" evidence
that it would have made the same decision had it not relied on impermissible
factors.30 2 Speaking for the entire Court, he found no persuasive reason to depart from normal standards of proof in civil litigation; the employer need not
show that it would have made the same decision by proof of "clear and convincing evidence." 30 3 Then, speaking for only four members of the Court, he wrote
that the employer must present "some objective evidence as to its probable [i.e.,
same] decision in the absence of an impermissible motive. '' 3° € On this issue,
Justice Brennan responded specifically to Justice White's concurrence. 30 5 Justice White found "no special requirement that the employer [produce] ... objective evidence" to support the "same decision" inquiry. 30 6 He concluded that
any credible testimony that "the action would have been taken for the legitimate
reasons alone... [would constitute] ample proof." 3 0 7 In light of a trial court

finding that the employer had, in fact, relied upon impermissible factors, Justice

Brennan found Justice White's position "baffling.

' 30 8

The dissenters made the doubtful 309 assertion that the "Court" would impose the "same decision" burden on the employer only when plaintiff's prima

facie evidence is "direct" as well as substantial. 3 10 More convincingly, they ob-

300. Id. at 1802 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
359 n.45 (1977)).
301. Id. at 1788 (plurality opinion).
302. Id. at 1790-91 (plurality opinion).
303. Id. at 1792-93 (plurality opinion).
304. Id. at 1791 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
305. Justice Brennan also made a comment apparently addressed to Justice Kennedy, who began
his opinion by counting votes and characterizing the various opinions. Justice Kennedy wrote that
the employer needed to show only that its employment decision "would have [been] justified...
without reference to any impermissible motive." Id. at 1806 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Although
Justice Kennedy referenced that statement to the White and O'Connor opinions, neither opinion will
sustain that reading. Justice Brennan seemed to be speaking for six members of the Court when he
said that "justification" is not the standard; the employer must prove that it would have made the
same decision without reference to the forbidden criterion. Id. at 1791-92 (Brennan, J., plurality).
Justice Kennedy seemed to be saying that if the employer "could" have made the same decision,
it will be exonerated. There is, of course, at least potentially a significant difference between
"would" and "could." Professor Ortiz surveys this issue in the equal protection context and concludes that moving from "would" have made the same decision to "could" have made the same
decision undermines the court's need to analyze the "actual policy's worthiness." Ortiz, supranote
139, at 1113-15. If the Court ultimately subscribes to such a test, it would give teeth to Justice
O'Connor's normative statement in Watson that the courts are not competent to reorder employers'
hiring decisions. See supra texts accompanying notes 158, 162-63. Moreover, the substitution of
"could" for "would" also totally undermines "but-for" causation.
306. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1796 (White, J., concurring).
307. Id. (White, J., concurring).
308. Id. at 1791 n.14 (plurality opinion).
309. See supra text accompanying note 279. If, as the cited text suggests, Justice White took no
position on the "direct" evidence prerequisite, then only four members of the Court, the dissenters
and Justice O'Connor, subscribe to it.
310. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1812 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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served that the plurality's insistence on "objective" evidence to discharge that
burden had failed to carry the day. 311 In any event all the justices agreed that
the quantum of the employer's burden on that issue is the ordinary civil stan312
dard, a preponderance of the evidence.
The "direct-indirect" evidence requirement is hard to assess. It may either
reflect a relatively pedestrian concern about fair trial procedure or, alternatively,
mask a judicially erected, artificial barrier to recovery. If Justice O'Connor
means only that something more than the standard McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
prima facie showing is required to reallocate the risk of nonpersuasion in the
average disparate treatment case, her formulation is unexceptionable.3 13 The
prima facie individual treatment case is not onerous; to some extent it is merely
a procedural device for moving the inquiry forward. It only begins to assay the
employer's intent and therefore provides marginal justification for reversing the
ordinary burdens of persuasion. At the same time, however, Justice O'Connor's
conclusion that the employer is entitled to a presumption of good faith after the
plaintiff's initial McDonnell Douglas showing seems inconsistent with current
law, which permits the imposition of liability immediately after plaintiff's prima
facie case.3 14 This would happen, for example, if, after the prima facie showing,
the employer fails to offer evidence of a legitimate business reason. 315
Justice O'Connor's distinction between types of evidence may betray hostility towards Title VII. If she is suggesting that circumstantial evidence of illicit
intent will not effect the shift at any stage of an inferential treatment case, she
31 6 It
has sorely confused probative value with the nature of the evidence.
presses hard on intellectual vapidness to suggest that only statements which
more or less "directly" reveal an employer's unlawful motives justify a finding
that the employer relied upon an impermissible criterion and in turn warrant a
persuasion burden shift. First, even when such statements of intent are found,
311. The three dissenters joined Justice White in explicitly rejecting the objective evidence requirement. Id at 1806 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor did not squarely address the

point, writing simply that the employer must "demonstrate that with the illegitimate factor removed
from the calculus, sufficient business reasons would have induced it to take the same employment
action." Id at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

312. The trial court had required the employer to meet that burden by clear and convincing
proof. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1120 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). The appellate court affirmed

without discussion. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458,472 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109
S. Ct. 1775 (1989). Without dissent as to this portion of the opinion, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the ordinary preponderance of the evidence standard would adequately serve the public

policies underlying Title VII. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1792-93 (plurality opinion).
313. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985), the Court held that if the
plaintiff has access to direct evidence of discrimination, it could not rely on the McDonnell.Douglas
inferential scheme. Id. at 121. Although Thurston is not mentioned in the Price Waterhouse opin-

ion, the Court seems to be limiting the burden shift in a mixed motive case in a similar fashion.
314. See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1798-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.

316. A common articulation of the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence focuses on whether the fact-finder must make an inference to determine materiality. If the immediate
inference from the evidence is the existence or nonexistence of a material fact, the proof is direct; if
an intermediate inference is required, it is circumstantial. R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E.
KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE 139 (1983); G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO

THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 43 (1987).
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they frequently are not "direct," but only circumstantial evidence of the pro-

scribed conduct, namely, discrimination because of sex. In that sense Justice
O'Connor's test fails in its very first application. 3 17 Second, drawing any conclusion about the probative value of the evidence from the mere fact that it is
circumstantial is impossible; only the particulars of each incident reflect on the
3
weight of the evidence.

18

A third, related problem is the distinction's clear overbreadth. Most employers are circumspect-or will be now that corporate counsel have brought
word of Price Waterhouse home. 3 19 Business managers, like lawyers, often
cover their tracks. Accordingly, it will be difficult for many plaintiffs to point to
such direct evidence. In addition, it is simply too easy to imagine believable
scenarios where probative circumstantial evidence beyond the simple prima facie
showing would clearly reflect improper motives. For example, assume a sys-

temic disparate treatment claim by twenty-five fully qualified minority employees of a company. They prove that on one hundred occasions, they sought but
were denied promotion to management positions and that on each occasion, the
job was held open until filled by a white male. It ignores reality to suppose that
the employer was not engaging in proscribed conduct.
Moreover, read literally, the distinction renders evidence of stereotyping
irrelevant to the burden inquiry, regardless of how rampant its use may be
within a particular plant or company. Evidence of the existence of stereotyping
behavior is not "direct" evidence of motive, but omitting such evidence from the
allocation determination is, at best, shortsighted. As law evolves it soaks up and
digests information provided by other disciplines. 320 No one advocates arbitrarily isolating evolving legal doctrine from sources of information in the behavioral sciences that may provide penetrating insights into the operations of
317. Consider, for example, the statements "I hate women and I'm going to fire her," or "Blacks
just can't work worth a damn and I'm going to lay him off." Both reveal the state of mind of the
speaker; both, however, are only circumstantial evidence of discrimination because of an impermissible motive. All we can ever produce is circumstantial evidence of the thoughts of an individual, even
if a letter says "I fired her because she's a woman." Those thoughts are forever immune to direct
examination. There is no direct evidence of intent in this case. See G. LILLY, supranote 316, at 248
& n.3; McComIcK, supra note 42, § 295; C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note
21, at 34.
318. See, eg., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) ("Ec]ircumstantial evidence...
is intrinsically no different from testimonial [direct] evidence"); G. LILLY, supra note 316, at 43-44
(no conclusion can be drawn about probative value from the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence). Professor Prosser asks rhetorically: "There are footprints in the mud, and a
hundred eyewitnesses testify on oath that they sat there the whole time and no one passed by. Can a
jury find that someone did?" W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 238 (8th ed. 1988). And, of course, some "direct" evidence is notoriously unreliable. See
Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of CriminalIdentification: The Gapfrom Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA.
L. REv. 1079 (1973).
319. See C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 21, at 34; Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 806-14 (1989) (discussing the current debate within feminist circles on the merits of "sameness" or "difference" as a way of achieving equality for women).
320. See generally Collier, Precedentand LegalAuthority A CriticalHistory, 1988 Wis. L. REV.
771 (discussing a theory of precedential authority based on the assumptions of the natural and social
sciences); Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence,85 COLUM. L. REv. 38 (1985) (discussing the evolutionary tradition in Anglo-American jurisprudence).
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discrimination. Regrettably, Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement
does just that.
Finally, Justice O'Connor herself supports the imposition of a persuasion
burden on the employer in a different kind of treatment case: the classwide,
"pattern and practice" case grounded in evidence of systemic disparate treatment. 32 1 Yet there, as in the individual treatment case, the ultimate conclusion
about intentional discrimination rests only on statistical inference. Granted the
inference is both stronger and broader than in the individual case, but the fact
remains that plaintiff's evidence is credited as demonstrating unlawful discrimination despite its lack of resemblance to any other type of evidence Justice
O'Connor considers "direct."
Given the number of times she reiterated the need for direct evidence, and
her generally insensitive view of evidence of stereotyping, Justice O'Connor's

"direct evidence" requirement may represent more than a simple reaction to the
relatively easily met prima facie burden in a treatment case. If so, and if the
"direct-indirect" distinction is interpreted to preclude a burden shift in the absence of written statements or oral testimony that bear immediately on the employer's motives under this scenario, one can conclude that the direct evidence
mandate reflects one of at least two positions. It may reflect an artificially imposed barrier to recovery that simply mirrors arbitrary judicial disfavor for the
cause of action. 322 Alternatively, the requirement may represent an attachment
to individual autonomy that refuses to find blame in the absence of substantial,
direct evidence of subjective bad faith.
4. Expert Testimony of Gender Stereotyping
A large part of plaintiff's case in Price Waterhouse was built on the existence of gender sensitive stereotypes that permeated the thinking of some number
of the firm's male-dominated partnership hierarchy. The problem of linking
those illicit, largely unconscious motives to the liability-dependent finding that
an adverse employment decision was made "because of... sex" occupied much
of the lower courts' opinions and informed the Court's resolution of the issues
discussed above.
One unambiguous aim of Title VII is the equal treatment of women and
men in the labor pool. 32 3 As one commentator writes: "[S]exual equality...
321. Price Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1799 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) and Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)).
322. For a contrary conclusion, see Note, Clearingthe Mixed-Motive Smokescreen: An Approach
to DisparateTreatment under Title VII, 87 MICH. L. REv. 863, 877-82 (1989). The writer's empiri-

cal assumption is that most employers in fact have more than one motive. Id. at 877-82. Yet the
argument is made that the Court should adopt a direct evidence test in part because in mixed motive
cases, the Court is not convinced by either side's evidence. But if the assumption about multiple

motives is correct, then the court should be impressed when there is an adjudicated finding of an
impermissible motive regardless of the type of evidence that yields the findings. It is unreasonable to
suppose that the discovery of an unlawful motive is dependent upon direct evidence.
323. Title VII's application to gender based discrimination raises unresolved tensions about its

goals similar to the tension underlying its application to race discrimination. See supra texts accompanying notes 19-33, 51-53 & 59-72. The statute's scope and remedial power will depend upon

which of two views of the problem the Court or Congress adopts. In one modest, if yet unrealized
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means... that those of one sex, in virtue of their sex, should not be in a socially
advantageous position vis-A-vis those of the other sex."'324 In its Guidelines on

DiscriminationBecause of Sex, the EEOC states succinctly that "[tihe refusal to
hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of women in general" is not permissible. 325 The Guidelines also forbid job denial "based on stereotyped characterizations of the

sexes." 326 The Commission gives as one example the notion that "women are
less capable of aggressive salesmanship," noting that "[t]he principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis of individual
capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the
group."1327 Still, federal courts have been somewhat less consistent either in recognizing
employer stereotyping as per se gender discrimination under Title
VII, 32 8 or in condemning legislative stereotyping as unconstitutional. 329
Stereotyping takes root in a deeply embedded, richly reinforced cultural
ideology that has elevated males over females. 330 So strong is the ideology's
view of the problem, Title VII exists simply as a legislative requirement that differentiations made on
the basis of gender be justified by some rational difference between the sexes. Differentiation is legal
if it is not arbitrary. Another vision sees Title VII as a vehicle for ending male dominance as a
defining value of our culture. Thus, discrimination exists if laws that treat men and women differently maintain male domination. C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF THE WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 101-06 (1979).
324. Jaggar, On Sexual Equality, 84 ETHics 275, 275 (1974) (envisioning a radically desexualized society and arguing that sexual inequality is almost entirely an institutional phenomenon having
no basis in physiological differences). For a different view that emphasizes a biological basis for
differences in temperament that the author believes to have implications for societal ordering, se&
Browne, Biology, Equality, and the Law: The Legal Signiicance of Biological Sex Differences, 38
Sw. L.J. 617 (1984). The current stage of the debate within feminist literature is described in Williams, supra note 319.
325. Uniform Guidelines, supra note 54, at § 1604.2(a)(1)(i) (1988). The prohibition arises in
the context of what constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification.
326. Id. at § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii).
327. Id.
328. Compare Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334-37 (1977) (paying lip service to the evils
of gender stereotyping but upholding a sex-based classification resting largely on a stereotype of
women as relatively powerless sex objects) and Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1215 (8th
Cir. 1985) (condemning only those gender stereotypes that presented "distinct employment disadvantages" and thus upholding gender-based differences in employer's rules about dress and grooming), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986) with California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 290 (1987) (upholding state protective legislation because it "does not reflect archaic or stereotypical notions about pregnancy and the abilities of pregnant workers").
329. Compare Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding compensatory legislation
that favors women where the benefits were calculated to redress a specific well-articulated problem)
with Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (criticizing legislative stereotyping and striking down
a paternalistic plan that made it more difficult for widowers to collect benefits where the plan took
no account of the relative financial status of individual men and women). See Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution: The State of the Art, 4 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REp. 143, 145 (1978) (describing
the benefits plan in Goldfarb as a "knee jerk reflex, a certain way of looking at [women]").
330. See B. HARRIS, BEYOND HER SPHERE: WOMEN AND THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 3-22 (1978). Professor Harris traces the intellectual origins of what she labels "An Ideology of Inferiority" from biblical times through colonial America. Id. She finds that during the
Victorian period ideology had superimposed upon society "a rigid conceptual distinction between
the home and the economy and a determination to preserve that separation as desirable," id. at 33,
which was ultimately-and arbitrarily-tied to anatomy, physiology and reproduction. Id. at 40-41.
See, eg., C. MAcKINNON, supra note 323, at 101. Rosemary Tong relates:
At every turn, nature appears hand in glove with culture, so that the special definition of

woman's place within man's world appears to conform exactly to her differences from him.
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grasp that even social scientists researching gender-based differences in work
socialization are frequently impervious to it. 331 The problem has, until recently,
escaped unbiased study and measurement. 332 If social scientists studying the
phenomenon-those who ought to be sensitive to stereotyping behavior-fail to
recognize it in themselves, one has little cause to wonder why the work-a-day
333
person has little awareness of the problem.
The problem manifests and reinforces itself in a variety of ways; 334 but
most important, at least in the present context, is the incompatible dominant
cultural virtues that seem to be demanded of the woman and the worker.
But the same reality can be seen as the fist of social dominance hidden in the soft glove of
reasonableness-the ideology of biological flat.
R. TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE LAW 198-99 (1984) (connecting the problem to the traditional
Freudian notion of the Oedipal crisis, and concluding that stereotypical notions about sexual identity
have been reinforced profoundly by erroneous perceptions about the relative value of female and
male genitalia).
331. See S. DEX, THE SExuAL DIvIsioN OF WORK: CONCEPTUAL REVOLUTIONS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCEs (1985). Professor Dex summarizes a study of attitudes toward work in which the
researchers, following the conventional wisdom in industrial sociology, used entirely different models to discuss the attitudes. Id. For males, researchers used a "job model," which viewed attitudes
through the work they did; for females, the researchers employed a "gender model," which viewed
attitudes towards work in relation to women's personal traits or family life. Id. at 36. As Dex
concludes, the "use of sex-segregated models coincides with the view of men as primarily bread
winners... and women primarily as wives." Id. The study surveyed was Feldberg & Glenn, Male
and Female Job versus Gender Models in the Sociology of Work, 26 Soc. PRnos. 524 (1979). The
older studies that contained the conventional wisdom were H. BEYNON & KL BLACKBURN, PERCEPTIONS OF WORK: VARIATIONS WITHIN A FACTORY (1972), and R. BLAUNER, ALIENATION AND
FREEDOM: THE FACTORY WORKER AND HIs INDUSTRY (1964).
332. S.DEx, supra note 331, at 36-37; Bratton, The Eye of the Beholder: An Interdisciplinary
Examination of Law and Social Research on Sexual Harassment, 17 N.M.L. REV. 91, 91 (1987);
Taub, Keeping Women in TheirPlace"StereotypingPer Se as a Form ofEmployment Discrimination,
21 B.C.L. REv. 345, 354-55 (1980).
333. A number of writers have surveyed and summarized the social science research on both the
pervasiveness of the stereotyping problem and the difficulty men have even seeing that it exists. See
Bratton, supra note 332, at 98-104; Taub, supra note 332, at 355-56; Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism,
and PreferentialTreatment" An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581, 590 (1977).
Even when men acknowledge the existence of stereotypes and the harassment that may follow
from them,*some managers are incapable of seeing it in themselves. Meyer et aL relate an interview
with a senior manager at a St.Paul-Minneapolis broadcasting organization. Asked how he would
respond to an incident of sexual harassment in his organization, he opined that he would "fire his
butt" because he demanded that his personnel "treat people fairly and not abuse [their] power."
Later, without a hint of recognition for the incompatibility of his position, he remarked, "'You
know, some women dress so that people will look at their breasts.'" And later still: "'A man has to
earn a living, you know. Most women don't-they can get married and be taken care of.'" M.
MEYER, I. BERCHTOLD, . OEsTREICH, & F. COLLINS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 39 (1981) (quoting
L. FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 151-52
(1978)).
334. Dex lists a number of common stereotypes that operate in the workplace, including the
following:
-Women find it hard to reject the notion that their prime role is in the home 'servicing' male
breadwinners.
-Women work only for pin money.
-Women have an instrumental orientation to work: young women are only interested in work as a
means to find a husband; older women to finance home improvement.
-Women only work for money and are not involved in work personally.
-Women do not like to show initiative in their work and they are less interested in challenging jobs
or promotion than men.
S. DEX, supra note 331, at 37 (citations omitted); See Taub, supra note 332, at 352-53 (women's
participation in the market is secondary to men's).
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The model of the successful manager in our culture is a masculine one.
The good manager is aggressive, competitive, firm, just. He is not feminine, he is not soft or yielding or dependent or intuitive in the wo-

manly sense. The very expression of emotion is widely viewed as a
feminine weakness that would interfere with effective business
335
processes.

Given the prevailing perception of the value of the woman's virtues, the stereotypical expectation for the woman as manager presents the classic "Catch-22":
if she is competent and aggressive, she's deficient as a woman; if she retains her
femininity, she is not doing her job. Thus, any conduct that draws attention to

her gender distracts from management's ability to view the employee as a
336
worker and measure worth-productivity-without regard to gender.
Finally, from the perspective of male-dominated management, stereotypes

are useful. At the simplest level, they permit the easy maintenance of the gender
hierarchy; the employer discounts the positive value of any information actually

received about a female job applicant by reference to the stereotype that informs
his decisionmaking. 337 At the bottom line, stereotypes enable the employer to

reduce information costs in hiring; management makes individual decisions
about productivity without costly research into individual merit. The stereotype's negative valence operates ineluctably to the detriment of the female: if the

man and woman look roughly equal on paper, stereotypical expectations easily
tip the balance in favor of the

man. 3 3 8

Moreover, the true measure of their

lethal effect is that stereotypes generally operate unconsciously. 339 In short,
stereotyping is a mischievous, ubiquitous, yet functional phenomenon that is incompatible with a bias-free work force.
335. D. MCGREGOR, THE PROFESSIONAL MANAGER 23 (1967), quoted in Taub, supra note 332,
at 356.
336. Taub, supra note 332, at 357-61. One researcher approaches the area through the "concept
of marginality," which applies to individuals who live in two cultural systems that impose different
standards of measurement for individual worth. In the case of women in the professions, the conflict
is between a "nurturant, passive, emotional, home-oriented, and subordinate to men" standard, and
the modern standard that demands "rationality, striving, and achievement in the open market." V.
SAPIRO, THE POLrrICAL INTEGRATION OF WOMEN: ROLES, SOCIALIZATION, AND POLITICS 5-6
(1983). The goals implicit in the standards may be mutually exclusive; "'full realization of one role

threatens defeat in the other.'" Id. at 6 (quoting Komarovsky, Cultural Contradictions and Sex
Roles, 52 AM. J. Soc. 184, 184 (1946)).
337. Taub, supranote 332, at 353. See M. LEviN, FEMINISM AND FREEDOM 70 (1987). Professor Levin attacks feminism, noting that "[i]f stereotypes were capricious, they would be dysfunctional, and if they were dysfunctional we would not be here." Id. A similar point is made by
Browne, supra note 324, at 653-54. The simple response to such thinking is that it confuses the
descriptive with the normative. That these stereotypes exist does not preclude our ability to challenge their usefulness in the society we would like to have. See Wasserstrom, supra note 333, at 61011.
338. Perhaps the most common form of this phenomenon is the duplicate income syndrome:
"She's just the second breadwinner anyway!" See, eg., supra notes 333-34.
339. Even worse, as Wasserstrom points out, is that many members of the dominant group do
not believe that sexism is unjustifiable. Wasserstrom, supra note 333, at 590. Many of us have
viewed with collective embarrassment the pot-bellied, middle-aged man who proudly wears the
sweatshirt declaring "Chauvinist Pigi" For him sexist attitudes are the natural way of the world.
He has, of course, failed to make two distinctions: the first between descriptions of and prescriptions
for our society, id at 610-14; the second is between physiological and anatomical sex differences,
which are dichotomous, and the ideal types we label "masculinity" and "femininity," which are not.
V. SAPIRO, supra note 336, at 59.
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Hopkins had significant evidence that partners expected her to conform to a
gender stereotype, and that Price Waterhouse had a history of stereotyping.
One male opined that he would never vote favorably for a woman candidate;
others criticized a woman candidate as a "women's libber"; and two unsuccessful women candidates were referred to as "curt, brusque and abrasive" and a

"Ma Barker."'34° Hopkins herself was criticized for aggressive behavior and for
using profanity; characterized as a "woman manager"; and told that she lacked
social grace, needed a course in a charm school, and "overcompensated for being
a woman.

'34 1

Price Waterhouse took no measures to discourage its partners from using
and relying on sexual stereotypes in its decisionmaking process. 342 The partnership claimed that her candidacy was denied because her abrasive conduct
"might jeopardize morale and [make her]... incapable of successfully supervising staff as [she] move[d] among different locations in response to work demands. ' 343 Interestingly, however, there was no doubt about her productivity.
Not only did she bring huge contracts into the firm, but "[s]he had no difficulty
dealing with clients and her clients appear to have been very pleased with her
work.,,344

Hopkins employed Dr. Susan Fiske, "a well qualified expert... who ha[d]
done extensive research in the field of stereotyping," to explain the significance
of the comments and general partnership evaluation process at Price
3 46
Waterhouse. 345 Price Waterhouse never challenged her credentials.
Although Fiske disclaimed any ability to identify particular statements as motivated by unconscious stereotypes, she did express an opinion that "unfavorable
comments by operation of male stereotyping, slanted in a negative direction by
'3 47
male partners, were a major factor in the firm's evaluation of the plaintiff."
She based her opinion on the presence of
"convergent indicators," such as the extremely small number of female
partners at the firm; the absence of any other female candidates among
the 88 nominated along with Hopkins; the exaggerated and extremely
intense negative reactions of Hopkins's critics to behavior that supporters perceived as positive; the ambiguous criteria the firm used to
evaluate a candidate's personal qualities; the absence of complaints
from Hopkins's clients; and the positive assessments of Hopkins in ar340. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S.Ct. 1775
(1989). The "women's libber" was made a partner. Price Waterhouse argued that because of this
fact, the comment could not reflect stereotyping. As the court pointed out, Price Waterhouse missed
the point: the comment reflected the pervasive attitude within the partnership system. Id.
341. Id. at 463; Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
342. 618 F. Supp. at 1117; see 825 F.2d at 466-68.
343. 618 F. Supp. at 1114.
344. Id. at 1112.
345. Id. at 1117.
346. 825 F.2d at 467. This is a critical fact that surely undermines the dissent's attack on the
expert. See infra text accompanying notes 358-59.
347. 618 F. Supp. at 1117.
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eas where performance could be measured objectively; (e.g., business
generation).
Dr. Fiske concluded that gender stereotyping tainted Price Waterhouse's part348
nership decision; the lower courts agreed.
Some members of the Court simply dismissed or derided Hopkins's evidence of stereotyping. Justice O'Connor's treatment of the issue was brief. Gender specific comments "unrelated to the decisional process" could not affect the

ultimate burden of persuasion. 349 Moreover, Fiske's testimony alone did not
satisfy the direct evidence requirement and, hence, could not alone justify that
burden shift.3 50 Mere reference to a "lady candidate" was, in Justice
O'Connor's opinion, "perfectly neutral and nondiscriminatory. '3 51 Nothing
less than "direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reli352
ance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision" would do.
Justice O'Connor's virtual dismissal of Hopkins's evidence of stereotyping
is surprising. In Watson, she had treated stereotyping as a subjective practice,
although one with unverifiable effects. In fact, the link between stereotypes and
subjective employment standards was central to her conclusion that plaintiffs
could use disparate impact analysis to challenge such procedures. 35 3 Price
Waterhouse rested in large measure on the very evidence of "subconscious stereotypes and prejudice" that Justice O'Connor, writing just one year earlier in
Watson, had feared might subvert Title VII. 354 Yet confronted with a case involving upper-echelon management, Justice O'Connor accorded that evidence
little significance.
The plurality responded more directly to Price Waterhouse's arguments,
and found more weight in the plaintiff's evidence than did Justice O'Connor.
To the charge that Hopkins failed to prove that the evidence of stereotyping
played a role in the decision, Justice Brennan responded that the partnership "in
no way disclaimed reliance on [stereotyped] comments. 355 He found probative
district court Judge Gesell's observation that the firm had failed to "sensitize"
its members to the dangers of stereotyping. 356 Justice Brennan found it unnecessary to determine whether Hopkins's evidence was, standing alone, sufficient
348. 825 F.2d at 467. The trial court was ambivalent. Although Judge Gesell crafted a sensitive
opinion that reflected study of the subject and an understanding that stereotyping operates in subtle,
unconscious and insidious ways, he found it "impossible to accept the view that Congress intended
to have courts police every instance where subjective judgment may be tainted by unarticulated,
unconscious... assumptions related to sex." Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1118. Nevertheless, he held
that Price Waterhouse maintained a system that "gave weight.., to... biased criticisms" and did

nothing to discourage it. Id. at 1119.

349. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
350. Id. at 1804-05 (O'Connor, J, concurring). O'Connor did suggest, however, that "stray

remarks in the workplace" might be probative of sexual harassment. Id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
Watson, 487 U.S. at 990.
Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1794 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 1794 & n.16 (plurality opinion).
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to shift the burden of proof. Given the nature of the comments about Hopkins,
he stated that Dr. Fiske's testimony "was merely icing on Hopkins' cake. It

takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female employee as requiring 'a course in charm school.'

",357

By contrast, Justice Kennedy's view of Dr. Fiske in particular, and evidence of stereotyping in general, was hostile. He barely contained his contempt
for Fiske's credentials and integrity, opining that a plaintiff who engages her

"should have no trouble showing that sex discrimination played a part in any
decisions."' 358 In his opinion, Fiske's conclusion that the partnership engaged in
gender stereotyping, a conclusion she based on various partners' descriptions of
Hopkins and reached without meeting the partners or the subject of the com-

ments, was not worthy of belief by a fact-finder. 359 For Justice Kennedy, reading anything into such comments was impossible. 36° Moreover, Title VII did
not require employers to "disclaim reliance" on stereotyping behavior or impose
on them a "duty to sensitize" recalcitrant personnel. 361 The whole business
smacked of thought control, and of using Title VII "as an engine for rooting out
sexist thoughts. '362 In his opinion, such a use of Title VII was illegitimate.

The Court's breezy opinions, and especially those of Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, stand in stark contrast with the exacting analysis of the district court.
Judge Gesell was uncomfortable with the evidence of stereotyping but had done
his homework. 363 He was unwilling to find that Fiske's testimony was a suffi-

cient predicate for a determination that the refusal to promote Hopkins constituted intentional discrimination. "Congress [had not] intended to have courts
police every instance where subjective judgment may be tainted by... unarticu357. Id. at 1793 (plurality opinion).
358. Id. at 1813 n.5 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). There is surprisingly little discussion in the
Court's opinion of Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, which deal with expert qualifications and
the bases of experts' opinions, respectively. During trial, expert Fiske's statement that she based her
conclusions on information of a type that was reasonably relied upon by experts within her field was
unchallenged. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S.
Ct. 1775 (1989). In light of its admissibility under rules 702 and 703, Justice Kennedy's objection
was, in effect, not directed at her conclusion, but at the standards of her field. However, he should
have realized that the issue simply was not before the Court.
359. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1813 n.5 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy relied
almost entirely on the analysis of Judge Williams, who dissented from the court of appeals' decision.
Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 473-78.
360. Perhaps the more appropriate question is this: How can we fail to read something into the
comments in light of her uniformly positive interaction with clients and her spectacular business.

generation ability?
361. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1813 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
362. Id. at 1813-14 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 477 (Williams, J., dissenting)). That some Justices of the Supreme Court view this evidence derisively should not be
surprising. See Vladeck & Young, Sex Discrimination in Higher Education: It's Not Academic, 4
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 59, 62-65 (1978) (surveying lower court cases dealing with allegations of
discriminatory promotion and tenure decisions in which the trial court judges made little effort to
hide their unsympathetic view of such suits). For a recent example of a suit in which the court
turned stereotypes into a presumption against which women must fight, see E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). For a description and indictment of the case, see Williams, supra note 319, at 813-21.
363. The court cited a number of studies which document the phenomenon described in the
preceding subsection. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117-18 nn.10-12 (D.D.C.
1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).

1990]

TITLE VII

lated, unconscious assumptions related to sex."' 364 At the same time, he understood the social science documentation of stereotyping within the employment
hierarchy. "[Tlhe subtle and unconscious discrimination created by sex stereotyping appears to be a major impediment to Title VII's goal of ensuring equal
employment opportunities.

'

365

Moreover, he found that Price Waterhouse con-

gave weight to... biased criticisms" and did
sciously maintained a system "that
366
nothing to correct the system.

Judge Gesell may have confused the intent of Congress with the weight to
be accorded to evidence when he expressed skepticism that Congress wanted the
courts to police illicit assumptions. Congress clearly did want to create genderneutral conditions in the workplace. Any evidence, including evidence of stereotyping, that bears upon that goal may be relevant in a proper case. At the same
time, Judge Gesell's hesitation is understandable. Judges, like most of us, probably assume that they are equally astute observers of human nature as most expert witnesses and are accordingly suspicious about explanations of human
behavior based on controversial assumptions. But to deny entirely the benefit of
a well qualified expert-and to belittle her contribution to the point of ridicule,
as did the dissenting Justices in the Supreme Court-is spurious. In effect the
dissent passed on the weight of the evidence and usurped the role of the factfinder. To conclude that the literature on sexual stereotyping merely confirms
common sense is one thing;367 it is quite another to conclude that the information is without value.
There is a deceptive quality of activism to Price Waterhouse. Its rhetoric
seduces the casual reader into believing that the Supreme Court fortified the
individual disparate treatment case by saddling employers with the burden of

demonstrating their reliance on nondiscriminatory factors whenever the plaintiff
prima facie shows reliance on an impermissible one. In fact, the case does almost the opposite.
In the first place, the Court imposed the "same-decision" burden under
rather limited circumstances. A bare majority, the plurality plus Justice White,
would require the employer to shoulder that burden only when plaintiff's prima
facie evidence of individual disparate treatment is, as Justice White wrote, "substantial. ' 368 Therefore, it remains to be seen if the employer persuasion burden
will be triggered not just by the unusual "direct" evidence of gender stereotyping
presented in Price Waterhouse,3 69 but by the more common inferential evidence
approved by McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. If Justice O'Connor's position
carries the day, as it well may in the wake of Justice Brennan's resignation, the
answer to that question will be negative; she would impose the "same-decision"'
burden on the employer only when the plaintiff's prima facie evidence is
364. Id. at 1118.
365. Id. at 1117-18 (citing Taub, supra note 332, at 349-61).
366. Id. at 1119.
367. Id. at 1120 n.15. That is also how we interpret Justice Brennan's "icing on the cake"
statement. See supra text accompanying notes 356-57.
368. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1795 (White, J., concurring).
369. Id. at 1801-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Second, the Court's views actually represent a retreat from the posture of
most intermediate federal appellate courts that have come to grips with the
mixed motive question. 37 1 Two circuits had mandated the "same-decision"
showing whenever the plaintiff's evidence showed that impermissible employer
motivation played any part in the adverse decision.3 72 Five others had found
that the employer burden was triggered either when the discriminatory motive
was a "substantial" factor, as Justice White insisted, or as the Supreme Court
plurality would have permitted, when it was merely a "motivating" factor.3 73
Further, two of these seven circuits had raised the quantum of the employer
burden to "clear and convincing" evidence; even the Price Waterhouse plurality
settled for the preponderance standard. 374 On balance, it is probably fair to say
that the decision, far from advancing the typical case of individual disparate
treatment, has somewhat set it back.
VI. OF

BASELINES AND POLICIES

It is surely impossible for a judge (or a law professor) to analyze a statute or
a case without a commitment to a pre-existing cognitive foundation.37 5 In the
absence of absolute clarity, we are all called upon to make judgments against a
backdrop of intensely personal experiences and communally shared tenets that
inform our analysis and direct the very questions we ask.376 In short, we are
asked to determine the intent of the legislature through lenses that always filter
reality; the best we can hope for is integrity and honesty; we cannot avoid discretion. Discretion, working within the loose joints of Title VII, explains the Reagan Court's responses in Watson, Wards Cove, and Price Waterhouse. This
section defines and applies the baselines that direct the new majority's exercise of
discretion in the resolution of employment discrimination cases.
A.

Defining Baselines
Soon after the turn of the century, the Supreme Court decided companion

370. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
371. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1784 n.2 (plurality opinion) (list and discussion of federal
courts of appeals decisions).
372. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Fadhl v. City and County of San Fransico, 741 F.2d 1163,
165-66 (9th Cir. 1984); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320-24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en band)).
373. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Fields v. Clark University, 817 F.2d 931, 936-37 (1st Cir.
1987); Ber v. Westchester County, 849 F.2d 712, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1988); Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court of
Adair County, 825 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir. 1987); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552,
1557 (11th Cir. 1983); Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1362, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
374. Id. (citing Toney, 705 F.2d at 1366; Fadhl, 741 F.2d at 1165-66).
375. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 903, has addressed this issue in the context of constitutional law.
We find it no less true when the courts deal with statutory issues. We are all hypothetico-deductive
animals; indeed, how could we be anything else? Two excellent essays by Nobel Laureate Sir Peter
Medawar cover this landscape. P. MEDAWAR, Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought, in
PLuTo's REPUBLIC 73 (1984); P. MEDAWAR, Hypothesis and Imagination, in PLUTO'S REPUBLIC
1115 (1984).
376. Blumoff, The ThirdBest Choice: An Essay on Law and History, 41 HASTING'S L.J. 537, 573
(1990).
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cases that implicitly raised questions concerning the extent to which employer
377
hiring preferences are subject to exogenous constraints. Helm v. McCall sustained state labor legislation that discriminated absolutely against alien laborers
in state public improvement projects. Rejecting the claim that the statute violated equal protection, the Court proceeded on the premise that the state, as
employer, is little more than the aggregate of its citizens, and "'like any other
body corporate, it may enter into contracts and hold and dispose of property'...
without incurring the condemnation of the ... Constitution. '3 78 In nearly the
same breath, in Truax v. Raich,379 the Court struck down an Arizona criminal

statute that required private employers with more than five laborers to hire at
least eighty percent native born Americans. One can distinguish the cases based
on the states' respective roles, namely, state as employer (Helm) versus state as
regulator (Truax); however, the Supreme Court only acknowledged such a distinction in 1980.380 More importantly, the Truax Court commented in 1915
that the statute deprived "the employer [of the freedom] to exercise his judg'38
ment without illegal interference or compulsion." '
Both decisions were consistent with, if not expressions of, the dominant
ideology of the late nineteenth century. State interference with the use of private
property is justifiable only when property poses the threat of injury: sic utere
tuo, ut alienum non laedas,38 2 use your property so as not to injure others. In

the absence of injury, the principle of noninterference-the doctrine of laissez
faire exalted by Lochner v. New York 3 3 -held sway. One commentator who
frequently repaired to the principle, Christopher Tiedemann, elaborated in his
1886 opus:
Any law which goes beyond that principle, which undertakes to abol-

ish rights, the exercise of which does not involve an infringement of the

rights of others, or to limit the exercise of rights beyond what is necessary to provide for the public welfare and the general security, cannot
be included3in the police power of the government. It is a government
usurpation. 84

377. 239 U.S. 175 (1915). Its companion was Crane v. New York, 139 U.S. 195, afftg, People v.
Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 426 (1915). The statute was New York Labor Laws § 14 (Consol.
1909). The case is discussed in some detail in Blumoff, The ProprietaryException to the Dormant
Commerce Clause" A PersistentNineteenth Century Anomaly, 1984 S. ILL. U.L.J. 73, 90-91 (1984).
378. Helm, 239 U.S. at 188 (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)).
379. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
380. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
381. Truax, 239 U.S. at 38.
382. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (cited in Blumoff, supra note 377,
at 96) (law that does not affect interest of public is an invalid exercise of police power).
383. Id.; see also C. TIEDEMANN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS FOR POLICE POWER IN
THE UNITED STATES vii (1886).
384. C. TIEDEMANN, supra note 383, at 2-3. For further elaboration of the Spencerian Law of

Equal Freedom, according to which everyone has equal rights to pursue and acquire, provided that
no one infringes on another's right to do same, see H. SPENCER, THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY (1882).
See generally P. BOLLER, AMERICAN THOUGHT IN TRANsITION: THE IMPACT OF EVOLUTIONARY
NATURALISM, 1865-1900, at 49-56 (1969) (explaining how Spencer integrated evolutionary principles into his philosophy); R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 18-36
(1944) (reciting the political, social, and economic forces behind Spencer's principles).
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Implicit in Tiedemann's quote is a conception of the public weal thought to
have died with the Lochner era's demise during the New Deal. Its underlying
ethos, as Professor Sunstein pointed out recently in his survey of constitutional
jurisprudence, still flourishes:
For the Lochner Court, neutrality, understood in a particular way, was
a constitutional requirement. The key concepts here are threefold:
government inaction, the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements, and the baseline set by the common law. Governmental intervention was troublesome, whereas inaction was not; and both
neutrality and inaction were defined as respect for the behavior of private actors pursuant to the common law, in light of the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements. Whether there was a departure
from the requirement of neutrality... depended on whether the government had altered the common law distribution of entitlements. 385
As Sunstein persuasively argues throughout the work, Lochner's impulse is with
us still, although understood as a set of predispositions rather than a judicial
usurpation of political functions.
Given the insights of Sunstein's synthesis, perhaps the question we should
now ask is essentially rhetorical. How could Lochner's drive, its devotion to
individual autonomy in the market, have ever failed to thrive? We began our
society with a deep commitment to individualism, a commitment that carried
over from the economy to politics. 386 Faith in a guiding set of largely unstated
first principles is the norm. Every society orders its preferences, "admire[s] and
reward[s] some abilities more than others.... and... arrange[s them] in a more
or less tidy hierarchy. ' 387 Our preference hierarchy retains an intense fidelity to
individual liberty, defined to include not only affirmative freedoms but those
negative rights3 88 -freedoms from-to which the Lochner era gave constitutional blessing. A necessary corollary of freedom from government interference
385. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 874.
386. In his critique of the equal opportunity model and discussion of its philosophical founda-

tion for our individualistic ethos, Professor Schaar suggests that the model moved from the economic to the political sphere. Schaar, Equality of Opportunity, and Beyond, in NoMos IX:
EQUALITY 237 (1967). Our reading of John Winthrop, the founding father of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony, leads to the conclusion that the marketplace, politics, and the dominant Protestant
theology were inextricably tied from the beginning. See M. KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX: AN
INQUIRY CONCERNING THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 145-58 (1972); E. MORGAN,
THE PURITAN DILEMMA 84-100 (1958).
Professor Shapiro traced the evolution of our national philosophical commitment to that ideology. See I. SHAPIRO, THE EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY 273 (1986). For a work

that attempts to carry that tradition forward, see R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
(1974). We do not mean to suggest, however, that the liberal ideology stands alone. We are impressed by the work of one of our former teachers, John Pocock, as well as the work of Professor
Sunstein, and the argument in favor of a tradition of civic virtue. See J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 462-506 (1975); Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1129, 1130-38 (1986); Sunstein, InterestGroups in American PublicLaw, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
31-35 (1985); Sunstein, Naked Preferencesand the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1690-91,
1730-32 (1984). Much of the recent scholarship is discussed and critiqued in Fallon, What isRepublicanism, and is it Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1697-1733 (1989).

387. Schaar, supra note 386, at 230. As Professor Levinson explains: "[I]f sociologists and anthropologists are correct, we cannot escape membership in some civil faith even if we wish to, for the
alternative to organizing belief is chaos." S. LEVINSON, supra note 32, at 27.

388. See, eg., Seidman, Public Principleand Private Choice" The Uneasy Casefor a Boundary
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with private contractual relations is the largely unregulated freedom to enter
into such relationships as we see fit. The principle of neutrality thus recognizes
and reinforces the existing hierarchy, by resolving doubts, for example, in favor
38 9
of the free play of market forces.
Among the rights so cherished was the common-law commitment to employment at will. The employment-at-will doctrine holds that the employer may
discharge any employee "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally
wrong" and escape societal sanctions. 390 This dual doctrine of neutrality and
inaction found justification in our radically individualistic conception of the public good. In defending the employer's absolute rights, the Tennessee Supreme
Court wrote: "May I not refuse to trade with any one? May I not forbid my
family to trade with any one? May I not dismiss my domestic servant for dealing, or even visiting, when I forbid? And if my domestic, why not my farm
391
hand, or mechanic, or teamster?"
This negative conception of individuality had a "freedom to" counterpart.
Two Louisiana appellate courts, refusing to intervene between labor and management, gave that idea expression in 1932392 and again in 1975. 393 The positive
expression rested in part on the notion of mutuality of obligation or the presumed reciprocal benefits of the doctrine that were held to favor both labor and
management. "[I]n this land of opportunity it would be against public policy
and the spirit of our institutions that any man should thus handicap himself" by
denying himself the right to pursue a new job at anytime in the absence of an
express agreement. 394 Both the negative and positive views of the doctrine were
nourished in the dominant cultural value of our marketplace. The Court in Coppage v. Kansas395 explained:
[S]ince it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in common,
some persons must have more property than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right
of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate
those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise
Maintenance Theory of ConstitutionalLaw, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1026-29 (1987) (discussing "pri-

vacy" in constitutional law as a freedom from universalist criticism).
389. Seidman, supra note 388, at 1016-18; Sunstein, supra note 12, at 880-81.
390. Eg., Payne v. Western & Ati. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 544, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915). The employment-at-will
doctrine has generated a great deal of secondary literature in recent years. On its common-law
origins, see, e.g., P. WEINER, S. BOMPEY & M. BRITrAIN, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS: A
PREVENTATIVE APPROACH 5-9 (1986); Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. RaV. 1404, 1416-19 (1967); Summers, IndividualProtection Against Unjust Dismissal. Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 484-

91 (1976).
391. Payne, 81 Tenn. at 518. On the pervasiveness of this type ofpater-familiasthinking, see
Blades, supra note 390, at 1416-17.
392. See Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 174 La. 66, 69-70, 139 So. 760, 761 (1932).
393. Simmons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 311 So. 2d 28, 31 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
394. Id. (quoting Pitcher, 174 La. at 69, 139 So. at 760-61); see Summers, supra note 390, at 491.
Lochner itself identified the impermissible nature of the New York statute as its "illegal interference
with the rights of individuals, both employers and employees, to make contracts regarding labor."

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905).
395. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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of those rightg.396
Although the law of Coppage long ago fell into disfavor when the Court realized
that government inaction was itself an expression of government policy,3 97 the
quote above is as vital in 1990 as it was in 1915.
The same can be said about the harshly negative conception of individual
freedom. Although its precise doctrinal expression, like that of Coppage, has

fallen into disrepute, its ethos survives. The unforgiving rhetoric has been subdued and inroads have been made into at-will employment, both by the common
law398 and by statutes like Title VII. But the underlying premise, that freedom
399
of contract remains a crucial aspect of individual liberty, remains vibrant.
Outside the employment context, one need look no further than the first substantive provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, section 1-102, to appreciate
what its comments state unambiguously: "that freedom of contract is a principle of the Code." 4° ° Within Title VII, the new Supreme Court majority, a
constitutive element in the Reagan Revolution, is committed to straying no further than necessary from the underlying baselines of neutrality and
noninterference. 40 1
B.

The Common Law of Title VII

At first blush, it seems almost inherently inconsistent to speak of the survival of common-law economic and political premises in light of a statutory
scheme which, while stopping short of requiring just cause for discharge, 4° 2 is an
undoubted encroachment on the doctrine of employment at will. To some extent the inconsistency is patent. Title VII intrudes into the labor-management
relationship in a number of ways. It prohibits (if only on a handful of specified
grounds) discriminatory discharges, constructive or otherwise; limits an employer's freedom of choice in hiring, promotion and pay; and otherwise creates
396. Id. at 17.
397. Seidman, supra note 388, at 1010-17; Sunstein, supra note 12, at 880-81.
398. For a survey of state law, see Annotation, Employee's Arbitrary Dismissal as Breach of
Employment Contract Terminable at Will, 62 A.L.R.3D 271 (1975 and Supp. 1989).
399. Professor Epstein expressly made the modem case for this conception in employment law
without the vicious negative rhetoric of the late nineteenth century. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947, 953-55 (1984).
400. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) comment 2 (1972 Official Text).
401. The Court's recent interpretations of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts clearly sustain

this proposition. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago

County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003-04 (1989) (holding that severely brain damaged
four-year-old child had no liberty interest in state protection after state agency received repeated
reports of child abuse).
402. This conclusion is implicit in the Supreme Court's consistent failure to insist that the "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" that will rebut the prima facie case of individual disparate treatment be related to productivity, efficiency, safety, or indeed any other business-related reason; it is
sufficient if that reason is anything other than consideration of race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) (Title VII "does not forbid employers
to hire only persons born under a certain sign of the zodiac."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
But see Blumrosen, StrangersNo More: All Workers Are Entitled to 'Just Cause' Protection Under
Title VII, 2 INDus. REL. L.J. 519, 520 (1978). These examples are cited by Professors Zimmer,
Sullivan and Richards in their casebook, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 56 (2d ed. 1988).
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caution where none was necessary before. The nearly absolute freedom that the
employer once enjoyed is gone.

But it is not entirely inconsistent to discuss common-law predispositions in
the context of Title VII because the encroachment is limited. Title VII's scope

and application, after all, are not self-executing. In the absence of explicit legislative direction, the lacunae in the statute's substance and procedure are filled by

judges more or less committed to the principles that underlie marketplace activity. Moreover, almost by virtue of their very presence on our courts, federal
judges hold preexisting, deeply held beliefs about the role of government with
4 °3
respect to the marketplace.

To some degree these generative common-law baselines have long informed

the Supreme Court's explication of Title VII. Its general disinclination to

"restructure" private business practices, iterated by Justice O'Connor in Wat-

son, was announced as early as 1978.404 That same year the Court declined to
apply the ordinary presumption that an adjudicated Title VII violator is liable
for backpay, citing the resulting disruption of market expectations. 405 The year
before, the Court held that an employer would suffer "undue hardship" in dis-

charging the special statutory obligation reasonably to accommodate employee
religious practices if an alternative arrangement would result in more than "de
4 °6
minimus" cost.
Even earlier, in 1976, the Court's implicit adherence to the law of the market was reflected in its opinions about the appropriate remedies available when
discrimination is found but the scarce jobs in question are already encumbered. 4° 7 One remedy, "front pay," affords postjudgment compensation to minority or female "discriminatees" without "bumping" or otherwise penalizing
white or male incumbents for the employer's discrimination. Wont pay may
even be the only practicable way to compensate the discriminatee because, as the
Court would soon also hold, judges may not, except under vaguely defined "eq403. On the general question of where courts should look for guidance for filling statutory interstices with publicly held values, see Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA.
L. REv. 1007, 1014 (1989) (arguing that process theorists of the 1950s were committed to neutrality
principles in statutory interpretation).
404. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
405. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717-23 (1978).
The Court found gender discrimination in the employer's practice of requiring female employees to
make larger pension contributions to receive the same pension benefits as male employees. The
Court's order directing gender neutral contributions was prospective only. The Court justified its
refusal to uphold the lower courts' refund order in large part because of a speculative adverse effect
on all pensioners since the Court assumed that the cost of compliance would fall on the pension fund
rather than the employer, the City of Los Angeles. In fact, as Justice Marshall observed in dissent,
further proceedings might well have led to the conclusion that the refund burden would fall on the
City alone. Id. at 732 (Marshall, J., dissenting). More recently, but for similar reasons, the Court
refused retrospective economic relief to female pensioners who had received lesser benefits than their
male counterparts under an employer-sponsored pension program that required employees of both
genders to make equal contributions. It reached this conclusion despite condemning the Arizona
plan as a form of unlawful gender discrimination foreshadowed to some degree by the holding in
Manhart. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
406. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); accord Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
407. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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uitable" circumstances, displace incumbents when doing so would frustrate their
seniority expectations. 4° 8 But front pay is inimical to the premises of free enterprise; alone among the possible approaches to this intractable problem, it requires the adjudicated wrongdoer, the employer, to pay twice for one job. It is
hardly surprising, therefore, that only one member of the Court was prepared to
4 10
endorse the remedy, 4°9 and so the matter stands today.
Paradoxically, 4 11 the Court even rationalizes its indulgence of "voluntary,"

"benign" employer affirmative action, 4 12 in the face of statutory text unambigu4 14
ously to the contrary, 4 13 as a nod toward preserving managerial prerogatives.
For example, reverse discrimination against white or male incumbents or applicants without fear of liability, the Court tells us, enables employers to maintain

government contracts which, by law, are contingent upon minority representation in the employer's workforce that mirrors minority availability in the
broader labor pool. 4 15 Affirmative action programs also help employers reduce
the likely incidence of ordinary Title VII litigation brought by minorities. The

price of both these benefits is borne for the most part by incumbent nonminority
employees rather than by the employer.
We now inquire whether the Court's recent decisions simply implement its
continued commitments to governmental nonintervention in the market and
correlative judicial restraint, or instead record a resurgence.
1. Watson and Wards Cove: The Denigration of Disparate Impact
If Watson and Wards Cove reflect allegiance to legislative intent, shots

taken at judicial predilections are wide of the mark. In fact, Congress gave significant indications in reports accompanying the 1972 amendments to Title VII
that it approved Griggs-like principles of group justice. 4 16 Moreover, lower
courts, with the virtually unanimous approval of the commentators, 41 7 had gen408. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
409. Franks,424 U.S. at 780-81 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
410. In the void created by Supreme Court evasion of the issue, the circuit courts are undecided
about the availability of front pay. See McKnight v. General Motors, 908 F.2d 104, 116-17 (7th Cir.
1990). As far as the Court's own jurisprudence is concerned, district judges have only two choices
when faced with a discriminatee's demand to receive the job she was denied in violation of Title VII:
grant the demand at the expense of an innocent incumbent, or deny it and deprive a proven discrimination victim of a remedy she must have to be made whole.
411. This indulgence is paradoxical because "reverse" discrimination is intended to serve the
equal result model that the Court's recent decisions so firmly reject. See, eg., infra text accompany.
ing notes 426-28.
412. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979).
413. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), (d)(1988); Weber, 443 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
414. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 207.
415. Id. at 222-23 & n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the employer's plan was
prompted by the threat that it might be barred from future government contracts for violating the
"goals" and "timetables" of Executive Order 11246).
416. S.REP.No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971); H.R. REP.No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1972). See Fallon & Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models ofRacialJustice, 1984 Sup.
Cr. REv. 1, 24 & n.109.
417. See, eg., Note, supra note 58, at 114 n.68; Note, supra note 57, at 384; Comment, supra
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erally interpreted Griggs and its progeny as putting both the burden of going
forward and the risk of nonpersuasion on the employer. 4 18 Accordingly, Watson and Wards Cove are fairly read as breaching interpretive boundaries theretofore well accepted.
Nor was the Court's own precedent set on an inevitable course that the two
cases simply illuminated; the Court had choices within its own jurisprudence.
For example, as the law spreads into new terrain, the Court frequently finds
itself in areas whose full contours are revealed only as case law expands. Still,
shadows from the unfolding landscape can be seen, and in dicta the Court indicates its anticipated course. Thus, by the time the foreseen issues actually reach
the Court, the decisions are fairly predictable.4 19 In contrast, Watson represents
a sharp break with the Court's own prior understanding, a break that Wards
Cove acknowledged and enthusiastically enlarged. Justice White almost admitted as much when, reallocating the ultimate burden of proof, he noted that
"some of our earlier decisions can be read as suggesting otherwise." 420 Thus,
the Reagan Court was not constrained by the mandates of the political branches
or the inevitable flow of prior precedent.
Moreover, the Court turned its back on presumptions and accompanying
proof burdens developed in early Title VII opinions that reflected value laden
preferences among possible "states of affairs." 42 1 McDonnell Douglas, for instance, held that mere proof of rejection plus job qualification and availability
suffice to meet plaintiff's prima facie case and to effect a shift in the burden of
production. 4 22 Certainly the "because of" language in Title VII did not mandate such a conclusion. The Court might as easily have held that, as in any
intentional tort action, plaintiff could survive involuntary dismissal only by
presenting evidence from which a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the
employer actually intended to discriminate.
Instead, the Court demarked the Title VII claim as special, as something
other than a garden-variety tort. If, after the plaintiff's modest prima facie case,
the employer failed to produce evidence of a legitimate business motive for the
decision at issue, plaintiff prevailed.4 23 In short, the Court preferred potential
recovery to no recovery at all, even in the absence of direct evidence of actual
intent. Although later opinions would supply inductive-probabilistic and procedural explanations for this choice, 424 when the Court first created the initial
note 23, at 1760-61. The one exception is Gold, supra note 20, but his focus is on the intent of the
original enacting Congress in 1964.
418. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
419. The evolving jurisprudence of municipal liability under § 1983 exemplifies this tradition.
Lewis & Blumoff, Reshaping the Asymmetry in § 1983 (unpublished manuscript on file in the offices
of the NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEw) (discussing Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct.
2702 (1989), City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988), and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,

475 U.S. 469 (1986)).
420. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989).
421. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
422. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.

423. See supra text accompanying note 41.
424. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 255-56 (1980) (The allocation "eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection"; it also
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proof allocations in McDonnell Douglas the justification was said to lie in assuring efficient and trustworthy workmanship "through fair and racially neutral

employment and personnel decisions." 425
Wards Cove, through its implicit adoption of Watson's normative principles

and its explicit ratification of Justice O'Connor's procedural scheme, swept these
earlier normative decisions aside. In fact, the opinion alluded to the norms of

routine federal litigation to justify placing the risk of nonpersuasion on the challenger. 426 The most far-reaching of the Wards Cove conclusions not only makes
recovery more difficult, but it also negates the potential of disparate impact recovery as a meaningful alternative to proof of disparate treatment. The Court
must have understood that the full implications of disparate impact analysis appear to threaten the existing order, the regime of equal opportunity and its prin427

cipal metaphor of colorblindness.
The Watson plurality launched its revisionist assault on Title VII's potential

achievement goal by articulating a weak version of the statute's general command to eradicate employment discrimination. Purporting merely to bring dis-

parate impact analysis into manageable bounds, the plurality's commitment to
common-law baselines is seen in its unfounded fear of quotas, unwillingness to
find liability on the basis of "less evidence" than is required in a treatment case,

and questionable expression of humility about judicial competence to restructure
business practices. All three observations marginalize the equal achievement
aim.
The fear of quotas-a central issue in the debate about equality--operates
at a number of levels to undermine efforts at collective justice. At a visceral
level, the phrase is emotionally loaded, harking back to times when Americans,

oblivious to our national history, shut out foreign immigrants and deprived even
its native born ethnic minorities of opportunities in education, industry and society.4 28 The contemporary fear that floors designed to assure minimum proporfocuses "the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity
to demonstrate pretext."). See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1981); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977).
425. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
426. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 ("This rule conforms with the usual method for allocating
persuasion and production burdens in the federal courts, see Fed. Rule Evid. 301.").
427. Equal opportunity is the historically determinative and prevailing social ethic. In other
words, it
implies prior acceptance of an already established social-moral order. Thus, the doctrine
is, indirectly, very conservative. It enlists the support for established patterns of values. It
encourages change and growth... but mainly along the lines of tendency already apparent
and approved in a given society. . . . It does not advance alternatives to the existing
pattern.
Schaar, supra note 386, at 230. The equal opportunity model is, in sum, the product of our earliest
drives. In contrast, the equal achievement model that disparate impact theory reflects jeopardizes
the individualistic conception that underlies equal opportunity.
428. The use of quotas as a curb on immigration is, of course, still with us. We are speaking of a
more pernicious practice: the use of quotas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as
part of a nativist plan to minimize foreigners whose presence might somehow taint American culture. The whole topic is brilliantly described and analyzed in J. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE
LAND: PATERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (1974). Certain groups, having labored
under quotas that prevented full participation in American society, view quotas not as floors that
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tional representation in America's cultural and social life will turn to ceilings
that deprive otherwise qualified members of society from rightful participation
haunts entire segments of the body politic. Even without the anxiety-producing
transformation of floors into ceilings, the dreaded quota strikes at a level that
pierces to the core of the collective justice model which disparate impact could
help realize. Quotas and their twin, "reverse" discrimination, imperil equal opportunity. If, to satisfy a quota, a qualified member of the dominant white male
community must step aside for a black or woman who emerges as marginally
less qualified, the existing hierarchy appears besieged. A white's freedom to
enter into a contract as he chooses and his freedom from government interference in the market for his labor are undermined. Quite apart from whether the
implementation of the quota itself violates Title VII, the "established pattern of
values" that the equal opportunity idea serves undergoes change. By engaging

the neutrality principle, the Court can affect at least the rate of change.
The Court cannot remain entirely neutral in all employment decisions;
Congress prohibited that institutional posture when it passed Title VII twentyfive years ago. But successive majorities can determine how much evidence is
enough to enlist its support. The new majority declines to find liability "on the
basis of less evidence than is required to prove intentional discrimination." 429
But the notion that impact recovery somehow requires "less evidence" than
either mode of disparate treatment recovery is difficult to fathom.
In the first place, the prima facie showing that a practice has disproportionate adverse impact is more rigorous, especially after the new strictures of Watson
and Wards Cove, than the individual plaintiff's evidence of disparate treatment.
The McDonnell Douglas plaintiff eliminates only the absence of a vacancy and
his own lack of minimum qualifications and interest as explanations for his rejection.430 All other explanations remain alive, and the law's judgment that the
real reason must have been discriminatory intent depends on a large measure of
speculation and inference. The need for inference is not eliminated even when
the plaintiff reveals the employer's stated legitimate reason as pretext by demonstrating its lack of plausibility. 43 1 This demonstration negates only one additional possible explanation for the employer's decision; it does not affirmatively
point to discriminatory intent as the culprit.
By contrast, the Court tells us as a formal matter that the impact case does
not require proof of employer intent. 432 We must take the Court at face value
assure something like proportional participation, but as ceilings beyond which participation is foreclosed. It is not surprising, for instance, that the organized American Jewish community has generally opposed affirmative action. See, Wasserstrom, supra note 333, at 581 n.1. The dilemma for
liberal Jews is discussed in A. VORSPAN, JEWISH CULTURAL VALUES AND SOCIAL CRISIS- A
CASE OOK FOR SOCIAL ACTION 96-102 (1974).

429. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988). That Wards Cove sub-

scribes to this principle is the necessary conclusion one draws from its ratification of Justice
O'Connor's new procedural scheme, the effect of which is to require more proof from - or at least
increased burdens on - the plaintiff. See supra text accompanying note 151.
430. See supra texts accompanying notes 38-39 and note 38.
431. See supra text accompanying note 231.
432. Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2119; see text accompanying note 196.
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on this if impact attacks on neutral practices are to serve any meaningful independent function. 4 33 The plaintiff's probandum in such cases is simply that a
particular practice that derailed her own chances to secure an employment benefit also caused a significant disproportionate impact on her group. Even before
Watson and Wards Cove, plaintiffs attacking a neutral practice generally were
required to demonstrate a prima facie link between the challenged practice and
adverse group impact through statistical evidence that generated a much higher
degree of confidence about that link than the McDonnell Douglas showing ever
yielded about unlawful motive. Is it really true, then, that the impact plaintiff
sneaks by with "less evidence" than, say, a class attempting to prove systemic
disparate treatment? The answer depends on whether we take into account the
conceptual nub of plaintiff's proof and the practical consequences of a plaintiff's
victory in the two kinds of cases. Systemic treatment plaintiffs seek to paint a
much more dire picture than plaintiffs complaining about the impact of a particular practice. Systemic treatment plaintiffs allege that the employer routinely
discriminated against an entire group through a variety of formal policies and
practices or the aggregate of individual supervisory or managerial decisions. If
they prevail, moreover, relief flows to all class members who sought but failed to
attain the employment level at which the class has proved gross underrepresentation. By contrast, impact recovery is limited to plaintiffs who suffered
an employment detriment from the particular practice shown statistically to
have adversely impacted their group. Both conceptually and practically, therefore, systemic treatment plaintiffs should be required to offer "more evidence"
than those who restrict their challenge to particular neutral practices.
The Court's "less evidence" conclusion, then, is perhaps better understood
as the reflection of an unexpressed assumption about the judiciary's obligations
to the employer and society. The assumption seems to be that the courts should
remain neutral, thereby respecting the employer's freedom to contract with
whom it pleases, in the absence of powerful evidence of some form of discrimination that in common understanding is culpable. The hostility to impact theory
always has been rooted in the perception that it is simply unfair to hold the latest
discriminator liable when the real "but-for" malefactor is society at large.
In this sense, the less evidence injunction serves as a metaphor for the liberty interests once protected by due process. It is as if the Court were saying:
An interest countervailing the evil of stratification produced by our
society is our devotion to individual liberty. It is unfair to hold the
employer liable if there is doubt about its contribution to the disproportionate adverse impact of its practices. In such cases we will not
encroach on that freedom without the functional equivalent of direct
proof of subjective bad faith.
Put otherwise, the Court prefers to preserve the defendant's freedom of contract
rather than commit the "false positive" error that favors the victim. This freedom is the bedrock underlying the Court's stated reluctance to restructure ex433. See supra text following note 124.
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isting business practices, unless "'mandated to do so by Congress.' -434 For the
Court, the focus of impact analysis on redress of historic group disadvantage
challenges the market's premise that "individual opportunity has little relation
to class or group background." 435
2. Price Waterhouse: A Minimalist Concept of Disparate Treatment
If Watson and Wards Cove sought to reel in impact analysis for fear of
uncontrollable assaults on employer freedom of contract and chariness about
joining the judiciary as an antagonist in that battle, Price Waterhouse presented
an opportunity to reaffirm the prevailing equal opportunity model. On its surface, the case was nothing more than an individual disparate treatment dispute,
the sort least threatening to the common-law baseline of individual freedom.
Beneath the surface, however, were deep-seated issues that called upon the new
conservative majority to reveal the extent of its willingness to eliminate sexism

from the workforce at the upper echelons that direct American enterprise. Of

course, because there was no majority opinion, the future of Price Waterhouse is
not entirely clear. If, however, one adds to Justice O'Connor's position the dissenters' and Justice White's, even this more favored proof mode lacks a bright

future, at least when mixed motives are involved. The majority appears just as
committed to neutrality, common-law distributions and inaction here as in the
disparate impact context.

The opinions of Justice O'Connor and the dissenters reflect the neutrality
and inaction baselines in these respects: the presumption of good faith the employer enjoys even after plaintiff satisfies the requirement of the circumstantial
prima facie case; the need for "direct evidence" of impermissible motives in the
mixed motive case; and the disdain for evidence of stereotyping as a form of

thought control.
The tension between the settled doctrine that holds the employer liable on
the basis of the highly inferential prima facie case (where, for example, the employer refuses to defend or proffers an excuse that the court deems illegitimate)
and Justice O'Connor's assertion that, notwithstanding the prima facie case, the
employer retains a presumption of good faith,4 36 gives reason to wonder whether
the Court will abandon the McDonnell Douglas model altogether. Justice
O'Connor's direct evidence requirement may reflect nothing more than the thinness of plaintiff's prima facie case of inferential disparate treatment. 437 Alternatively, however, she insists that henceforth the burden shift in mixed motive
cases must be predicated on testimonial or documentary evidence that in some
mysterious way provides immediate access to the material fact of discrimination. 4 38 That requirement significantly reduces the likelihood of recovery and
434. Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 999 (1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1981)).
435. Horwitz, supra note 52, at 609.
436. See supra text accompanying notes 293-96.
437. See supra text accompanying note 313.
438. See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1803-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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reflects a desire to preserve employer freedom in the absence of the most effective evidence that can possibly be brought to bear on an issue of discrimination-evidence that is notoriously elusive.4 39
The desire for the most effective proof possible also explains Justices
O'Connor's and Kennedy's attitudes toward stereotypes. Justice O'Connor's insensitivity to this issue is evident in her conclusion that references to "a lady
candidate" might be perfectly neutral; in and of itself, it has no probative value
on intent. 440 Although a single similar reference may not support a change in
the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion, the reference to a "lady candidate" can be
genuinely neutral only when the employer alludes to gender in referring to all
candidates or never refers to gender at all. Only then will gender cease to be a
factor that diverts attention from the critical inquiry: the measurement of an
individual's value as a productive, efficient employee.
The disdain that Justice Kennedy indulges for stereotyping evidence, however, runs to the heart of the matter. Title VII is not to be used "[to] root[ ] out
sexist thoughts" 441 or, as Justice O'Connor quoted, as a "thought control"
bill.442 The alleged attack on management's thought process conjures up all
types of negative images associated with the communist threat that defined our
cultural reaction during the Cold War.44 3 It also suggests two more immediate
premises: that Congress had no intention of changing the thinking of individual
employers and that it is not the Court's place to affect management's personal
taste for prejudice. The Court's only role is to redress the result of that prejudice, and then only if all the conceivable evidence available proves its existence.
These conclusions explain Justice Kennedy's resolution that Title VII neither
requires the employer to disclaim reliance on stereotypical comments nor imposes a duty on management to be sensitive to the presence of stereotypes in the
decision making process.
Title VII was part of a package whose plain import was to influence thinking, to affect our national morality, to make distasteful the nation's appetite for
and tolerance of prejudice. The characterization of Title VII as a "thought control bill" came from an opponent of the bill who used his considerable rhetorical
4" Senator Case
skills and all the devices at his disposal in an effort to kill it.
responded prescriptively: "We try to persuade [the discriminator], to show him
445
where he is wrong, to get him to do voluntarily what he should be doing."
Legal restraints that influence thought trench on the negative conception of
individual autonomy. Yet one need not countenance government efforts at gen439.
440.
441.
442.

See supra text accompanying note 319.
Price Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See supra text accompanying note 362.
Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting 110 CONO. REC.

7254 (1964)).
443. See generally T. Blumoff, Popular Fiction and the Creation of a Cold War Consensus,
1943-52, at 1-8 (1976) (unpublished doctoral thesis on file in the offices of the NORTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW) (discussing George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-four).
444. 110 CONG. REc. 7254 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
445. Id.
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uine thought control to recognize the legitimacy of government efforts to diminish the incidence of racism and sexism in America. Invoking cold war rhetoric
to justify these cramped decisions can be explained without reference to deleterious motives only if one looks to different conceptions of the economy and the
Court's place within it. In Price Waterhouse, as in Watson and Wards Cove, the
Court sought to minimize, to the considerable extent that its own rules of procedure and evidence permitted, government interference with common-law distribution of jobs and job benefits.
Two generations ago, Justice Douglas recorded the tendency of courts to

make significant changes in prevailing notions about the law, and then, under
the rubric of "astute political management," to "proclaim that no change is underway."' 44 6 It is now a commonplace that procedural rules are manipulated to
effect such change,447 though they purport to leave substance unaffected. As
Professor McCormick observed, the allocation of burdens of proof and the use of

presumptions can serve as a means of "handicapping a disfavored contention." 448 A new conservative majority, wedded to employer control of the mar-

ket place, has seized on the technique of burden allocation to impede both
principal proof modes of Title VII.449
The Court's predisposition to abstain from interference with the market
draws sustenance from recent economic thinking about discrimination and legislation aimed against it. For example, it is asserted that employment discrimina-

tion of the "statistical" or "effects" variety may be "efficient." '450 To the degree
that legal rules are designed to foster efficiency, this view recommends a rela-

tively unfriendly judicial reception for claims of disparate impact. 45 1 Further,
even to the extent that discrimination is inefficient

-

the conventional wisdom

about animus-based discrimination like disparate treatment4 5 2 - the standard
model assumes that over time a free market will drive out invidiously discrimi-

natory employers more effectively than government regulation. 453 It is perhaps
446. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 754 (1949), quoted in Belton, supra note
14, at 1209 n.15.
447. Professor Belton noted almost a decade ago that issues of proof were becoming the "battleground upon which some judges are attempting to repudiate the disparate impact theory of discrimination." Belton, supra note 14, at 1209.
448. MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 337, at 950.
449. For a related recent example see Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 109 S.
Ct. 2854, 2871 n.5 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority, in order to defeat the
immunity provided by § 4(f)(2) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-34 (1988), improperly placed persuasion burden on plaintiff to show employer's actual discriminatory intent in adopting benefit plans with age-discriminatory provisions).
450. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 513, 519 (1987).
See Donahue, FurtherThoughts On Employment DiscriminationLegislation: A Reply To Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 523, 532 (1987).
451. Professor Donahue argues that even if statistical discrimination is "profit-maximizing for
the firm," it may be "inefficient for society as a whole" since it will discourage minority members
from investing in their own "human capital." Donahue, supra note 450, at 532-33. He concludes
that although prohibiting this kind of discrimination "may be inefficient in the short run, it may be
efficient in the long run." Id.
452. G. BECKER, supra note 28, at 15; Donahue, supra note 450, at 531.
453. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 108-115 (1962); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 27.1 (3d ed. 1986). Professor Donahue, taking issue with this view, contends

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

not entirely coincidental, then, that a Court committed to a neutral stance vis-Avis private business arrangements has viewed Title VII so skeptically, and regulation of arguably efficient "statistical" discrimination even more so.
VII.
A.

PROPOSALS AND VETOED LEGISLATION

Proposals

1. Impact
Since its inception, Title VII has been the battleground over competing conceptions of equality. If the legislation's only function is to justify differences
based on race or gender, treatment analysis will suffice. If, on the other hand, it
exists to redress the structural problems 454 that are the legacy of our peculiar
institutions, Congress clearly has the authority to do so455 by shoring up the
case of disparate impact. Three measures are in order.
Congress could start to revivify the impact case by recasting the nature and
quantum of the employer justification that will overcome a statistically reliable
prima facie case of disproportionate adverse impact. The employer should be
called on to do more than offer evidence that its practice "significantly serves"
virtually any business goal. 4 56 That Wards Cove description disrespects the
strength of the neutral practice/adverse impact prima facie case, especially as it
has been fortified by the recent requirements of identification, causation and
quantification. 457 The impact plaintiff proves much more, prima facie, than the
plaintiff who shows individual disparate treatment. A practice or test that discriminates in fact should be justified only if it correlates with "important elements of work behavior, '4 3 and then only if the correlation is manifest, rather
than merely significant. 459
that antidiscrimination legislation eliminates discriminators more rapidly than the free market.
Donahue, supranote 450, at 523-24; Donahue, Is Title VIIEfficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411, 1430

(1986). Judge Posner does not explicitly challenge that assertion but argues that the costs of speeding up the eradication process through regulation may outweigh the savings. Posner, supra note 450,
at 519.
454. See C. MACKiNNON, supra note 323, at 101-06.
455. The Court's conclusion in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976), that it would
"await legislative prescription" before holding that impact alone was sufficient to find an equal pro-

tection violation, suggests that Congress can more fully enforce the commands of the equal protec-

tion clause. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (rejecting a facial challenge to a set aside
scheme in federal contracts under the "Minority Business Enterprise" provision of the Public Works

Employment Act of 1977, § 105(f)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6705(f)(2) (West 1983)); see generally Sager,

FairMeasure The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212
(1978) (arguing that Supreme Court, because of institutional concerns, has failed to enforce some
provisions of the Constitution to their full conceptual boundaries).

456. See supra text accompanying notes 208-09.
457. See supra texts accompanying notes 115-23 (Watson) and 200-04 (Wards Cove).
458. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2607.4(c)
(1975) (current version at 29 C.F.R. 1607 (1989)).

459. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 402 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). We stress that we are not suggesting a return to the misguided enthusiasm of the earlier decisions that required the employer to
demonstrate that its practice was "necessary" to a business goal. Still less do we propose that "necessity" be defined, as it once was, to mean essential to both safety and efficiency. That would cause
the impact defense to resemble the bona fide occupational qualification defense to a facially discrimi-

natory policy or expressly discriminatory conduct, unfairly to the employer. Further, the necessity
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Congress could further resuscitate the impact case by again placing on the

employer the risk of nonpersuasion as to the importance of its goal and the role
of its practice in achieving that goal. For burden shifting purposes, the post-

Wards Cove prima facie impact case has more in common with the powerful
statistical systemic disparate treatment case, where the employer does assume a
persuasion burden on justification, than with the inferential and anecdotal case
of individual disparate treatment, which represents the analogy adopted by the

Court. It plainly seems an instance of judicial overkill to require the plaintiff,
even aided by discovery, to demonstrate the unimportance to the employer of
the goal the employer has cited, or to bear the onus of demonstrating the ab-

sence of a strong link between the employer's chosen practice and that goal.
Last, lesser discriminatory alternatives should suffice to rebut even when

they entail more than de minimis incremental cost or inconvenience. While it is
difficult to quantify what level of burden is tolerable for the corresponding re-

duction in adverse impact, the Court's approach effectively removes lesser discriminatory alternatives from the calculus. Further, the employer should carry
the persuasion burden on this issue. With the relaxed version of the defense
decreed by Wards Cove, it is reasonable to place the persuasion burden on the

party with the greatest information about alternatives, the employer. Requiring
it to show persuasively that an alternative proposed by the plaintiff is not as

effective as its chosen practice is little to ask of a party who has had only to
produce evidence that its own practice "significantly" serves some undefined

business goal.
2. Treatment
Even if impact analysis is to wither before its work is done,4 6° the Court
itself should restore disparate treatment to its earlier vigor. The straightforward

equal opportunity conception advanced by disparate treatment furthers an individual's basic right to participate in the market as fully as she is able.4 61 By
enforcing the disparate treatment concept in a way that maximizes nondiscrimistandard would relieve the plaintiff of the burden it has consistently carried since Griggs and Albemarle tb propose less discriminatory alternatives. See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
460. The impetus for impact recovery lay in a desire to ameliorate the lingering consequences of
structural economic disparities that weighed heavily on racial minorities. An exhaustive recent
study by the National Research Council reports that one-third of the people of color in the United
States still live below the poverty level. NATIONAL RESEARCH COuNcIL, A COMMON DEsINY:
BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 3 (1989). Similar statistics appear in R. FARLEY & W. ALLEN,
THE COLOR LINE AND THE QuALrry OF LwE IN AMERICA 55 (1987), and Hutchinson, Indiana
Dworkin and Law's Empire, 96 YALE L.J. 637, 662-64 (1987).
Moreover, wages associated with the low-skilled jobs in which those people are concentrated,
measured in constant dollars, actually declined between 1969 and 1986. NATIONAL RESEARCH
COuNCIL, supra, at 8. This was a period almost entirely spanned by the reign of Griggs and the
principle of adverse impact. It is as if the underlying structural economic problems were immune to
remedies that serve the rest of the economy. The study concluded that there was a "divergence
between social principle and individual practice" and that "at the core of black-white relations is a
dynamic tension between many whites' expectations of American institutions and their expectations
of themselves." Id. at 5. That tension is at the core of America's belief system and it is not altogether surprising that the same tension is the motive force behind the dismantling of Title VII's
impact case.
461. Schaar, supra note 386, at 242.
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natory entry, the Court does no more than express faith in its own baselines.
Two measures should suffice.
First, the employer should assume the "same decision" burden when the
plaintiff proves by any mode, direct or inferential, that intentional discrimination played a part in the adverse employment decision. The employer should
not escape this obligation whenever a trial court can characterize plaintiff's
prima facie case as less than "substantial." The critical point is that even when
she employs the inferential mode approved by McDonnell Douglas and Burdine,
the plaintiff does not demonstrate intentional discrimination until well after the
presentation of the prima facie case, usually by discharging her own burden to
persuade that the employer's stated legitimate reason is pretextual. Such evidence of intentional discrimination is sufficiently reliable to require the employer
to demonstrate that it would have taken the adverse employment action independent of the discriminatory factor.
Second, the "same decision" test itself should be modified to better reflect
the ideal of nondiscriminatory treatment. To ask if the employer would have
made the same decision absent a proven hostile motive presupposes a world free
from prejudice, a world that Title VII assumes does not exist. A more realistic
test would ask whether the employer would have made the same decision had
the candidate been a member of the group most heavily represented in the atissue job category. Phrasing the issue in that manner would encourage the employer to retain genuine records about all employees and could improve produc46 2
tivity by ridding the economy of prejudicial standards.
B.

Legislation

In order to "provide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation
for victims of discrimination," the Civil Rights Act of 1990463 "respond[s] to the
Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring the civil rights protections that
were dramatically limited by those decisions."'464 The Act is sweeping in scope,
tackling crucial liability and remedy issues under Title VII as well as other statutes providing for the protection of civil rights.4 65 Here we discuss only the
462. It has been suggested that the Wards Cove insistence on better prima facie statistical evidence linking practice and effect will similarly spur employers to maintain better records about the
impact of subjective neutral practices. Barrett, supra note 128, at 189-90.
463. S.2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNr. RFc. S9966 (daily ed. July 15, 1990) (President
Bush vetoed the Act on Oct. 22, 1990; the Senate failed by one vote to override the veto on Oct. 24,

1990).

464. Id. at § 2(b)(2) and (1), respectively.
465. For example, § 12 overturns the Supreme Court's Patterson decision, see supra text accompanying notes 8-11, by providing that the right secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to "make and enforce
contracts" reaches ongoing terms and conditions of employment and dismissal, not just contract

formation. Section 6, a response to Martin v. Wilks, 109 S.Ct. 2180 (1989), sharply limits challenges to practices that implement consent judgments and orders resolving employment discrimina-

tion claims by persons who had notice of and a reasonable opportunity to object during the
underlying proceeding. Section 7 generally enlarges the Title VII statute of limitations; in particular,
by overruling Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 109 S.Ct. 2261 (1989), it assures that claims of
persons attacking the application of intentionally discriminatory seniority systems are not time

barred before such systems affect them personally. Section 8 for the first time affords jury trials,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages for claims of intentional discrimination under Title
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provisions that address the Price Waterhouse mixed motives problem and the
Wards Cove approach to disparate impact under Title VII.
Section 5 of the Act clarifies that "an unlawful employment practice is established" when the plaintiff "demonstrates" that a prohibited consideration
"was a contributing factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also contributed to such practice.'" 4 6 The defendant may then avoid liability for reinstatement, promotion, or damages if it "establishes that it would have
' 467
taken the same action in the absence of any discrimination.

The key consequence, we believe, is to confirm the plurality's approach in
Price Waterhouse by placing the "same decision" burden of persuasion on the
employer whenever the plaintiff "demonstrates" (elsewhere defined to mean
"meets the burdens of production and persuasion") 46 that the consideration of

a forbidden criterion infected "any" employment practice. There are no "substantial evidence" or "direct evidence" preconditions to this required employer
showing of the kind outlined in the concurring and dissenting opinions. Indeed,

in one respect the Act goes further than the plurality. It authorizes injunctive
relief whenever the employee proves her employer partially discriminated; a successful "same decision" showing merely relieves the employer from affirmative
orders and monetary relief."6 9 In sum, these provisions ringingly reaffirm and
expand the statute's core concern with disparate treatment.
Congress's attempt in sections 3 and 4 to revive the disparate impact case
by countering the Court's decision in Wards Cove 470 is notably less successful.
The bill makes no attempt to identify the required magnitude of the plaintiff's
showing of disparate impact,47 1 despite Justice O'Connor's strong suggestion in
Watson, 472 echoed by Justice White in Wards Cove,473 that the EEOC's 80%
VII, as well as under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Section 9 strikes language from
§ 701(k) of Title VII which the Court in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), read as relieving
defendants of liability to prevailing plaintiffs for certain statutory attorneys' fees under the "offer of
judgment" provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68; precludes the compulsory waiver of
those fees by settlement, a practice the Court approved in Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986); and
allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover "expert fees and other litigation expenses" contrary to the
apparent majority view in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
466. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a), 136 CONG. REc. S9966 (daily ed. July 15, 1990)
(adding Title VII § 7030), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1)).
467. Id. at § 5*) (amending Title VII § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1972)).
468. Id. at § 3(m) (adding Title VII § 701(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (1972)).
469. The first sentence of § 5(b) of the Act amends Title VII § 706(g) so as to include the "same
decision" showing as a circumstance that relieves the employer of liability for hiring, reinstatement,
promotion, or backpay. The second sentence provides that "damages" are available "only for injury
that is attributable to the unlawful employment practice." Id. at § 5(b).
The Pice Waterhouse plurality, in contrast, specifically held that an employer who made the
"same decision" showing had not committed an unlawful employment practice at all. PKce
Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1787 n.10. Presumably, the employer was therefore not subject to an
injunction.
470. In different language, both the House and Senate bills observe that the extensive definitional
subsections added to § 701 of Title VII by § 3 of the Act are designed to codify Griggs and overrule
Wards Cove. Id. at § 3(m).
471. It states only that an unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established prima facie when a plaintiff "demonstrates that an employment practice results in a disparate
impact." Id. at § 4 (adding Title VII § 703(k)(1)(A)).
472. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
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measure was infirm. This issue is thus left for restrictive revision by a Court
conspicuously hostile to the disparate impact theory.
The Act purports to free up the prima facie case by providing that plaintiffs
may demonstrate the disparate impact of a group or combination of practices
without having to prove the disparate impact of the specific practices included
within the group. 4 74 An exception, however, threatens to swallow this rule.
The plaintiff is required to isolate the impact of specific practices "if the court
finds" that the plaintiff "can identify, from records or other information of the
respondent reasonably available (through discovery or otherwise), which specific
practice or practices contributed to the disparate impact." 47 5 While this provision may induce some defendants to be more forthcoming in discovery than they
otherwise might be - to convince the trial court that records exist from which
plaintiffs might ascertain the effect of particular practices - it may also simply
further complicate discovery. On balance, then, it is unclear that the Act significantly alters the prima facie impact case as it stands after Wards Cove.
Congress did address the employer justification question, a primary impetus
for the legislation and the focus of greatest controversy during Congressional
deliberations. Under the Act, plaintiff's proof of the disparate impact of a practice or group of practices establishes an unlawful employment practice if the
defendant "fails to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity."' 476 "Business necessity," in turn, is defined to mean, in the case of selection practices, that "the practice or group of practices must bear a significant
relationship to successful performance of the job." "Demonstrates" demands
4 77
persuasion as well as production.

While these provisions, by placing the risk of nonpersuasion on the defendant, obviously do treat the employer justification as an affirmative defense, the
nature of the defense is little changed from Wards Cove. It is not apparent how
evidence of a "significant relationship to successful performance of the job" is
any more rigorous than evidence that the challenged practice "servenl, in a significant way, the legitimate goals of the employer. '4 7 8 Certainly a "significant"
relationship between the practice and the job or business 479 is less exacting than
a "manifest" link between the practice and "important elements"4 80 of a job.
The main rallying cry of Congressional opponents of the Act was that the new
473. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
474. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 4, 136 CONG. REc. S9966-67 (adding new Title VII
§ 703(k)(1)(B)(i)).
475. Id. at § 4 (adding new Title VII §§ 703(k)(1)(B)(i) and (iii)).

476. Id. (adding Title VII § 703(k)(1)(A)).
477. Id. at § 3 (adding Title VII §§ 701(o) and (m), respectively, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(o) and

(M)).
478. See supra text accompanying note 209. True, the quoted statutory test focuses on traits
particular to the job, rather than the employer's entire business. But an alternative statutory test for

"employment practices that do not involve selection" closely tracks the Wards Cove formulation in
requiring evidence that the practice bear "a significant relationship to a significant business objective
of the employer." S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3, 136 CONG. REc. S9966 (daily ed. July 15,
1990) (adding Title VII subsection 701(o)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(o)(1)(B)).
479. See supra note 478.
480. See supra note 459 and accompanying text.
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impact defense would be so difficult to maintain that employers would resort to

quota hiring to forestall impact litigation. In fact, the new "significant relationship" justification is less stringent in nature, and no more stringent in quantum,
that prevailed during
than most formulations of the business necessity defense
48 1
the eighteen years between Griggs and Wards Cove.

Employers will thus presumably be as able to defend prima facie cases of
adverse impact under the new Act as they were before Wards Cove. The plain-

tiff's potential rebuttal of less discriminatory alternatives therefore remains vital.
As noted above, Wards Cove severely vitiated that rebuttal by insisting that addi-

tional cost may prevent the alternative practice from being considered as "effective" as the employer's own. Yet on this critical point, as on who should bear
the persuasion burden, the Act is silent. 482 The impact case is consequently
even weaker under the most recent amendments to Title VII than it was before

the Reagan Court's latest round of decisions.
We can conclude, then, that the Act modestly liberalizes the prima facie
impact case by permitting attacks on combinations of practices. Not only is this
4 84
4 83
it may prove unimportant in practice.
change theoretically questionable,

By contrast, except for returning the persuasion burden on business justification
to the employer, the Act only trivially alters the employer's defense and leaves

untouched the plaintiff's rebuttal, features of the impact case so badly crippled
by Wards Cove.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In one sense it is surprising that legislation so largely inspired by outrage in
the civil rights community over the Court's dismemberment of the impact case
in Watson and Wards Cove would do so little to revive it. It is equally surpris-

ing, given the same community's warm reception of Price Waterhouse, that the
Act's prime contribution may turn out to be the enlargement of the circumstances permitting a "burden shift" to the employer in mixed motive disparate
treatment cases. On reflection, however, these results might have been pre-

dicted. Equal opportunity, the motive force behind American antidiscrimina481. See supra text accompanying notes 84-90.
482. In fact, the House bill, H.R. 4000, noted that the plaintiff could overcome the business
justification defense if she "demonstrates that a different employment practice or group of employment practices with less disparate impact would serve the respondent as well." § 4, proposing to add
Title VII § 703(k)(l)(B)(iii)(II). By using the defined term "demonstrates" the House thus takes
note, without quarrel, of the plaintiff's persuasion burden. Even more importantly, this provision
says nothing about the relationship between cost and the effectiveness of an alternative practice.
That the House was not intending to disturb Wards Cove on this issue is suggested by its observation
that the definitional provisions in § 3 of the Act are intended to overrule only "the treatment of
business necessity as a defense in Wards Cove." The conference committee managers recommend
retaining the House bill's reference to less discriminatory alternatives in proposed § 703(k)(1)(B)(iii)
(II), asserting only that it expresses a test that "governed before the decision in Wards Cove and is
restored by this legislation." Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, paragraph 4 (9/25/90). It is hard to see how a test that limits alternatives to those that serve the employer's needs "as well" as the employer's original, chosen practice restores anything. Indeed it
ratifies the "equality as effective" notion of Wards Cove.
483. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
484. See supra text following note 127.
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tion legislation and the disparate treatment theory, is still the prodigal son; equal
achievement, the theoretical fuel for disparate impact, remains at best a troublesome stepchild.

